Todoist MCP Server DNS Rebinding Data Tampering (CVE-2026-76807)
Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-76807, a DNS rebinding vulnerability (CWE-346 Origin Validation Error / CWE-350 Reliance on Reverse DNS Resolution) in the @doist/todoist-mcp npm package (Model Context Protocol server) at versions <= 10.3.2. The local MCP server binds an HTTP listener on localhost without validating the HTTP Origin/Host header, so a malicious website visited in the user's browser can use DNS rebinding to re-point a hostname it controls to 127.0.0.1 and issue authenticated requests to the local MCP server. This lets arbitrary web pages invoke Todoist MCP tools (create/update/delete tasks, projects and comments) using the victim's stored Todoist API token. Detection focuses on inbound HTTP requests to the local MCP listener bearing cross-site Origin headers, non-loopback or unexpected Host headers resolving to loopback, and anomalous task-mutation tool invocations originating from browser-driven traffic. Remediation: upgrade to @doist/todoist-mcp v10.3.3 or later (PR #516 / commit 245bf29), which adds Origin/Host allowlisting.
Based on GHSA-833v-v58w-294h, Todoist MCP Server DNS rebinding advisory
Vulnerability Intelligence
Public PoCAffected Software
- Vendor
- npm
- Product
- @doist/todoist-mcp
- Versions
- <= 10.3.2
Timeline
- Disclosed
- November 19, 2026
References & Proof of Concept
- https://github.com/Doist/todoist-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-833v-v58w-294h
- https://github.com/todoist/todoist-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-833v-v58w-294h
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76807
- https://github.com/todoist/todoist-mcp/pull/516
- https://github.com/todoist/todoist-mcp/commit/245bf29cf5dbd8272e2aa896ad38557f91f8a16a
- https://github.com/todoist/todoist-mcp/releases/tag/v10.3.3
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-833v-v58w-294h
CVSS
What is CVE-2026-76807 Todoist MCP Server DNS Rebinding Data Tampering (CVE-2026-76807)?
Todoist MCP Server DNS Rebinding Data Tampering (CVE-2026-76807) (CVE-2026-76807) maps to the Initial Access and Impact tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.
This page provides production-ready detection logic for Todoist MCP Server DNS Rebinding Data Tampering (CVE-2026-76807), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, DeviceNetworkEvents, DeviceProcessEvents. The queries below are rated high severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Initial Access Impact
// df00tech DF00-dddf09f50e · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-76807 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
// Inbound HTTP to local Todoist MCP listener with cross-site Origin / rebound Host
let mcpPorts = dynamic(["3000","8080","8000","5173"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where ActionType in ("InboundConnectionAccepted", "ConnectionAccepted", "ListeningConnectionCreated")
| where LocalIP in ("127.0.0.1", "::1")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node.exe", "node", "npm.exe", "npx.exe")
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("todoist-mcp", "@doist/todoist-mcp")
| where tostring(LocalPort) in (mcpPorts) or RemoteIP !in ("127.0.0.1", "::1")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, LocalIP, LocalPort, RemoteIP, RemotePort, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc Flags inbound connections to the Node-hosted Todoist MCP server on loopback that originate from non-loopback peers or on the HTTP tool port, consistent with a browser reaching the local server via DNS rebinding. Correlate with web proxy logs for the triggering Origin.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Legitimate MCP client (Claude Desktop, IDE extension) connecting over loopback to the Todoist MCP server
- Local developer testing the MCP HTTP endpoint with curl or a REST client
- Security scanners probing localhost ports during authorized vulnerability assessments
Query fingerprint DF00-dddf09f50e · licence
Sigma logsource & community rules
The detection logic for Todoist MCP Server DNS Rebinding Data Tampering (CVE-2026-76807) (CVE-2026-76807) above is provided in a vendor-neutral
form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the
following logsource:
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:
Platform-specific guides for CVE-2026-76807
References (7)
- https://github.com/Doist/todoist-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-833v-v58w-294h
- https://github.com/todoist/todoist-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-833v-v58w-294h
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76807
- https://github.com/todoist/todoist-mcp/pull/516
- https://github.com/todoist/todoist-mcp/commit/245bf29cf5dbd8272e2aa896ad38557f91f8a16a
- https://github.com/todoist/todoist-mcp/releases/tag/v10.3.3
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-833v-v58w-294h
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 DNS rebinding cross-site request to local MCP listener
Expected signal: Inbound HTTP connection to 127.0.0.1:3000 served by the node todoist-mcp process with a non-localhost Origin/Host header.
- Test 2 Unauthorized task mutation via MCP tool call
Expected signal: MCP server log entry for a tools/call create_task invocation correlated with a cross-site Origin inbound request.
- Test 3 Windows loopback MCP probe with external Host header
Expected signal: DeviceNetworkEvents inbound connection to 127.0.0.1:3000 from the browser/powershell process with external Host header.
Response Playbook
Triage
- Confirm whether the host runs @doist/todoist-mcp and determine its installed version (npm ls @doist/todoist-mcp or inspect the MCP client config); versions <= 10.3.2 are vulnerable.
- Inspect the flagged HTTP request's Origin and Host headers; a non-localhost Origin or a Host that is an external domain resolving to 127.0.0.1 strongly indicates DNS rebinding exploitation.
- Correlate the timestamp with the user's browser history / web proxy logs to identify the website that triggered the request.
- Review MCP server logs for task/project/comment mutation tool invocations (create_task, delete_task, update_task, etc.) occurring in the same window.
Containment
- Immediately stop the Todoist MCP server process and remove its HTTP listener until patched.
- Upgrade @doist/todoist-mcp to v10.3.3 or later, which enforces Origin/Host validation.
- Rotate the Todoist API token stored in the MCP configuration, as it may have been abused by the malicious site.
Evidence Collection
- Capture the full HTTP request headers (Origin, Host, Referer) and body of the flagged requests from proxy or packet capture.
- Export MCP server logs and the Node process command line and configuration file containing the API token reference.
- Snapshot the Todoist account's recent activity/audit log to enumerate unauthorized task/project changes.
Escalation Criteria
- ! Escalate to IR if MCP logs confirm unauthorized data-mutation tool calls were executed against the user's Todoist account.
- ! Escalate if the triggering domain is attacker-controlled or the same pattern is observed across multiple hosts, indicating a targeted campaign.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
MCP server HTTP access logs showing requests with external Origin/Host headers - >
Browser history and cache entries for the domain that performed the rebinding - >
Todoist account audit log entries for unauthorized create/update/delete operations - >
Node process command line and MCP configuration file referencing the Todoist API token
Tuning Guidance
Enumerate the exact port the Todoist MCP server binds in your environment and constrain the port list accordingly to cut noise. Allowlist the Origin/Host values used by your sanctioned MCP clients (e.g., http://localhost:<port>) so only non-localhost origins alert. If the MCP server runs over stdio rather than HTTP it is not exposed to this vector and can be excluded. After upgrading all hosts to v10.3.3+, lower severity or retire the rule.
Hunting Queries
Hunt for loopback MCP traffic whose peer or Host header is not localhost, indicating rebinding-driven cross-site access to the local Todoist MCP server.
// df00tech DF00-dddf09f50e · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-76807 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
DeviceNetworkEvents | where LocalIP in ("127.0.0.1","::1") | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "todoist-mcp" | where RemoteIP !in ("127.0.0.1","::1") | summarize count() by DeviceName, RemoteIP, LocalPort ``` df00tech DF00-dddf09f50e · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-76807 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=* sourcetype="stream:http" dest_ip="127.0.0.1" | rex field=http_header "(?i)Host:\s*(?<req_host>\S+)" | where NOT match(req_host,"(?i)^(localhost|127\.0\.0\.1)") | stats count by req_host, dest_port Atomic Red Team Tests
Simulates a browser-origin cross-site request to the local Todoist MCP HTTP endpoint by sending a request with an external Origin header to loopback.
Command
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/mcp -H 'Origin: http://attacker.example.com' -H 'Host: rebind.attacker.example.com' -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/list"}' Cleanup
echo 'no persistent changes created by this test' Expected Telemetry
Inbound HTTP connection to 127.0.0.1:3000 served by the node todoist-mcp process with a non-localhost Origin/Host header.
Expected Detection
KQL/SPL rules fire on the cross-site Origin to the loopback MCP port.
Invokes a Todoist data-mutation MCP tool over the local HTTP endpoint with a spoofed external Origin to emulate data tampering.
Command
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/mcp -H 'Origin: https://evil.test' -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"create_task","arguments":{"content":"rebind-poc"}}}' Cleanup
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/mcp -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":3,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"delete_task","arguments":{"query":"rebind-poc"}}}' || true Expected Telemetry
MCP server log entry for a tools/call create_task invocation correlated with a cross-site Origin inbound request.
Expected Detection
Rules flag the mutation tool call arriving with a non-localhost Origin on the loopback listener.
Sends a PowerShell HTTP request to the local MCP listener with a rebound external Host header on Windows.
Command
powershell -Command "Invoke-WebRequest -Uri 'http://127.0.0.1:3000/mcp' -Method POST -Headers @{Origin='http://attacker.example.com'; Host='rebind.attacker.example.com'} -Body '{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"method\":\"tools/list\"}' -ContentType 'application/json' -UseBasicParsing" Cleanup
Write-Output 'no cleanup required' Expected Telemetry
DeviceNetworkEvents inbound connection to 127.0.0.1:3000 from the browser/powershell process with external Host header.
Expected Detection
KQL rule matches the loopback MCP connection with non-localhost origin.
Related Detections
Tactic Hubs
Related Techniques
Same Tactic: Initial Access
Browse by tactic
- Reconnaissance TA0043
- Resource Development TA0042
- Initial Access TA0001
- Execution TA0002
- Persistence TA0003
- Privilege Escalation TA0004
- Stealth TA0005
- Defense Impairment TA0112
- Credential Access TA0006
- Discovery TA0007
- Lateral Movement TA0008
- Collection TA0009
- Command and Control TA0011
- Exfiltration TA0010
- Impact TA0040