Detect CVE-2026-91510: Oracle Access Manager Authentication Engine Pre-Auth Compromise in Sumo Logic CSE
Detects exploitation attempts against CVE-2026-91510, a critical (CVSS 10.0) vulnerability in the Authentication Engine component of Oracle Access Manager (part of Oracle Fusion Middleware 12.x). The flaw is unauthenticated and network-exploitable, allowing full takeover of the OAM authentication service. Detection focuses on anomalous requests to OAM authentication endpoints (e.g. /oam/server/, /oam/CredCollectServlet, /oamfed/), crafted authentication tokens, and unexpected process/child spawning from the WebLogic/OAM managed server. Exploit status is currently theoretical; these analytics are built on the vulnerable surface and OAM access patterns rather than a confirmed PoC.
MITRE ATT&CK
Sumo Detection Query
// df00tech DF00-7dd4af5115 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-91510 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
_sourceCategory=*iis* OR _sourceCategory=*oam* OR _sourceCategory=*proxy*
| parse regex "(?<method>\w+)\s(?<url>\S+)\sHTTP" nodrop
| where url matches "*/oam/server/*" or url matches "*/oam/CredCollectServlet*" or url matches "*/oamfed/*"
| if(url matches "*..*" or url matches "*obMyLoginUrl*" or useragent matches "*nuclei*" or useragent matches "*python-requests*", 1, 0) as suspicious
| where suspicious = 1 or status = "500"
| timeslice 10m
| count as hits, values(url) as paths by src_ip, useragent, _timeslice
| where hits > 10 Sumo Logic query clustering anomalous OAM authentication endpoint requests by source IP, surfacing traversal payloads, scanner user agents, and server errors.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Peak-hour legitimate SSO authentication volume
- Uptime and synthetic monitoring
- Approved penetration testing traffic
Other platforms for CVE-2026-91510
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 Automated enumeration of OAM authentication endpoints
Expected signal: IIS/proxy logs showing >10 requests to /oam/ endpoints from one source IP with a python-requests user agent within 10 minutes.
- Test 2 Traversal-style payload against OAM redirect parameter
Expected signal: Web log entry with '..' and 'obMyLoginUrl' in the query string to an /oam/ endpoint.
- Test 3 Induce OAM Authentication Engine server error
Expected signal: Repeated HTTP 500 responses from the OAM managed server logged in IIS/WebLogic logs.
Response Playbook
Triage
- Confirm the targeted host runs Oracle Access Manager 12.x (Oracle Fusion Middleware) with the Authentication Engine exposed, and check whether the November 2026 Oracle Critical Patch Update addressing CVE-2026-91510 has been applied.
- Review OAM managed-server (oam_server1) and WebLogic logs for the source IP and timestamps flagged, correlating request volume, response codes (especially 500s), and any crafted authentication tokens.
- Determine whether the source IP is internal, a known proxy/NAT egress, or external and previously unseen; enrich with threat intel reputation.
- Verify whether any authentication succeeded unexpectedly or whether session/OAM tokens were issued to the suspect source.
Containment
- Block the offending source IP(s) at the WAF/load balancer fronting OAM and rate-limit the /oam/ authentication endpoints.
- If exploitation is confirmed, isolate the affected OAM managed server from the network and fail over to a patched node if available.
- Rotate OAM encryption keys, WebLogic admin credentials, and any potentially exposed federation/SSO secrets.
Evidence Collection
- Preserve OAM server logs (oam_server*-diagnostic.log), WebLogic access/audit logs, and WAF/IIS logs covering the attack window.
- Capture memory and a disk image of the OAM managed server if host compromise is suspected, and snapshot the OAM policy/config store.
Escalation Criteria
- !Escalate to incident response if any authentication succeeded for the suspect source or if OAM tokens/sessions were issued without valid credentials.
- !Escalate to the identity and application owners if post-exploitation indicators (unexpected child processes, outbound connections, config changes) appear on the OAM host.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
OAM managed-server diagnostic and access logs (oam_server1-diagnostic.log) - >
WebLogic domain audit logs and stdout/stderr for the OAM managed server - >
WAF/IIS/proxy request logs showing payloads to /oam/ endpoints - >
OAM session/token store entries issued during the window
Tuning Guidance
Baseline normal SSO login volume per corporate egress IP and raise the per-window thresholds accordingly. Allowlist known monitoring probes and authorized scanners by IP/user-agent. If OAM sits behind a reverse proxy, ensure the true client IP (X-Forwarded-For) is parsed so grouping is not collapsed onto the proxy address.
Hunting Queries
Surfaces source IPs generating a high proportion of 500 errors against the OAM Authentication Engine, a potential crash/exploit signal.
// df00tech DF00-7dd4af5115 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-91510 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csUriStem has "/oam/server/" | summarize req=count(), errs=countif(scStatus==500) by cIP, bin(TimeGenerated,1h) | where errs > 5 ``` df00tech DF00-7dd4af5115 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-91510 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web uri_path="*/oam/server/*" | stats count AS req count(eval(status=500)) AS errs by clientip | where errs>5 Atomic Red Team Tests
Simulates a scanner probing OAM Authentication Engine endpoints with an automated user agent to trigger the burst/anomalous-agent logic.
Command
for p in /oam/server/ /oam/CredCollectServlet /oamfed/ /oam/server/obrareq.cgi; do for i in $(seq 1 15); do curl -s -A 'python-requests/2.31' -o /dev/null "https://oam-lab.internal${p}?test=$i"; done; done Cleanup
echo 'No persistent artifacts created by probe; no cleanup required' Expected Telemetry
IIS/proxy logs showing >10 requests to /oam/ endpoints from one source IP with a python-requests user agent within 10 minutes.
Expected Detection
The KQL/SPL burst analytics fire on hits>10 with a scanner user agent.
Sends a request with path-traversal and obMyLoginUrl manipulation to the OAM authentication endpoint to trigger the suspicious-payload branch.
Command
curl -s -o /dev/null 'https://oam-lab.internal/oam/server/obrareq.cgi?obMyLoginUrl=http://evil.example/&redir=../../../../etc/passwd' Cleanup
echo 'No cleanup required; stateless request' Expected Telemetry
Web log entry with '..' and 'obMyLoginUrl' in the query string to an /oam/ endpoint.
Expected Detection
The suspicious-payload condition in all SIEM queries matches on the traversal/obMyLoginUrl pattern.
Sends malformed authentication data to the OAM endpoint to provoke a 500 response, exercising the error-based detection branch.
Command
powershell -Command "1..12 | ForEach-Object { try { Invoke-WebRequest -UseBasicParsing -Uri 'https://oam-lab.internal/oam/server/authentication' -Method POST -Body ('%%INVALID%%' * 2000) } catch {} }" Cleanup
powershell -Command "Write-Host 'No artifacts to clean'" Expected Telemetry
Repeated HTTP 500 responses from the OAM managed server logged in IIS/WebLogic logs.
Expected Detection
The status=500 branch of the analytics fires when error count exceeds the window threshold.