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CVE-2026-17298

IBM API Connect SSRF, Sensitive Information Disclosure (CVE-2026-17298)

Discovery Collection Last updated:

Detects exploitation attempts against CVE-2026-17298, a server-side request forgery (SSRF, CWE-918) vulnerability in IBM API Connect 10.0.8.0-10.0.8.12 and 12.1.0.0-12.1.1.2. A remote authenticated attacker can coerce the API Connect management/gateway components into issuing attacker-controlled outbound requests, enabling retrieval of sensitive information from internal services or cloud metadata endpoints (e.g., 169.254.169.254). Detection focuses on authenticated requests carrying URL-like parameters that resolve to internal/metadata/loopback destinations, correlated with anomalous outbound connections originating from API Connect hosts.

Vulnerability Intelligence

Theoretical

Affected Software

Vendor
ibm
Product
api_connect
Versions
>= 10.0.8.0, < 10.0.8.13, >= 12.1.0.0, < 12.1.1.3

Weakness (CWE)

Timeline

Disclosed
November 7, 2026

CVSS

9.9
Critical (9.0–10)

What is CVE-2026-17298 IBM API Connect SSRF, Sensitive Information Disclosure (CVE-2026-17298)?

IBM API Connect SSRF, Sensitive Information Disclosure (CVE-2026-17298) (CVE-2026-17298) maps to the Discovery and Collection tactics — the adversary is trying to figure out your environment in MITRE ATT&CK.

This page provides production-ready detection logic for IBM API Connect SSRF, Sensitive Information Disclosure (CVE-2026-17298), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Sentinel, IIS logs, Web application firewall. The queries below are rated critical severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Discovery Collection
Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
kusto
// df00tech DF00-fad00443a4 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-17298 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
let metadataTargets = dynamic(["169.254.169.254","metadata.google.internal","metadata.azure.com","100.100.100.200","127.0.0.1","localhost","::1","[::1]"]);
W3CIISLog
| where csUriStem has_any ("/api", "/apiconnect", "/management", "/consumer-api", "/platform-api")
| where scStatus < 500
| extend DecodedQuery = url_decode(csUriQuery)
| where DecodedQuery has_any ("http://", "https://", "gopher://", "file://", "dict://")
| where DecodedQuery has_any (metadataTargets) or DecodedQuery matches regex @"(?i)(https?|gopher|file|dict)://(10\.|192\.168\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1])\.|169\.254\.|127\.)"
| where isnotempty(csUsername) and csUsername != "-"
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, cIP, csUsername, csMethod, csUriStem, DecodedQuery, scStatus, csUserAgent
| sort by TimeGenerated desc

Flags authenticated IIS-fronted API Connect requests whose decoded query string contains a URL scheme pointing at loopback, RFC1918, link-local, or cloud-metadata destinations, the signature of SSRF exploitation of CVE-2026-17298.

critical severity medium confidence

Data Sources

Microsoft Sentinel IIS logs Web application firewall

Required Tables

W3CIISLog

False Positives

  • Legitimate API Connect integrations that proxy to internal microservices over private IP ranges
  • Health-check or monitoring tooling that passes internal URLs as parameters
  • Developers testing API definitions that reference localhost backends in non-production environments

Query fingerprint DF00-fad00443a4 · licence

Sigma logsource & community rules

The detection logic for IBM API Connect SSRF, Sensitive Information Disclosure (CVE-2026-17298) (CVE-2026-17298) above is provided in a vendor-neutral form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the following logsource:

logsource:
  category: network_connection
  product: windows

Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 SSRF to cloud metadata endpoint via API parameter

    Expected signal: IIS/API Connect access log entry with authenticated username and a query string containing http://169.254.169.254

  2. Test 2 SSRF to internal RFC1918 service

    Expected signal: Access log with decoded query containing http://10.10.5.20 and an outbound connection from the API Connect host to 10.10.5.20

  3. Test 3 SSRF to loopback service via gopher scheme

    Expected signal: Access log with decoded query containing gopher://127.0.0.1 and authenticated username


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Identify the authenticated user associated with the flagged request and confirm whether the account is a legitimate API Connect consumer or an administrative/service account that should not be issuing URL-parameterized calls.
  2. Extract the embedded target URL/host from the query string and classify the destination: cloud metadata endpoint (169.254.169.254), loopback, RFC1918 internal service, or external callback, metadata/loopback targets are high-fidelity SSRF indicators.
  3. Check the API Connect version on the responding host against affected ranges (10.0.8.0-10.0.8.12, 12.1.0.0-12.1.1.2) to confirm exploitability.
  4. Correlate the inbound request timestamp with outbound network connections from the API Connect host to the embedded target to confirm the SSRF actually fired.

Containment

  1. Block the offending source IP and suspend the implicated authenticated account pending investigation.
  2. Apply the IBM fix by upgrading to API Connect 10.0.8.13 or 12.1.1.3; where immediate patching is not possible, restrict egress from API Connect management/gateway hosts to an allowlist of required backends and deny access to 169.254.169.254.
  3. Rotate any credentials or tokens that may have been exposed via metadata or internal service access if SSRF to a secrets endpoint is confirmed.

Evidence Collection

  1. Preserve IIS/API Connect access logs containing the full request URI, query string, authenticated username, and response code.
  2. Capture host-level network connection telemetry (outbound flows from API Connect processes) around the request window to establish SSRF success and data retrieved.
  3. Export WAF/proxy logs and any gateway debug logs that record the coerced outbound request and its response size.

Escalation Criteria

  • ! Escalate to incident response if the SSRF target is a cloud metadata endpoint or internal secrets/credential service and a successful outbound connection with a non-trivial response is confirmed.
  • ! Escalate if multiple accounts or source IPs show the same SSRF pattern, indicating coordinated exploitation rather than an isolated test.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • > IIS/API Connect access logs with URL-bearing query parameters and authenticated usernames
  • > Host netflow/EDR outbound connection records from API Connect runtime processes to internal or metadata IPs
  • > Gateway/DataPower debug and transaction logs showing the coerced request and response

Tuning Guidance

Baseline legitimate internal backend hosts that API Connect proxies to and add them to an allowlist so routine private-IP references do not alarm. Prioritize alerts whose embedded target is a cloud metadata address (169.254.169.254) or a secrets/management service, and lower severity for RFC1918 destinations already in the known-backend allowlist. Require the authenticated-user condition to suppress unauthenticated scanner noise, since the CVE requires authentication.


Hunting Queries

Hunt for any authenticated API Connect request embedding a URL to internal, loopback, or metadata destinations over a wide time window to catch low-and-slow SSRF probing.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-fad00443a4 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-17298 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | extend q = url_decode(csUriQuery) | where q has "169.254.169.254" or q matches regex @"(?i)(https?)://(10\.|192\.168\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1])\.|127\.)" | summarize count() by csUsername, cIP, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-fad00443a4 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-17298 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web (sourcetype=ms:iis OR sourcetype=ibm:apiconnect:access) | eval q=urldecode(uri_query) | where match(q,"(?i)(https?|gopher|file)://(169\.254|127\.|10\.|192\.168\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1])\.)") | stats count by user, src_ip

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 SSRF to cloud metadata endpoint via API parameter
linux

Simulates an authenticated request to an API Connect endpoint with a URL parameter coercing a request to the cloud metadata service.

Command

bash
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $APIC_TOKEN" "https://apic.lab.local/consumer-api/proxy?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"

Cleanup

bash
echo 'No artifacts to clean; request is read-only'

Expected Telemetry

IIS/API Connect access log entry with authenticated username and a query string containing http://169.254.169.254

Expected Detection

KQL/SPL rule fires on decoded query string matching the metadata target with a non-empty username.

Test 2 SSRF to internal RFC1918 service
linux

Simulates coercing API Connect to request an internal private-IP service.

Command

bash
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $APIC_TOKEN" "https://apic.lab.local/management/validate?target=http://10.10.5.20:8080/admin"

Cleanup

bash
echo 'No artifacts to clean'

Expected Telemetry

Access log with decoded query containing http://10.10.5.20 and an outbound connection from the API Connect host to 10.10.5.20

Expected Detection

Network EQL/CQL rule flags outbound connection to RFC1918 address from API Connect process; log-based rules match the private-IP URL.

Test 3 SSRF to loopback service via gopher scheme
linux

Simulates an SSRF attempt using a non-http scheme to reach a loopback service.

Command

bash
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $APIC_TOKEN" "https://apic.lab.local/platform-api/fetch?resource=gopher://127.0.0.1:6379/_INFO"

Cleanup

bash
echo 'No artifacts to clean'

Expected Telemetry

Access log with decoded query containing gopher://127.0.0.1 and authenticated username

Expected Detection

Rules match the gopher:// scheme and loopback target in the decoded query string.

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