T1036 CrowdStrike LogScale · LogScale

Detect Masquerading in CrowdStrike LogScale

Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names. Renaming abusable system utilities to evade security monitoring is also a form of Masquerading.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Defense Evasion
Technique
T1036 Masquerading
Canonical reference
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/

LogScale Detection Query

CrowdStrike LogScale (LogScale)
cql
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| ImageFileName = /(?i)(svchost|csrss|lsass|services|smss|wininit|winlogon|explorer|spoolsv|taskhost|taskhostw|conhost|dllhost|RuntimeBroker)\.exe$/
| ImageFileName != /(?i)^\\Device\\HarddiskVolume[0-9]+\\Windows\\System32\\/
| ImageFileName != /(?i)^\\Device\\HarddiskVolume[0-9]+\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\/
| ImageFileName != /(?i)^\\Device\\HarddiskVolume[0-9]+\\Windows\\WinSxS\\/
| ImageFileName != /(?i)^\\Device\\HarddiskVolume[0-9]+\\Windows\\explorer\.exe$/
| regex(field=ImageFileName, regex="(?i)(?P<binary_name>[^\\\\]+)$")
| table([@timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, ImageFileName, binary_name, CommandLine, ParentImageFileName, ParentCommandLine, TargetProcessId, ContextProcessId])
| sort(field=@timestamp, order=desc)
high severity high confidence

Detects masqueraded Windows system binaries in CrowdStrike Falcon telemetry by matching process image names against known system binary list and excluding legitimate device paths under Windows system directories.

Data Sources

CrowdStrike Falcon Sensor (Windows)CrowdStrike LogScale (Humio)

Required Tables

ProcessRollup2

False Positives & Tuning

  • CrowdStrike Falcon sensor self-tests or prevention policy simulations that launch processes from non-standard paths to validate detection coverage
  • Windows installer packages that temporarily extract and execute system binaries from %TEMP% directories during in-place upgrade sequences
  • Antivirus or DLP quarantine processes that relocate suspect files including binaries matching system name patterns before remediation
Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1036


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Masquerade as svchost.exe from Temp Directory

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=%TEMP%\svchost.exe, OriginalFileName=Cmd.Exe. Security Event ID 4688 with NewProcessName containing svchost.exe in a temp directory. Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate for svchost.exe in temp.

  2. Test 2Masquerade as lsass.exe from User Profile

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=%APPDATA%\lsass.exe, OriginalFileName=NOTEPAD.EXE. The OriginalFileName mismatch is a key indicator.

  3. Test 3Masquerade as explorer.exe from Downloads

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image in Downloads folder, OriginalFileName mismatch. File creation event for explorer.exe in Downloads.

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Response PlaybookInvestigation GuideHunting QueriesAtomic Red Team TestsTuning Guidance

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