Detect NTDS in Sumo Logic CSE
Adversaries extract credentials from the Active Directory domain database NTDS.dit, located at %SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit on domain controllers. The file contains all domain user password hashes. Methods include: ntdsutil.exe (used by APT28, Sandworm, Volt Typhoon, LAPSUS$, APT41), Volume Shadow Copy plus copy, esentutl.exe, secretsdump.py, and Invoke-NinjaCopy. The SYSTEM registry hive is also required for decryption. Used by virtually every major threat group and all ransomware operators. Highest-impact credential theft technique — compromises the entire domain at once.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Credential Access
- Technique
- T1003 OS Credential Dumping
- Sub-technique
- T1003.003 NTDS
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/003/
Sumo Detection Query
_sourceCategory="Windows/EventLogs" OR _sourceCategory="Sysmon"
| where EventID = "1" OR EventID = "4688"
| json field=_raw "EventData.Image" as process_image nodrop
| json field=_raw "EventData.CommandLine" as commandline nodrop
| json field=_raw "EventData.User" as username nodrop
| json field=_raw "EventData.Computer" as hostname nodrop
| where (
(matches(toLowerCase(process_image), "*ntdsutil.exe*") and (
matches(toLowerCase(commandline), "*ifm*") or
matches(toLowerCase(commandline), "*install from media*") or
matches(toLowerCase(commandline), "*create full*") or
matches(toLowerCase(commandline), "*ac i ntds*") or
matches(toLowerCase(commandline), "*activate instance ntds*")
)) or
matches(toLowerCase(commandline), "*ntds.dit*") or
matches(toLowerCase(commandline), "*secretsdump*") or
matches(toLowerCase(commandline), "*drsuapi*") or
matches(toLowerCase(commandline), "*dcsync*") or
matches(toLowerCase(commandline), "*ninja*copy*") or
(matches(toLowerCase(process_image), "*esentutl.exe*") and (
matches(toLowerCase(commandline), "*ntds*") or
matches(toLowerCase(commandline), "*shadow*")
))
)
| eval dump_method = if(matches(toLowerCase(process_image), "*ntdsutil*"), "NtdsUtil-IFM",
if(matches(toLowerCase(commandline), "*secretsdump*") or matches(toLowerCase(commandline), "*drsuapi*"), "SecretsDump",
if(matches(toLowerCase(commandline), "*dcsync*"), "DCSync",
if(matches(toLowerCase(process_image), "*esentutl*"), "ESENTUtil-Copy",
if(matches(toLowerCase(commandline), "*ntds.dit*"), "DirectCopy", "Other")))))
| fields _messagetime, hostname, username, process_image, commandline, dump_method
| sort by _messagetime descDetects NTDS.dit credential extraction attempts on Windows domain controllers by analysing Sysmon Event ID 1 and Windows Security Event ID 4688 process creation logs. Identifies ntdsutil IFM, VSS-based copies, secretsdump, DCSync, and esentutl extraction methods.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Scheduled backup jobs on domain controllers using ntdsutil IFM for authorised AD backups
- Domain controller cloning or virtualisation snapshots referencing NTDS.dit paths
- Security health-check scripts referencing NTDS.dit for integrity verification
Other platforms for T1003.003
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Create NTDS IFM Backup via ntdsutil
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for ntdsutil.exe with CommandLine containing 'ac i ntds' and 'create full'. Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate for ntds.dit and other database files in C:\AtomicTest_NTDS. Security Event ID 4688 for ntdsutil.exe.
- Test 2Copy NTDS.dit via Volume Shadow Copy
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: vssadmin.exe with 'create shadow'. Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate for atomic_ntds.dit. Sysmon Event ID 1: copy/xcopy/robocopy commands accessing ntds.dit path. System Event Log: VSS service events (8193/8194).
- Test 3DCSync via Mimikatz lsadump::dcsync
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for mimikatz.exe with 'lsadump::dcsync' in CommandLine. Security Event ID 4662 on the DC: DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All access rights for the mimikatz-running account. Network Event ID 3 for LDAP connections to DC.
References (6)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/003/
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Active_Directory
- http://adsecurity.org/?p=1275
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.003/T1003.003.md
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/ntds.dit-enumeration
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/get-started/virtual-dc/virtualized-domain-controller-architecture
Unlock Pro Content
Get the full detection package for T1003.003 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.