Homer homer-app Authentication Bypass via Empty JWT Secret (CVE-2026-62253)
Detects exploitation and exposure of CVE-2026-62253, an authentication bypass in the sipcapture homer-app (HEP/QoS capture UI for VoIP). When coordinator.jwt.secret is empty (the default), the JWT middleware is skipped and the protected API endpoints under /api/v1, /api/v3, and /api/v4 require no authentication. An unauthenticated attacker can read and write all configuration, users, database connections, and stored VoIP call data. This detection surfaces anomalous API access to homer-app endpoints (/api/v3/*), access that succeeds with little or no preceding authentication traffic, use of forged, none-algorithm, or empty-signature JWTs, and configuration indicators of the vulnerable default. Fixed in commit 5e90809657c9 / release 11.0.283 (version >= 0.0.0-20260625093330-5e90809657c9).
Vulnerability Intelligence
Public PoCAffected Software
- Vendor
- go
- Product
- github.com/sipcapture/homer-app
- Versions
- < 0.0.0-20260625093330-5e90809657c9
Weakness (CWE)
Timeline
- Disclosed
- October 7, 2026
References & Proof of Concept
- https://github.com/sipcapture/homer/security/advisories/GHSA-rqcc-94gv-wjm9
- https://github.com/sipcapture/homer/pull/839
- https://github.com/sipcapture/homer/commit/5e90809657c9df321db191a69c6050f873f5646b
- https://github.com/sipcapture/homer/releases/tag/11.0.283
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rqcc-94gv-wjm9
CVSS
What is CVE-2026-62253 Homer homer-app Authentication Bypass via Empty JWT Secret (CVE-2026-62253)?
Homer homer-app Authentication Bypass via Empty JWT Secret (CVE-2026-62253) (CVE-2026-62253) maps to the Initial Access and Privilege Escalation and Credential Access tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.
This page provides production-ready detection logic for Homer homer-app Authentication Bypass via Empty JWT Secret (CVE-2026-62253), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: IIS Logs, Reverse Proxy Logs, Web Server Logs. The queries below are rated critical severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.
MITRE ATT&CK
// df00tech DF00-5bbfd794a9 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-62253 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
let homerPaths = dynamic(["/api/v3/auth", "/api/v3/user", "/api/v3/search", "/api/v3/admin", "/api/v3/agent"]);
W3CIISLog
| where csUriStem startswith "/api/v3/"
| extend AuthHeader = tostring(column_ifexists("csAuthorization", ""))
| where (csMethod in ("GET","POST","PUT","DELETE")) and scStatus in (200, 201, 204)
| extend JwtPart = extract(@"[Bb]earer\s+([A-Za-z0-9_\-\.]+)", 1, AuthHeader)
| extend JwtHeaderB64 = tostring(split(JwtPart, ".")[0])
| extend JwtSig = tostring(split(JwtPart, ".")[2])
| where isnotempty(JwtPart) and (JwtSig == "" or base64_decodestring(JwtHeaderB64) has "\"alg\":\"none\"")
| project TimeGenerated, cIP, csUriStem, csMethod, scStatus, AuthHeader, sIP
| sort by TimeGenerated desc Flags successful authenticated requests to homer-app /api/v3 endpoints where the presented JWT has an empty signature or an alg:none header, the hallmark of an empty-secret bypass token.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Legitimate administrators using a reverse proxy that strips or rewrites the Authorization header, producing truncated JWT fields.
- Security scanners and health-check probes that intentionally send malformed Authorization headers.
- Internal integration services using service accounts whose tokens are proxied in a non-standard format.
Query fingerprint DF00-5bbfd794a9 · licence
Sigma logsource & community rules
The detection logic for Homer homer-app Authentication Bypass via Empty JWT Secret (CVE-2026-62253) (CVE-2026-62253) above is provided in a vendor-neutral
form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the
following logsource:
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:
Platform-specific guides for CVE-2026-62253
References (5)
- https://github.com/sipcapture/homer/security/advisories/GHSA-rqcc-94gv-wjm9
- https://github.com/sipcapture/homer/pull/839
- https://github.com/sipcapture/homer/commit/5e90809657c9df321db191a69c6050f873f5646b
- https://github.com/sipcapture/homer/releases/tag/11.0.283
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rqcc-94gv-wjm9
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 Access homer-app API with no credential
Expected signal: Web/proxy log entry for GET /api/v3/user with no Authorization header and a 200 response from an unauthenticated source.
- Test 2 Access homer-app API with alg:none token
Expected signal: Web/proxy log entry for /api/v3/search carrying a Bearer JWT with empty trailing signature segment.
- Test 3 Detect vulnerable empty JWT secret configuration
Expected signal: File read / process-execution telemetry showing grep over homer configuration paths.
Response Playbook
Triage
- Confirm the homer-app version in use; if it is below 0.0.0-20260625093330-5e90809657c9 (pre-release 11.0.283 / commit 5e90809657c9), it is vulnerable.
- Inspect the running configuration for coordinator.jwt.secret. An empty or missing value means the JWT middleware is skipped and protected endpoints require no authentication. Treat an empty secret plus any external exposure as active-exploitation risk.
- Review API access on the suspect source IP: a successful /api/v3 request with no valid credential, or carrying a JWT with an empty signature segment or an alg:none header, indicates bypass rather than a legitimate session.
- Correlate the source IP's history, a successful /api/v3 call with no preceding legitimate /api/v3/auth login flow strongly indicates bypass.
Containment
- Immediately set a strong, random coordinator.jwt.secret (>=32 bytes) and restart homer-app so the JWT middleware is enforced.
- Block external access to the homer-app UI/API at the reverse proxy or firewall until patched, restricting to trusted management networks.
- Upgrade homer-app to release 11.0.283 (commit 5e90809657c9) or later, which enforces JWT on protected routes when the secret is empty.
Evidence Collection
- Capture web/proxy access logs for all /api/v3 requests from the suspect source IP, preserving full Authorization headers.
- Export the homer-app configuration file and container/host environment showing the coordinator.jwt.secret value and version at time of incident.
- Snapshot the homer-app database and audit tables for any user, dashboard, or data-export actions performed during the suspected bypass.
Escalation Criteria
- ! Escalate to incident response if an unauthenticated or forged request produced a successful 200/201/204 response to an admin or user-management endpoint.
- ! Escalate if the empty-secret configuration was confirmed on an internet-exposed instance, as unauthenticated full compromise must be assumed.
- ! Escalate if evidence shows data exfiltration (bulk /api/v3/search or export calls) or creation/modification of accounts during the suspected bypass.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
Web/reverse-proxy access logs containing /api/v3 requests with no valid credential or with empty-signature or alg:none JWTs. - >
homer-app configuration showing coordinator.jwt.secret empty or unset. - >
homer-app application and audit logs recording session creation and privileged actions without a corresponding login. - >
Container image/binary version metadata confirming a pre-11.0.283 build.
Tuning Guidance
Baseline the legitimate source IPs and reverse-proxy addresses that front homer-app, and whitelist proxies known to rewrite the Authorization header to cut false positives. Because the bypass requires no token at all, also hunt for successful /api/v3 responses from source IPs with no preceding /api/v3/auth login, not just forged-token patterns. After the secret is set and the app upgraded, the middleware is enforced, so persistent 200 responses to unauthenticated or empty-signature requests post-remediation indicate caching or an unpatched instance and should be investigated.
Hunting Queries
Surfaces all homer-app API access accompanied by empty-signature JWTs, regardless of response code, to find both successful and attempted bypass.
// df00tech DF00-5bbfd794a9 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-62253 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csUriStem startswith "/api/v3/" | extend Jwt = extract(@"[Bb]earer\s+([A-Za-z0-9_\-\.]+)", 1, tostring(column_ifexists("csAuthorization",""))) | where isnotempty(Jwt) and tostring(split(Jwt,".")[2]) == "" | summarize count() by cIP, csUriStem ``` df00tech DF00-5bbfd794a9 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-62253 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web uri_path="/api/v3/*" | rex field=_raw "[Bb]earer\s+(?<jwt>[A-Za-z0-9_\-\.]+)" | eval sig=mvindex(split(jwt,"."),2) | where sig="" | stats count by src_ip, uri_path Atomic Red Team Tests
Calls a protected homer-app endpoint with no Authorization header to confirm the empty-secret bypass, where the JWT middleware is skipped and no token is required.
Command
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' http://127.0.0.1:9080/api/v3/user Cleanup
echo 'no changes made' Expected Telemetry
Web/proxy log entry for GET /api/v3/user with no Authorization header and a 200 response from an unauthenticated source.
Expected Detection
Behavioral hunt flags a successful /api/v3 response with no preceding login from the source IP.
Sends an unsigned alg:none JWT to a homer-app endpoint to test none-algorithm acceptance under the empty-secret default.
Command
HDR=$(printf '{"alg":"none","typ":"JWT"}' | base64 | tr '+/' '-_' | tr -d '=\n'); PAY=$(printf '{"user":"admin"}' | base64 | tr '+/' '-_' | tr -d '=\n'); TOKEN="$HDR.$PAY."; curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" http://127.0.0.1:9080/api/v3/search Cleanup
unset TOKEN HDR PAY Expected Telemetry
Web/proxy log entry for /api/v3/search carrying a Bearer JWT with empty trailing signature segment.
Expected Detection
Detection matches the empty-signature/none-algorithm JWT pattern.
Inspects the homer-app configuration to confirm the vulnerable empty coordinator.jwt.secret default is present.
Command
grep -rEi 'jwt[._]?secret' /etc/homer/ /opt/homer/ 2>/dev/null | grep -Ei 'secret\s*[:=]\s*(""|'\'''\''|$)' || echo 'EMPTY_JWT_SECRET_DETECTED check config manually' Cleanup
echo 'no changes made' Expected Telemetry
File read / process-execution telemetry showing grep over homer configuration paths.
Expected Detection
Configuration audit flags an empty or unset coordinator.jwt.secret on a pre-11.0.283 build.
Related Detections
Tactic Hubs
Related Techniques
Same Tactic: Initial Access
Blog posts about this detection
Browse by tactic
- Reconnaissance TA0043
- Resource Development TA0042
- Initial Access TA0001
- Execution TA0002
- Persistence TA0003
- Privilege Escalation TA0004
- Stealth TA0005
- Defense Impairment TA0112
- Credential Access TA0006
- Discovery TA0007
- Lateral Movement TA0008
- Collection TA0009
- Command and Control TA0011
- Exfiltration TA0010
- Impact TA0040