node-opcua Namespace-Level RBAC Fail-Open, Anonymous Write/Call Bypass (CVE-2026-95860)
Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-95860, a fail-open authorization flaw in node-opcua (>= 2.42.0, < 2.180.0). An operator can configure a restrictive namespace default with setDefaultRolePermissions and rely on inheritance, but the runtime enforcement path does not read that configured default for nodes without explicit per-node RolePermissions. The check resolves to null and is treated permissively, so anonymous or low-privilege OPC UA sessions can perform Write and Call (method invocation) operations on nodes that should require the configured role permissions. Fixed in version 2.180.0. Detection focuses on OPC UA server telemetry and surrounding host/network signals: anonymous session establishment followed by Write/Call service requests, node-opcua version exposure, and successful writes/method calls from sessions lacking authenticated role grants.
Vulnerability Intelligence
Public PoCAffected Software
- Vendor
- npm
- Product
- node-opcua, node-opcua-address-space, node-opcua-server
- Versions
- >= 2.42.0, < 2.180.0
Timeline
- Disclosed
- November 10, 2026
References & Proof of Concept
- https://github.com/node-opcua/node-opcua/security/advisories/GHSA-xggf-m53x-jc3f
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-95860
- https://github.com/node-opcua/node-opcua/pull/1580
- https://github.com/node-opcua/node-opcua/commit/0261e873900800983c622e01120f484dc6063698
- https://github.com/node-opcua/node-opcua/releases/tag/v2.180.0
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xggf-m53x-jc3f
CVSS
What is CVE-2026-95860 node-opcua Namespace-Level RBAC Fail-Open, Anonymous Write/Call Bypass (CVE-2026-95860)?
node-opcua Namespace-Level RBAC Fail-Open, Anonymous Write/Call Bypass (CVE-2026-95860) (CVE-2026-95860) maps to the Privilege Escalation and Impact and Lateral Movement tactics — the adversary is trying to gain higher-level permissions in MITRE ATT&CK.
This page provides production-ready detection logic for node-opcua Namespace-Level RBAC Fail-Open, Anonymous Write/Call Bypass (CVE-2026-95860), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Syslog, Linux application logs, node-opcua server logs. The queries below are rated high severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.
MITRE ATT&CK
// df00tech DF00-3e48c45978 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-95860 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
// Anonymous OPC UA session performing privileged Write/Call against node-opcua server
let opcuaSvc = dynamic(["WriteRequest","CallRequest","Write","Call"]);
Syslog
| where Facility in~ ("local0","daemon","user") or ProcessName has_cs "node"
| where SyslogMessage has "opcua" or SyslogMessage has "OPC UA"
| extend SessionIsAnon = SyslogMessage has_any ("Anonymous","anonymous","AnonymousIdentityToken")
| extend Service = extract(@"(WriteRequest|CallRequest|\bWrite\b|\bCall\b)", 1, SyslogMessage)
| where isnotempty(Service)
| where SessionIsAnon
| extend NodeId = extract(@"(ns=\d+;[isgb]=[^\s,\]]+)", 1, SyslogMessage)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, HostIP, ProcessName, Service, NodeId, SessionIsAnon, SyslogMessage
| summarize WriteCallCount = count(), SampleNodes = make_set(NodeId, 10), Services = make_set(Service, 5) by Computer, HostIP, bin(TimeGenerated, 10m)
| where WriteCallCount >= 1 Flags anonymous OPC UA sessions issuing Write or Call service requests against a node-opcua server, the core exploitation behaviour for the RBAC fail-open bypass.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Legitimately public OPC UA servers that intentionally expose Anonymous Write access for read/write test endpoints.
- Load-testing or conformance tools (e.g. UaExpert, opcua-commander) running against staging servers using anonymous sessions by design.
- Development servers where anonymous access is acceptable and DefaultRolePermissions are deliberately permissive.
Query fingerprint DF00-3e48c45978 · licence
Sigma logsource & community rules
The detection logic for node-opcua Namespace-Level RBAC Fail-Open, Anonymous Write/Call Bypass (CVE-2026-95860) (CVE-2026-95860) above is provided in a vendor-neutral
form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the
following logsource:
logsource:
product: windows Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:
Platform-specific guides for CVE-2026-95860
References (6)
- https://github.com/node-opcua/node-opcua/security/advisories/GHSA-xggf-m53x-jc3f
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-95860
- https://github.com/node-opcua/node-opcua/pull/1580
- https://github.com/node-opcua/node-opcua/commit/0261e873900800983c622e01120f484dc6063698
- https://github.com/node-opcua/node-opcua/releases/tag/v2.180.0
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xggf-m53x-jc3f
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 Anonymous Write to protected node on vulnerable node-opcua server
Expected signal: OPC UA server logs record an AnonymousIdentityToken session issuing a WriteRequest to ns=1;s=Protected.
- Test 2 Anonymous method Call bypass
Expected signal: Server logs show an anonymous session issuing a CallRequest against a protected method node.
- Test 3 Enumerate node-opcua version exposure
Expected signal: Process execution of npm/node reading node-opcua package metadata.
Response Playbook
Triage
- Confirm the affected OPC UA server is running node-opcua with a version in the vulnerable range (>= 2.42.0, < 2.180.0) via `npm ls node-opcua` or the server's package.json/lockfile.
- Determine whether the flagged session used an AnonymousIdentityToken and whether the targeted namespace relied on an inherited DefaultRolePermissions default that was not enforced.
- Identify the specific NodeIds that were written to or methods that were called, and assess whether they control physical process state, configuration, or security settings.
- Correlate the source IP of the anonymous session against expected OT/engineering workstation inventory to distinguish operator activity from unauthorized access.
Containment
- Upgrade node-opcua to >= 2.180.0, which restores enforcement of a configured namespace DefaultRolePermissions default on the runtime permission-check path.
- As an interim mitigation, set restrictive per-node RolePermissions on sensitive nodes and disable AnonymousIdentityToken acceptance in the server security policy.
- Restrict network access to the OPC UA endpoint (default TCP 4840) to known engineering/SCADA hosts via firewall or segmentation until patched.
Evidence Collection
- Preserve node-opcua server logs, OPC UA audit events, and session/channel establishment records covering the suspicious Write/Call activity.
- Capture the server's namespace configuration and DefaultRolePermissions state at time of incident.
- Export before/after values of any written node attributes and the arguments passed to any invoked methods for impact analysis.
Escalation Criteria
- ! Escalate to OT/ICS incident response if written nodes or called methods affect physical process control, safety instrumented functions, or device configuration.
- ! Escalate if the anonymous Write/Call originated from an untrusted or external network segment, indicating a boundary breach rather than internal misconfiguration.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
node-opcua server session and audit logs showing AnonymousIdentityToken usage with Write/Call services. - >
OPC UA namespace configuration dump indicating a DefaultRolePermissions default that was not enforced. - >
Modified node attribute values and method invocation records on affected address-space nodes.
Tuning Guidance
Baseline which OPC UA endpoints legitimately permit anonymous access and exclude those hosts, or raise the write_call_count threshold on known test/staging servers. Where the server emits structured identity/role fields, prefer matching on sessions whose effective role lacks an explicit WriteAttribute/Call grant rather than string-matching 'Anonymous', to reduce noise from intentionally public endpoints and catch low-privilege authenticated abuse.
Hunting Queries
Hunt for anonymous OPC UA sessions performing Write or Call operations across all node-opcua servers.
// df00tech DF00-3e48c45978 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-95860 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
Syslog | where SyslogMessage has 'opcua' and SyslogMessage has_any ('Anonymous','AnonymousIdentityToken') | where SyslogMessage has_any ('WriteRequest','CallRequest','Write','Call') | project TimeGenerated, Computer, HostIP, SyslogMessage ``` df00tech DF00-3e48c45978 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-95860 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=opcua ("Anonymous" OR "AnonymousIdentityToken") ("WriteRequest" OR "CallRequest" OR "Write" OR "Call") | stats count by host, src_ip Atomic Red Team Tests
Start a node-opcua server (vulnerable version) with a namespace relying on an inherited DefaultRolePermissions default, then write to a protected node using an anonymous session.
Command
node -e "const o=require('node-opcua');(async()=>{const s=new o.OPCUAServer({port:4840});await s.initialize();const ns=s.engine.addressSpace.getOwnNamespace();const v=ns.addVariable({browseName:'Protected',dataType:'Double',nodeId:'ns=1;s=Protected'});await s.start();const c=o.OPCUAClient.create({});await c.connect('opc.tcp://localhost:4840');const sess=await c.createSession();await sess.write({nodeId:'ns=1;s=Protected',attributeId:o.AttributeIds.Value,value:{value:{dataType:o.DataType.Double,value:42}}});console.log('anonymous write attempted');await sess.close();await c.disconnect();await s.shutdown();})();" Cleanup
pkill -f 'node -e' 2>/dev/null; true Expected Telemetry
OPC UA server logs record an AnonymousIdentityToken session issuing a WriteRequest to ns=1;s=Protected.
Expected Detection
KQL/SPL rules fire on anonymous session + Write service against the node-opcua host.
Invoke a method on a protected node via an anonymous OPC UA session, exercising the Call service path of the bypass.
Command
node -e "const o=require('node-opcua');(async()=>{const c=o.OPCUAClient.create({});await c.connect('opc.tcp://localhost:4840');const sess=await c.createSession();try{await sess.call({objectId:'ns=1;s=Protected',methodId:'ns=1;s=DoAction',inputArguments:[]});}catch(e){console.log('call attempted',e.message);}await sess.close();await c.disconnect();})();" Cleanup
true Expected Telemetry
Server logs show an anonymous session issuing a CallRequest against a protected method node.
Expected Detection
Rules fire on anonymous session + Call service pattern.
Query the installed node-opcua version to confirm whether a host is in the vulnerable range.
Command
npm ls node-opcua 2>/dev/null | grep -i node-opcua || node -e "console.log(require('node-opcua/package.json').version)" Cleanup
true Expected Telemetry
Process execution of npm/node reading node-opcua package metadata.
Expected Detection
Not directly alerting; supports triage by confirming vulnerable version <2.180.0.
Related Detections
Related Techniques
Same Tactic: Privilege Escalation
Blog posts about this detection
Browse by tactic
- Reconnaissance TA0043
- Resource Development TA0042
- Initial Access TA0001
- Execution TA0002
- Persistence TA0003
- Privilege Escalation TA0004
- Stealth TA0005
- Defense Impairment TA0112
- Credential Access TA0006
- Discovery TA0007
- Lateral Movement TA0008
- Collection TA0009
- Command and Control TA0011
- Exfiltration TA0010
- Impact TA0040