Skip to content
CVE-2026-62253 Microsoft Sentinel · KQL

Detect Homer homer-app Authentication Bypass via Empty JWT Secret (CVE-2026-62253) in Microsoft Sentinel

Detects exploitation and exposure of CVE-2026-62253, an authentication bypass in the sipcapture homer-app (HEP/QoS capture UI for VoIP). When coordinator.jwt.secret is empty (the default), the JWT middleware is skipped and the protected API endpoints under /api/v1, /api/v3, and /api/v4 require no authentication. An unauthenticated attacker can read and write all configuration, users, database connections, and stored VoIP call data. This detection surfaces anomalous API access to homer-app endpoints (/api/v3/*), access that succeeds with little or no preceding authentication traffic, use of forged, none-algorithm, or empty-signature JWTs, and configuration indicators of the vulnerable default. Fixed in commit 5e90809657c9 / release 11.0.283 (version >= 0.0.0-20260625093330-5e90809657c9).

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Privilege Escalation Credential Access

KQL Detection Query

Microsoft Sentinel (KQL)
kusto
// df00tech DF00-5bbfd794a9 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-62253 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
let homerPaths = dynamic(["/api/v3/auth", "/api/v3/user", "/api/v3/search", "/api/v3/admin", "/api/v3/agent"]);
W3CIISLog
| where csUriStem startswith "/api/v3/"
| extend AuthHeader = tostring(column_ifexists("csAuthorization", ""))
| where (csMethod in ("GET","POST","PUT","DELETE")) and scStatus in (200, 201, 204)
| extend JwtPart = extract(@"[Bb]earer\s+([A-Za-z0-9_\-\.]+)", 1, AuthHeader)
| extend JwtHeaderB64 = tostring(split(JwtPart, ".")[0])
| extend JwtSig = tostring(split(JwtPart, ".")[2])
| where isnotempty(JwtPart) and (JwtSig == "" or base64_decodestring(JwtHeaderB64) has "\"alg\":\"none\"")
| project TimeGenerated, cIP, csUriStem, csMethod, scStatus, AuthHeader, sIP
| sort by TimeGenerated desc
critical severity medium confidence

Flags successful authenticated requests to homer-app /api/v3 endpoints where the presented JWT has an empty signature or an alg:none header, the hallmark of an empty-secret bypass token.

Data Sources

IIS LogsReverse Proxy LogsWeb Server Logs

Required Tables

W3CIISLog

False Positives & Tuning

  • Legitimate administrators using a reverse proxy that strips or rewrites the Authorization header, producing truncated JWT fields.
  • Security scanners and health-check probes that intentionally send malformed Authorization headers.
  • Internal integration services using service accounts whose tokens are proxied in a non-standard format.

Other platforms for CVE-2026-62253


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Access homer-app API with no credential

    Expected signal: Web/proxy log entry for GET /api/v3/user with no Authorization header and a 200 response from an unauthenticated source.

  2. Test 2 Access homer-app API with alg:none token

    Expected signal: Web/proxy log entry for /api/v3/search carrying a Bearer JWT with empty trailing signature segment.

  3. Test 3 Detect vulnerable empty JWT secret configuration

    Expected signal: File read / process-execution telemetry showing grep over homer configuration paths.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm the homer-app version in use; if it is below 0.0.0-20260625093330-5e90809657c9 (pre-release 11.0.283 / commit 5e90809657c9), it is vulnerable.
  2. Inspect the running configuration for coordinator.jwt.secret. An empty or missing value means the JWT middleware is skipped and protected endpoints require no authentication. Treat an empty secret plus any external exposure as active-exploitation risk.
  3. Review API access on the suspect source IP: a successful /api/v3 request with no valid credential, or carrying a JWT with an empty signature segment or an alg:none header, indicates bypass rather than a legitimate session.
  4. Correlate the source IP's history, a successful /api/v3 call with no preceding legitimate /api/v3/auth login flow strongly indicates bypass.

Containment

  1. Immediately set a strong, random coordinator.jwt.secret (>=32 bytes) and restart homer-app so the JWT middleware is enforced.
  2. Block external access to the homer-app UI/API at the reverse proxy or firewall until patched, restricting to trusted management networks.
  3. Upgrade homer-app to release 11.0.283 (commit 5e90809657c9) or later, which enforces JWT on protected routes when the secret is empty.

Evidence Collection

  1. Capture web/proxy access logs for all /api/v3 requests from the suspect source IP, preserving full Authorization headers.
  2. Export the homer-app configuration file and container/host environment showing the coordinator.jwt.secret value and version at time of incident.
  3. Snapshot the homer-app database and audit tables for any user, dashboard, or data-export actions performed during the suspected bypass.

Escalation Criteria

  • !Escalate to incident response if an unauthenticated or forged request produced a successful 200/201/204 response to an admin or user-management endpoint.
  • !Escalate if the empty-secret configuration was confirmed on an internet-exposed instance, as unauthenticated full compromise must be assumed.
  • !Escalate if evidence shows data exfiltration (bulk /api/v3/search or export calls) or creation/modification of accounts during the suspected bypass.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • >Web/reverse-proxy access logs containing /api/v3 requests with no valid credential or with empty-signature or alg:none JWTs.
  • >homer-app configuration showing coordinator.jwt.secret empty or unset.
  • >homer-app application and audit logs recording session creation and privileged actions without a corresponding login.
  • >Container image/binary version metadata confirming a pre-11.0.283 build.

Tuning Guidance

Baseline the legitimate source IPs and reverse-proxy addresses that front homer-app, and whitelist proxies known to rewrite the Authorization header to cut false positives. Because the bypass requires no token at all, also hunt for successful /api/v3 responses from source IPs with no preceding /api/v3/auth login, not just forged-token patterns. After the secret is set and the app upgraded, the middleware is enforced, so persistent 200 responses to unauthenticated or empty-signature requests post-remediation indicate caching or an unpatched instance and should be investigated.


Hunting Queries

Surfaces all homer-app API access accompanied by empty-signature JWTs, regardless of response code, to find both successful and attempted bypass.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-5bbfd794a9 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-62253 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csUriStem startswith "/api/v3/" | extend Jwt = extract(@"[Bb]earer\s+([A-Za-z0-9_\-\.]+)", 1, tostring(column_ifexists("csAuthorization",""))) | where isnotempty(Jwt) and tostring(split(Jwt,".")[2]) == "" | summarize count() by cIP, csUriStem
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-5bbfd794a9 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-62253 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web uri_path="/api/v3/*" | rex field=_raw "[Bb]earer\s+(?<jwt>[A-Za-z0-9_\-\.]+)" | eval sig=mvindex(split(jwt,"."),2) | where sig="" | stats count by src_ip, uri_path

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Access homer-app API with no credential
linux

Calls a protected homer-app endpoint with no Authorization header to confirm the empty-secret bypass, where the JWT middleware is skipped and no token is required.

Command

bash
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' http://127.0.0.1:9080/api/v3/user

Cleanup

bash
echo 'no changes made'

Expected Telemetry

Web/proxy log entry for GET /api/v3/user with no Authorization header and a 200 response from an unauthenticated source.

Expected Detection

Behavioral hunt flags a successful /api/v3 response with no preceding login from the source IP.

Test 2 Access homer-app API with alg:none token
linux

Sends an unsigned alg:none JWT to a homer-app endpoint to test none-algorithm acceptance under the empty-secret default.

Command

bash
HDR=$(printf '{"alg":"none","typ":"JWT"}' | base64 | tr '+/' '-_' | tr -d '=\n'); PAY=$(printf '{"user":"admin"}' | base64 | tr '+/' '-_' | tr -d '=\n'); TOKEN="$HDR.$PAY."; curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" http://127.0.0.1:9080/api/v3/search

Cleanup

bash
unset TOKEN HDR PAY

Expected Telemetry

Web/proxy log entry for /api/v3/search carrying a Bearer JWT with empty trailing signature segment.

Expected Detection

Detection matches the empty-signature/none-algorithm JWT pattern.

Test 3 Detect vulnerable empty JWT secret configuration
linux

Inspects the homer-app configuration to confirm the vulnerable empty coordinator.jwt.secret default is present.

Command

bash
grep -rEi 'jwt[._]?secret' /etc/homer/ /opt/homer/ 2>/dev/null | grep -Ei 'secret\s*[:=]\s*(""|'\'''\''|$)' || echo 'EMPTY_JWT_SECRET_DETECTED check config manually'

Cleanup

bash
echo 'no changes made'

Expected Telemetry

File read / process-execution telemetry showing grep over homer configuration paths.

Expected Detection

Configuration audit flags an empty or unset coordinator.jwt.secret on a pre-11.0.283 build.

Related Detections