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CVE-2026-91510

CVE-2026-91510: Oracle Access Manager Authentication Engine Pre-Auth Compromise

Initial Access Privilege Escalation Last updated:

Detects exploitation attempts against CVE-2026-91510, a critical (CVSS 10.0) vulnerability in the Authentication Engine component of Oracle Access Manager (part of Oracle Fusion Middleware 12.x). The flaw is unauthenticated and network-exploitable, allowing full takeover of the OAM authentication service. Detection focuses on anomalous requests to OAM authentication endpoints (e.g. /oam/server/, /oam/CredCollectServlet, /oamfed/), crafted authentication tokens, and unexpected process/child spawning from the WebLogic/OAM managed server. Exploit status is currently theoretical; these analytics are built on the vulnerable surface and OAM access patterns rather than a confirmed PoC.

Vulnerability Intelligence

Theoretical

Timeline

Disclosed
November 17, 2026

CVSS

10.0
Critical (9.0–10)

What is CVE-2026-91510 CVE-2026-91510: Oracle Access Manager Authentication Engine Pre-Auth Compromise?

CVE-2026-91510: Oracle Access Manager Authentication Engine Pre-Auth Compromise (CVE-2026-91510) maps to the Initial Access and Privilege Escalation tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.

This page provides production-ready detection logic for CVE-2026-91510: Oracle Access Manager Authentication Engine Pre-Auth Compromise, covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: IIS Logs, Web Proxy, WAF. The queries below are rated critical severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Privilege Escalation
Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
kusto
// df00tech DF00-7dd4af5115 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-91510 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
let oamPaths = dynamic(["/oam/server/", "/oam/CredCollectServlet", "/oamfed/", "/oam/server/authentication", "/oam/server/obrareq.cgi", "/oam/server/obrar.cgi"]);
W3CIISLog
| where csUriStem has_any (oamPaths) or cs_uri_query has_any (oamPaths)
| where scStatus in (200, 302, 500) 
| where csMethod in ("POST", "GET")
| extend suspicious = iff(cs_uri_query has_any ("..", "%2e%2e", "obMyLoginUrl", "redirect_uri=http") or csUserAgent has_any ("curl", "python-requests", "java/", "nikto", "nuclei"), true, false)
| where suspicious or scStatus == 500
| summarize hits = count(), paths = make_set(csUriStem, 20), statuses = make_set(scStatus, 10) by cIP, csUserAgent, bin(TimeGenerated, 10m)
| where hits > 10
| project TimeGenerated, cIP, csUserAgent, hits, paths, statuses

Flags bursts of anomalous requests to Oracle Access Manager authentication endpoints from a single source, including traversal-style payloads, automated user agents, or server errors indicative of exploitation of the Authentication Engine.

critical severity medium confidence

Data Sources

IIS Logs Web Proxy WAF

Required Tables

W3CIISLog

False Positives

  • Legitimate SSO login surges during peak hours from corporate egress IPs
  • Monitoring and uptime probes hitting OAM endpoints on a schedule
  • Load/performance testing against the OAM managed server

Query fingerprint DF00-7dd4af5115 · licence

Sigma logsource & community rules

The detection logic for CVE-2026-91510: Oracle Access Manager Authentication Engine Pre-Auth Compromise (CVE-2026-91510) above is provided in a vendor-neutral form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the following logsource:

logsource:
  category: network_connection
  product: windows

Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Automated enumeration of OAM authentication endpoints

    Expected signal: IIS/proxy logs showing >10 requests to /oam/ endpoints from one source IP with a python-requests user agent within 10 minutes.

  2. Test 2 Traversal-style payload against OAM redirect parameter

    Expected signal: Web log entry with '..' and 'obMyLoginUrl' in the query string to an /oam/ endpoint.

  3. Test 3 Induce OAM Authentication Engine server error

    Expected signal: Repeated HTTP 500 responses from the OAM managed server logged in IIS/WebLogic logs.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm the targeted host runs Oracle Access Manager 12.x (Oracle Fusion Middleware) with the Authentication Engine exposed, and check whether the November 2026 Oracle Critical Patch Update addressing CVE-2026-91510 has been applied.
  2. Review OAM managed-server (oam_server1) and WebLogic logs for the source IP and timestamps flagged, correlating request volume, response codes (especially 500s), and any crafted authentication tokens.
  3. Determine whether the source IP is internal, a known proxy/NAT egress, or external and previously unseen; enrich with threat intel reputation.
  4. Verify whether any authentication succeeded unexpectedly or whether session/OAM tokens were issued to the suspect source.

Containment

  1. Block the offending source IP(s) at the WAF/load balancer fronting OAM and rate-limit the /oam/ authentication endpoints.
  2. If exploitation is confirmed, isolate the affected OAM managed server from the network and fail over to a patched node if available.
  3. Rotate OAM encryption keys, WebLogic admin credentials, and any potentially exposed federation/SSO secrets.

Evidence Collection

  1. Preserve OAM server logs (oam_server*-diagnostic.log), WebLogic access/audit logs, and WAF/IIS logs covering the attack window.
  2. Capture memory and a disk image of the OAM managed server if host compromise is suspected, and snapshot the OAM policy/config store.

Escalation Criteria

  • ! Escalate to incident response if any authentication succeeded for the suspect source or if OAM tokens/sessions were issued without valid credentials.
  • ! Escalate to the identity and application owners if post-exploitation indicators (unexpected child processes, outbound connections, config changes) appear on the OAM host.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • > OAM managed-server diagnostic and access logs (oam_server1-diagnostic.log)
  • > WebLogic domain audit logs and stdout/stderr for the OAM managed server
  • > WAF/IIS/proxy request logs showing payloads to /oam/ endpoints
  • > OAM session/token store entries issued during the window

Tuning Guidance

Baseline normal SSO login volume per corporate egress IP and raise the per-window thresholds accordingly. Allowlist known monitoring probes and authorized scanners by IP/user-agent. If OAM sits behind a reverse proxy, ensure the true client IP (X-Forwarded-For) is parsed so grouping is not collapsed onto the proxy address.


Hunting Queries

Surfaces source IPs generating a high proportion of 500 errors against the OAM Authentication Engine, a potential crash/exploit signal.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-7dd4af5115 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-91510 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csUriStem has "/oam/server/" | summarize req=count(), errs=countif(scStatus==500) by cIP, bin(TimeGenerated,1h) | where errs > 5
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-7dd4af5115 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-91510 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web uri_path="*/oam/server/*" | stats count AS req count(eval(status=500)) AS errs by clientip | where errs>5

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Automated enumeration of OAM authentication endpoints
linux

Simulates a scanner probing OAM Authentication Engine endpoints with an automated user agent to trigger the burst/anomalous-agent logic.

Command

bash
for p in /oam/server/ /oam/CredCollectServlet /oamfed/ /oam/server/obrareq.cgi; do for i in $(seq 1 15); do curl -s -A 'python-requests/2.31' -o /dev/null "https://oam-lab.internal${p}?test=$i"; done; done

Cleanup

bash
echo 'No persistent artifacts created by probe; no cleanup required'

Expected Telemetry

IIS/proxy logs showing >10 requests to /oam/ endpoints from one source IP with a python-requests user agent within 10 minutes.

Expected Detection

The KQL/SPL burst analytics fire on hits>10 with a scanner user agent.

Test 2 Traversal-style payload against OAM redirect parameter
linux

Sends a request with path-traversal and obMyLoginUrl manipulation to the OAM authentication endpoint to trigger the suspicious-payload branch.

Command

bash
curl -s -o /dev/null 'https://oam-lab.internal/oam/server/obrareq.cgi?obMyLoginUrl=http://evil.example/&redir=../../../../etc/passwd'

Cleanup

bash
echo 'No cleanup required; stateless request'

Expected Telemetry

Web log entry with '..' and 'obMyLoginUrl' in the query string to an /oam/ endpoint.

Expected Detection

The suspicious-payload condition in all SIEM queries matches on the traversal/obMyLoginUrl pattern.

Test 3 Induce OAM Authentication Engine server error
windows

Sends malformed authentication data to the OAM endpoint to provoke a 500 response, exercising the error-based detection branch.

Command

powershell
powershell -Command "1..12 | ForEach-Object { try { Invoke-WebRequest -UseBasicParsing -Uri 'https://oam-lab.internal/oam/server/authentication' -Method POST -Body ('%%INVALID%%' * 2000) } catch {} }"

Cleanup

powershell
powershell -Command "Write-Host 'No artifacts to clean'"

Expected Telemetry

Repeated HTTP 500 responses from the OAM managed server logged in IIS/WebLogic logs.

Expected Detection

The status=500 branch of the analytics fires when error count exceeds the window threshold.

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