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CVE-2026-76807 Elastic Security · Elastic

Detect Todoist MCP Server DNS Rebinding Data Tampering (CVE-2026-76807) in Elastic Security

Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-76807, a DNS rebinding vulnerability (CWE-346 Origin Validation Error / CWE-350 Reliance on Reverse DNS Resolution) in the @doist/todoist-mcp npm package (Model Context Protocol server) at versions <= 10.3.2. The local MCP server binds an HTTP listener on localhost without validating the HTTP Origin/Host header, so a malicious website visited in the user's browser can use DNS rebinding to re-point a hostname it controls to 127.0.0.1 and issue authenticated requests to the local MCP server. This lets arbitrary web pages invoke Todoist MCP tools (create/update/delete tasks, projects and comments) using the victim's stored Todoist API token. Detection focuses on inbound HTTP requests to the local MCP listener bearing cross-site Origin headers, non-loopback or unexpected Host headers resolving to loopback, and anomalous task-mutation tool invocations originating from browser-driven traffic. Remediation: upgrade to @doist/todoist-mcp v10.3.3 or later (PR #516 / commit 245bf29), which adds Origin/Host allowlisting.

Based on GHSA-833v-v58w-294h, Todoist MCP Server DNS rebinding advisory

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Impact

Elastic Detection Query

Elastic Security (Elastic)
eql
// df00tech DF00-dddf09f50e · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-76807 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
network where destination.ip in ("127.0.0.1", "::1") and
  process.name in ("node", "node.exe", "npm", "npx") and
  destination.port in (3000, 8080, 8000, 5173) and
  (source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and source.ip != "::1" or http.request.referrer != null)
high severity medium confidence

Matches network events to the loopback MCP listener served by a Node process on the known MCP HTTP ports where the source is not loopback or a cross-site referrer is present, indicating DNS-rebinding-driven access.

Data Sources

Elastic Defend network eventsPacketbeat HTTP

Required Tables

logs-endpoint.events.network-*packetbeat-*

False Positives & Tuning

  • Sanctioned MCP client connecting to the local server
  • Packetbeat recording legitimate developer HTTP calls to localhost
  • Other Node services reusing one of the monitored ports

Other platforms for CVE-2026-76807


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 DNS rebinding cross-site request to local MCP listener

    Expected signal: Inbound HTTP connection to 127.0.0.1:3000 served by the node todoist-mcp process with a non-localhost Origin/Host header.

  2. Test 2 Unauthorized task mutation via MCP tool call

    Expected signal: MCP server log entry for a tools/call create_task invocation correlated with a cross-site Origin inbound request.

  3. Test 3 Windows loopback MCP probe with external Host header

    Expected signal: DeviceNetworkEvents inbound connection to 127.0.0.1:3000 from the browser/powershell process with external Host header.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm whether the host runs @doist/todoist-mcp and determine its installed version (npm ls @doist/todoist-mcp or inspect the MCP client config); versions <= 10.3.2 are vulnerable.
  2. Inspect the flagged HTTP request's Origin and Host headers; a non-localhost Origin or a Host that is an external domain resolving to 127.0.0.1 strongly indicates DNS rebinding exploitation.
  3. Correlate the timestamp with the user's browser history / web proxy logs to identify the website that triggered the request.
  4. Review MCP server logs for task/project/comment mutation tool invocations (create_task, delete_task, update_task, etc.) occurring in the same window.

Containment

  1. Immediately stop the Todoist MCP server process and remove its HTTP listener until patched.
  2. Upgrade @doist/todoist-mcp to v10.3.3 or later, which enforces Origin/Host validation.
  3. Rotate the Todoist API token stored in the MCP configuration, as it may have been abused by the malicious site.

Evidence Collection

  1. Capture the full HTTP request headers (Origin, Host, Referer) and body of the flagged requests from proxy or packet capture.
  2. Export MCP server logs and the Node process command line and configuration file containing the API token reference.
  3. Snapshot the Todoist account's recent activity/audit log to enumerate unauthorized task/project changes.

Escalation Criteria

  • !Escalate to IR if MCP logs confirm unauthorized data-mutation tool calls were executed against the user's Todoist account.
  • !Escalate if the triggering domain is attacker-controlled or the same pattern is observed across multiple hosts, indicating a targeted campaign.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • >MCP server HTTP access logs showing requests with external Origin/Host headers
  • >Browser history and cache entries for the domain that performed the rebinding
  • >Todoist account audit log entries for unauthorized create/update/delete operations
  • >Node process command line and MCP configuration file referencing the Todoist API token

Tuning Guidance

Enumerate the exact port the Todoist MCP server binds in your environment and constrain the port list accordingly to cut noise. Allowlist the Origin/Host values used by your sanctioned MCP clients (e.g., http://localhost:<port>) so only non-localhost origins alert. If the MCP server runs over stdio rather than HTTP it is not exposed to this vector and can be excluded. After upgrading all hosts to v10.3.3+, lower severity or retire the rule.


Hunting Queries

Hunt for loopback MCP traffic whose peer or Host header is not localhost, indicating rebinding-driven cross-site access to the local Todoist MCP server.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-dddf09f50e · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-76807 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
DeviceNetworkEvents | where LocalIP in ("127.0.0.1","::1") | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "todoist-mcp" | where RemoteIP !in ("127.0.0.1","::1") | summarize count() by DeviceName, RemoteIP, LocalPort
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-dddf09f50e · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-76807 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=* sourcetype="stream:http" dest_ip="127.0.0.1" | rex field=http_header "(?i)Host:\s*(?<req_host>\S+)" | where NOT match(req_host,"(?i)^(localhost|127\.0\.0\.1)") | stats count by req_host, dest_port

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 DNS rebinding cross-site request to local MCP listener
linux

Simulates a browser-origin cross-site request to the local Todoist MCP HTTP endpoint by sending a request with an external Origin header to loopback.

Command

bash
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/mcp -H 'Origin: http://attacker.example.com' -H 'Host: rebind.attacker.example.com' -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/list"}'

Cleanup

bash
echo 'no persistent changes created by this test'

Expected Telemetry

Inbound HTTP connection to 127.0.0.1:3000 served by the node todoist-mcp process with a non-localhost Origin/Host header.

Expected Detection

KQL/SPL rules fire on the cross-site Origin to the loopback MCP port.

Test 2 Unauthorized task mutation via MCP tool call
linux

Invokes a Todoist data-mutation MCP tool over the local HTTP endpoint with a spoofed external Origin to emulate data tampering.

Command

bash
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/mcp -H 'Origin: https://evil.test' -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"create_task","arguments":{"content":"rebind-poc"}}}'

Cleanup

bash
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:3000/mcp -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":3,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"delete_task","arguments":{"query":"rebind-poc"}}}' || true

Expected Telemetry

MCP server log entry for a tools/call create_task invocation correlated with a cross-site Origin inbound request.

Expected Detection

Rules flag the mutation tool call arriving with a non-localhost Origin on the loopback listener.

Test 3 Windows loopback MCP probe with external Host header
windows

Sends a PowerShell HTTP request to the local MCP listener with a rebound external Host header on Windows.

Command

powershell
powershell -Command "Invoke-WebRequest -Uri 'http://127.0.0.1:3000/mcp' -Method POST -Headers @{Origin='http://attacker.example.com'; Host='rebind.attacker.example.com'} -Body '{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"method\":\"tools/list\"}' -ContentType 'application/json' -UseBasicParsing"

Cleanup

powershell
Write-Output 'no cleanup required'

Expected Telemetry

DeviceNetworkEvents inbound connection to 127.0.0.1:3000 from the browser/powershell process with external Host header.

Expected Detection

KQL rule matches the loopback MCP connection with non-localhost origin.

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