Skip to content
CVE-2026-17298 IBM QRadar · QRadar

Detect IBM API Connect SSRF, Sensitive Information Disclosure (CVE-2026-17298) in IBM QRadar

Detects exploitation attempts against CVE-2026-17298, a server-side request forgery (SSRF, CWE-918) vulnerability in IBM API Connect 10.0.8.0-10.0.8.12 and 12.1.0.0-12.1.1.2. A remote authenticated attacker can coerce the API Connect management/gateway components into issuing attacker-controlled outbound requests, enabling retrieval of sensitive information from internal services or cloud metadata endpoints (e.g., 169.254.169.254). Detection focuses on authenticated requests carrying URL-like parameters that resolve to internal/metadata/loopback destinations, correlated with anomalous outbound connections originating from API Connect hosts.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Discovery Collection

QRadar Detection Query

IBM QRadar (QRadar)
sql
-- df00tech DF00-fad00443a4 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-17298 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
SELECT QIDNAME(qid) AS event, sourceip, destinationip, username, "URL" AS url, starttime
FROM events
WHERE LOGSOURCETYPENAME(devicetype) IN ('Microsoft IIS', 'IBM API Connect')
AND ("URL" ILIKE '%http%://%' OR "URL" ILIKE '%gopher://%' OR "URL" ILIKE '%file://%')
AND ("URL" ILIKE '%169.254.169.254%' OR "URL" ILIKE '%127.0.0.1%' OR "URL" ILIKE '%localhost%' OR "URL" ILIKE '%metadata%' OR "URL" IMATCHES '.*(10\.|192\.168\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1])\.).*')
AND username IS NOT NULL
LAST 24 HOURS
critical severity medium confidence

Returns authenticated API Connect/IIS events whose URL field embeds a secondary URL pointing at internal or metadata endpoints, consistent with SSRF exploitation of CVE-2026-17298.

Data Sources

QRadarIIS logsIBM API Connect

Required Tables

events

False Positives & Tuning

  • Legitimate internal backend references in gateway requests
  • Monitoring probes carrying internal URL parameters
  • Non-production traffic referencing localhost

Other platforms for CVE-2026-17298


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 SSRF to cloud metadata endpoint via API parameter

    Expected signal: IIS/API Connect access log entry with authenticated username and a query string containing http://169.254.169.254

  2. Test 2 SSRF to internal RFC1918 service

    Expected signal: Access log with decoded query containing http://10.10.5.20 and an outbound connection from the API Connect host to 10.10.5.20

  3. Test 3 SSRF to loopback service via gopher scheme

    Expected signal: Access log with decoded query containing gopher://127.0.0.1 and authenticated username

Last updated: Research depth: standard
References (2)

Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Identify the authenticated user associated with the flagged request and confirm whether the account is a legitimate API Connect consumer or an administrative/service account that should not be issuing URL-parameterized calls.
  2. Extract the embedded target URL/host from the query string and classify the destination: cloud metadata endpoint (169.254.169.254), loopback, RFC1918 internal service, or external callback, metadata/loopback targets are high-fidelity SSRF indicators.
  3. Check the API Connect version on the responding host against affected ranges (10.0.8.0-10.0.8.12, 12.1.0.0-12.1.1.2) to confirm exploitability.
  4. Correlate the inbound request timestamp with outbound network connections from the API Connect host to the embedded target to confirm the SSRF actually fired.

Containment

  1. Block the offending source IP and suspend the implicated authenticated account pending investigation.
  2. Apply the IBM fix by upgrading to API Connect 10.0.8.13 or 12.1.1.3; where immediate patching is not possible, restrict egress from API Connect management/gateway hosts to an allowlist of required backends and deny access to 169.254.169.254.
  3. Rotate any credentials or tokens that may have been exposed via metadata or internal service access if SSRF to a secrets endpoint is confirmed.

Evidence Collection

  1. Preserve IIS/API Connect access logs containing the full request URI, query string, authenticated username, and response code.
  2. Capture host-level network connection telemetry (outbound flows from API Connect processes) around the request window to establish SSRF success and data retrieved.
  3. Export WAF/proxy logs and any gateway debug logs that record the coerced outbound request and its response size.

Escalation Criteria

  • !Escalate to incident response if the SSRF target is a cloud metadata endpoint or internal secrets/credential service and a successful outbound connection with a non-trivial response is confirmed.
  • !Escalate if multiple accounts or source IPs show the same SSRF pattern, indicating coordinated exploitation rather than an isolated test.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • >IIS/API Connect access logs with URL-bearing query parameters and authenticated usernames
  • >Host netflow/EDR outbound connection records from API Connect runtime processes to internal or metadata IPs
  • >Gateway/DataPower debug and transaction logs showing the coerced request and response

Tuning Guidance

Baseline legitimate internal backend hosts that API Connect proxies to and add them to an allowlist so routine private-IP references do not alarm. Prioritize alerts whose embedded target is a cloud metadata address (169.254.169.254) or a secrets/management service, and lower severity for RFC1918 destinations already in the known-backend allowlist. Require the authenticated-user condition to suppress unauthenticated scanner noise, since the CVE requires authentication.


Hunting Queries

Hunt for any authenticated API Connect request embedding a URL to internal, loopback, or metadata destinations over a wide time window to catch low-and-slow SSRF probing.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-fad00443a4 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-17298 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | extend q = url_decode(csUriQuery) | where q has "169.254.169.254" or q matches regex @"(?i)(https?)://(10\.|192\.168\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1])\.|127\.)" | summarize count() by csUsername, cIP, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-fad00443a4 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-17298 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web (sourcetype=ms:iis OR sourcetype=ibm:apiconnect:access) | eval q=urldecode(uri_query) | where match(q,"(?i)(https?|gopher|file)://(169\.254|127\.|10\.|192\.168\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1])\.)") | stats count by user, src_ip

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 SSRF to cloud metadata endpoint via API parameter
linux

Simulates an authenticated request to an API Connect endpoint with a URL parameter coercing a request to the cloud metadata service.

Command

bash
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $APIC_TOKEN" "https://apic.lab.local/consumer-api/proxy?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"

Cleanup

bash
echo 'No artifacts to clean; request is read-only'

Expected Telemetry

IIS/API Connect access log entry with authenticated username and a query string containing http://169.254.169.254

Expected Detection

KQL/SPL rule fires on decoded query string matching the metadata target with a non-empty username.

Test 2 SSRF to internal RFC1918 service
linux

Simulates coercing API Connect to request an internal private-IP service.

Command

bash
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $APIC_TOKEN" "https://apic.lab.local/management/validate?target=http://10.10.5.20:8080/admin"

Cleanup

bash
echo 'No artifacts to clean'

Expected Telemetry

Access log with decoded query containing http://10.10.5.20 and an outbound connection from the API Connect host to 10.10.5.20

Expected Detection

Network EQL/CQL rule flags outbound connection to RFC1918 address from API Connect process; log-based rules match the private-IP URL.

Test 3 SSRF to loopback service via gopher scheme
linux

Simulates an SSRF attempt using a non-http scheme to reach a loopback service.

Command

bash
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $APIC_TOKEN" "https://apic.lab.local/platform-api/fetch?resource=gopher://127.0.0.1:6379/_INFO"

Cleanup

bash
echo 'No artifacts to clean'

Expected Telemetry

Access log with decoded query containing gopher://127.0.0.1 and authenticated username

Expected Detection

Rules match the gopher:// scheme and loopback target in the decoded query string.

Related Detections