Detect NTDS in Microsoft Sentinel
Adversaries extract credentials from the Active Directory domain database NTDS.dit, located at %SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit on domain controllers. The file contains all domain user password hashes. Methods include: ntdsutil.exe (used by APT28, Sandworm, Volt Typhoon, LAPSUS$, APT41), Volume Shadow Copy plus copy, esentutl.exe, secretsdump.py, and Invoke-NinjaCopy. The SYSTEM registry hive is also required for decryption. Used by virtually every major threat group and all ransomware operators. Highest-impact credential theft technique — compromises the entire domain at once.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Credential Access
- Technique
- T1003 OS Credential Dumping
- Sub-technique
- T1003.003 NTDS
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/003/
KQL Detection Query
let NtdsutilAccess = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName =~ "ntdsutil.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any (
"ifm", "install from media", "create full",
"ac i ntds", "activate instance ntds"
)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine;
let SecretsDumpNTDS = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("ntds.dit", "secretsdump", "drsuapi", "dcsync")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine;
let VSSCopyNTDS = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "vssadmin.exe", "esentutl.exe", "robocopy.exe", "xcopy.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_all ("ntds", "dit") or ProcessCommandLine has_all ("shadow", "ntds")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine;
let DCSync = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemotePort == 389 or RemotePort == 636 or RemotePort == 3268
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("powershell.exe", "cmd.exe", "python.exe", "python3.exe")
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("dcsync", "drsuapi", "secretsdump")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine;
union NtdsutilAccess, SecretsDumpNTDS, VSSCopyNTDS, DCSync
| sort by Timestamp descDetects NTDS.dit credential extraction via four vectors: (1) ntdsutil.exe with IFM (install from media) commands, (2) secretsdump/DCSync commands, (3) file copy operations targeting ntds.dit via VSS or esentutl, and (4) network connections from scripting interpreters to domain controller LDAP ports with DCSync-related command patterns.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Authorized AD database backups using ntdsutil IFM for RODC provisioning or disaster recovery testing
- AD synchronization tools (Azure AD Connect, FIM/MIM) using DRSUAPI for legitimate directory synchronization
- Automated DR testing scripts that create NTDS backups per approved runbooks
- IT operations using Volume Shadow Copy for routine AD backup (check against authorized backup windows)
Other platforms for T1003.003
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Create NTDS IFM Backup via ntdsutil
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for ntdsutil.exe with CommandLine containing 'ac i ntds' and 'create full'. Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate for ntds.dit and other database files in C:\AtomicTest_NTDS. Security Event ID 4688 for ntdsutil.exe.
- Test 2Copy NTDS.dit via Volume Shadow Copy
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: vssadmin.exe with 'create shadow'. Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate for atomic_ntds.dit. Sysmon Event ID 1: copy/xcopy/robocopy commands accessing ntds.dit path. System Event Log: VSS service events (8193/8194).
- Test 3DCSync via Mimikatz lsadump::dcsync
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for mimikatz.exe with 'lsadump::dcsync' in CommandLine. Security Event ID 4662 on the DC: DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All access rights for the mimikatz-running account. Network Event ID 3 for LDAP connections to DC.
References (6)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/003/
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Active_Directory
- http://adsecurity.org/?p=1275
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.003/T1003.003.md
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/ntds.dit-enumeration
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/get-started/virtual-dc/virtualized-domain-controller-architecture
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