Detect node-opcua Namespace-Level RBAC Fail-Open, Anonymous Write/Call Bypass (CVE-2026-95860) in Splunk
Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-95860, a fail-open authorization flaw in node-opcua (>= 2.42.0, < 2.180.0). An operator can configure a restrictive namespace default with setDefaultRolePermissions and rely on inheritance, but the runtime enforcement path does not read that configured default for nodes without explicit per-node RolePermissions. The check resolves to null and is treated permissively, so anonymous or low-privilege OPC UA sessions can perform Write and Call (method invocation) operations on nodes that should require the configured role permissions. Fixed in version 2.180.0. Detection focuses on OPC UA server telemetry and surrounding host/network signals: anonymous session establishment followed by Write/Call service requests, node-opcua version exposure, and successful writes/method calls from sessions lacking authenticated role grants.
MITRE ATT&CK
SPL Detection Query
``` df00tech DF00-3e48c45978 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-95860 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=opcua OR sourcetype="node-opcua:server" OR sourcetype="opcua:audit"
("WriteRequest" OR "CallRequest" OR "Write" OR "Call")
("Anonymous" OR "AnonymousIdentityToken" OR "anonymous")
| rex field=_raw "(?<node_id>ns=\d+;[isgb]=[^\s,\]]+)"
| rex field=_raw "(?<opc_service>WriteRequest|CallRequest|\bWrite\b|\bCall\b)"
| eval is_anon=if(match(_raw,"(?i)anonymous"),1,0)
| where is_anon=1
| stats count AS write_call_count values(node_id) AS nodes values(opc_service) AS services values(src_ip) AS src_ip by host
| where write_call_count>=1 Splunk detection for anonymous OPC UA sessions invoking Write/Call services against node-opcua, indicating RBAC fail-open abuse.
Data Sources
Required Sourcetypes
False Positives & Tuning
- Intentionally anonymous-writable OPC UA endpoints used for integration testing.
- OPC UA client conformance tools exercising Write/Call with anonymous identity by design.
- Staging servers with deliberately permissive DefaultRolePermissions.
Other platforms for CVE-2026-95860
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 Anonymous Write to protected node on vulnerable node-opcua server
Expected signal: OPC UA server logs record an AnonymousIdentityToken session issuing a WriteRequest to ns=1;s=Protected.
- Test 2 Anonymous method Call bypass
Expected signal: Server logs show an anonymous session issuing a CallRequest against a protected method node.
- Test 3 Enumerate node-opcua version exposure
Expected signal: Process execution of npm/node reading node-opcua package metadata.
References (6)
- https://github.com/node-opcua/node-opcua/security/advisories/GHSA-xggf-m53x-jc3f
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-95860
- https://github.com/node-opcua/node-opcua/pull/1580
- https://github.com/node-opcua/node-opcua/commit/0261e873900800983c622e01120f484dc6063698
- https://github.com/node-opcua/node-opcua/releases/tag/v2.180.0
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xggf-m53x-jc3f
Response Playbook
Triage
- Confirm the affected OPC UA server is running node-opcua with a version in the vulnerable range (>= 2.42.0, < 2.180.0) via `npm ls node-opcua` or the server's package.json/lockfile.
- Determine whether the flagged session used an AnonymousIdentityToken and whether the targeted namespace relied on an inherited DefaultRolePermissions default that was not enforced.
- Identify the specific NodeIds that were written to or methods that were called, and assess whether they control physical process state, configuration, or security settings.
- Correlate the source IP of the anonymous session against expected OT/engineering workstation inventory to distinguish operator activity from unauthorized access.
Containment
- Upgrade node-opcua to >= 2.180.0, which restores enforcement of a configured namespace DefaultRolePermissions default on the runtime permission-check path.
- As an interim mitigation, set restrictive per-node RolePermissions on sensitive nodes and disable AnonymousIdentityToken acceptance in the server security policy.
- Restrict network access to the OPC UA endpoint (default TCP 4840) to known engineering/SCADA hosts via firewall or segmentation until patched.
Evidence Collection
- Preserve node-opcua server logs, OPC UA audit events, and session/channel establishment records covering the suspicious Write/Call activity.
- Capture the server's namespace configuration and DefaultRolePermissions state at time of incident.
- Export before/after values of any written node attributes and the arguments passed to any invoked methods for impact analysis.
Escalation Criteria
- !Escalate to OT/ICS incident response if written nodes or called methods affect physical process control, safety instrumented functions, or device configuration.
- !Escalate if the anonymous Write/Call originated from an untrusted or external network segment, indicating a boundary breach rather than internal misconfiguration.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
node-opcua server session and audit logs showing AnonymousIdentityToken usage with Write/Call services. - >
OPC UA namespace configuration dump indicating a DefaultRolePermissions default that was not enforced. - >
Modified node attribute values and method invocation records on affected address-space nodes.
Tuning Guidance
Baseline which OPC UA endpoints legitimately permit anonymous access and exclude those hosts, or raise the write_call_count threshold on known test/staging servers. Where the server emits structured identity/role fields, prefer matching on sessions whose effective role lacks an explicit WriteAttribute/Call grant rather than string-matching 'Anonymous', to reduce noise from intentionally public endpoints and catch low-privilege authenticated abuse.
Hunting Queries
Hunt for anonymous OPC UA sessions performing Write or Call operations across all node-opcua servers.
// df00tech DF00-3e48c45978 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-95860 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
Syslog | where SyslogMessage has 'opcua' and SyslogMessage has_any ('Anonymous','AnonymousIdentityToken') | where SyslogMessage has_any ('WriteRequest','CallRequest','Write','Call') | project TimeGenerated, Computer, HostIP, SyslogMessage ``` df00tech DF00-3e48c45978 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-95860 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=opcua ("Anonymous" OR "AnonymousIdentityToken") ("WriteRequest" OR "CallRequest" OR "Write" OR "Call") | stats count by host, src_ip Atomic Red Team Tests
Start a node-opcua server (vulnerable version) with a namespace relying on an inherited DefaultRolePermissions default, then write to a protected node using an anonymous session.
Command
node -e "const o=require('node-opcua');(async()=>{const s=new o.OPCUAServer({port:4840});await s.initialize();const ns=s.engine.addressSpace.getOwnNamespace();const v=ns.addVariable({browseName:'Protected',dataType:'Double',nodeId:'ns=1;s=Protected'});await s.start();const c=o.OPCUAClient.create({});await c.connect('opc.tcp://localhost:4840');const sess=await c.createSession();await sess.write({nodeId:'ns=1;s=Protected',attributeId:o.AttributeIds.Value,value:{value:{dataType:o.DataType.Double,value:42}}});console.log('anonymous write attempted');await sess.close();await c.disconnect();await s.shutdown();})();" Cleanup
pkill -f 'node -e' 2>/dev/null; true Expected Telemetry
OPC UA server logs record an AnonymousIdentityToken session issuing a WriteRequest to ns=1;s=Protected.
Expected Detection
KQL/SPL rules fire on anonymous session + Write service against the node-opcua host.
Invoke a method on a protected node via an anonymous OPC UA session, exercising the Call service path of the bypass.
Command
node -e "const o=require('node-opcua');(async()=>{const c=o.OPCUAClient.create({});await c.connect('opc.tcp://localhost:4840');const sess=await c.createSession();try{await sess.call({objectId:'ns=1;s=Protected',methodId:'ns=1;s=DoAction',inputArguments:[]});}catch(e){console.log('call attempted',e.message);}await sess.close();await c.disconnect();})();" Cleanup
true Expected Telemetry
Server logs show an anonymous session issuing a CallRequest against a protected method node.
Expected Detection
Rules fire on anonymous session + Call service pattern.
Query the installed node-opcua version to confirm whether a host is in the vulnerable range.
Command
npm ls node-opcua 2>/dev/null | grep -i node-opcua || node -e "console.log(require('node-opcua/package.json').version)" Cleanup
true Expected Telemetry
Process execution of npm/node reading node-opcua package metadata.
Expected Detection
Not directly alerting; supports triage by confirming vulnerable version <2.180.0.