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CVE-2026-130780

Incus Migration Path Traversal (CVE-2026-130780)

Detects exploitation and exposure of CVE-2026-130780, a path traversal vulnerability (CWE-22) in Incus before 7.6.0. During instance/volume migration, a malicious migration peer can supply unvalidated path components in the transferred filesystem stream, causing the receiving Incus daemon to write files outside the intended storage pool or instance directory. Successful exploitation can overwrite arbitrary files as the Incus daemon user (typically root), enabling code execution, privilege escalation or host compromise. This detection surfaces vulnerable Incus versions, suspicious migration activity, and daemon writes to unexpected paths.

Vulnerability Intelligence

Theoretical

Weakness (CWE)

Timeline

Disclosed
November 18, 2026

CVSS

9.9
Critical (9.0–10)
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

What is CVE-2026-130780 Incus Migration Path Traversal (CVE-2026-130780)?

Incus Migration Path Traversal (CVE-2026-130780) (CVE-2026-130780) maps to the Initial Access and Lateral Movement and Privilege Escalation tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.

This page provides production-ready detection logic for Incus Migration Path Traversal (CVE-2026-130780), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, Linux file monitoring. The queries below are rated critical severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Lateral Movement Privilege Escalation
Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
kusto
// df00tech DF00-79fce0bdff · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-130780 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
// Detect Incus daemon (incusd) writing files outside expected storage/instance dirs during migration
let expectedRoots = dynamic(["/var/lib/incus/","/var/log/incus/","/run/incus/","/tmp/"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("incusd","incus")
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified","FileRenamed")
| extend Dir = tostring(FolderPath)
| where not(Dir startswith "/var/lib/incus/" or Dir startswith "/var/log/incus/" or Dir startswith "/run/incus/")
| where FolderPath has_any ("..","/etc/","/root/","/usr/","/bin/","/home/")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc

Flags Incus daemon file writes to paths outside expected directories, or containing traversal sequences, during migration handling.

critical severity medium confidence

Data Sources

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Linux file monitoring

Required Tables

DeviceFileEvents

False Positives

  • Legitimate Incus backup or restore operations writing to custom storage paths
  • Administrator-configured non-default storage pool locations outside /var/lib/incus
  • Package upgrades of Incus touching /usr paths during maintenance windows

Query fingerprint DF00-79fce0bdff · licence

Sigma logsource & community rules

The detection logic for Incus Migration Path Traversal (CVE-2026-130780) (CVE-2026-130780) above is provided in a vendor-neutral form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the following logsource:

logsource:
  product: windows

Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Simulate Incus daemon write outside storage root

    Expected signal: File creation event in /etc/ attributed to a root-run process; auditd openat record for /etc/incus_traversal_poc.txt.

  2. Test 2 Emulate traversal path write by incusd-named process

    Expected signal: File write resolving through '..' sequences originating near an incusd-named process.

  3. Test 3 Detect vulnerable Incus version present

    Expected signal: Process execution of incus/dpkg/rpm returning a version string below 7.6.0.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm the installed Incus version on the alerting host (`incus version` / package manager) and determine whether it is below 7.6.0.
  2. Review the flagged file path(s) written by incusd, identify whether they contain '..' sequences or fall outside /var/lib/incus, /var/log/incus and /run/incus.
  3. Correlate the write with recent migration activity: check Incus logs (/var/log/incus/) and `incus operation list` for migration/copy/move operations and their remote peer.
  4. Determine whether the migration source peer is trusted; an untrusted or attacker-controlled remote is a strong exploitation signal.

Containment

  1. Pause or block inbound migrations on the affected Incus daemon and revoke trust/certificates for the suspicious remote peer (`incus remote remove`, trust prune).
  2. Isolate the affected host from migration networks and quarantine any files written outside expected directories before they are executed or loaded.

Evidence Collection

  1. Preserve /var/log/incus/ logs, auditd records for incusd syscalls, and the Incus operations database for the migration operation.
  2. Collect and hash the out-of-bounds written file(s) and capture their inode/timestamps for forensic comparison.

Escalation Criteria

  • ! Escalate to IR if written paths include system-critical locations (/etc, /usr, /root, systemd unit dirs) indicating possible root-level overwrite.
  • ! Escalate if the migration peer is unauthenticated/untrusted or if subsequent code execution or privilege escalation is observed on the host.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • > Incus operation logs in /var/log/incus/ and the operations table in the Incus database
  • > Auditd/falco records of incusd openat/rename syscalls to out-of-bounds paths
  • > File metadata (timestamps, inode, ownership) of files written outside storage roots

Tuning Guidance

Baseline legitimate non-default storage pool paths and backup/restore target directories for your environment and add them to an allowlist so routine Incus operations do not alert. Focus high-fidelity alerting on writes containing '..' or landing in system directories (/etc, /usr, /root, /bin). Correlate with migration operations from untrusted remotes to reduce noise.


Hunting Queries

Surface all incusd file writes with traversal sequences or outside the storage root for retrospective hunting.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-79fce0bdff · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-130780 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
DeviceFileEvents | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "incusd" | where FolderPath has ".." or (not(FolderPath startswith "/var/lib/incus/") and not(FolderPath startswith "/var/log/incus/")) | summarize count() by DeviceName, FolderPath
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-79fce0bdff · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-130780 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=linux sourcetype=linux:auditd comm=incusd | eval path=coalesce(name,fd_name) | where like(path,"%..%") OR NOT like(path,"/var/lib/incus/%") | stats count by host, path

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Simulate Incus daemon write outside storage root
linux

Emulates the daemon writing a file to an out-of-bounds path to validate file-event detection (lab only; does not exploit the CVE).

Command

bash
sudo install -m 0755 /bin/true /usr/local/bin/incusd-sim 2>/dev/null; sudo /usr/local/bin/incusd-sim; sudo -u root bash -c 'cp /etc/hostname /etc/incus_traversal_poc.txt'

Cleanup

bash
sudo rm -f /etc/incus_traversal_poc.txt /usr/local/bin/incusd-sim

Expected Telemetry

File creation event in /etc/ attributed to a root-run process; auditd openat record for /etc/incus_traversal_poc.txt.

Expected Detection

Detection should flag a write outside the Incus storage roots into /etc/.

Test 2 Emulate traversal path write by incusd-named process
linux

Creates a process named incusd that writes a file via a '..' relative path to trigger traversal-pattern matching.

Command

bash
sudo mkdir -p /var/lib/incus/storage-pools/default; sudo cp /bin/sleep /tmp/incusd; cd /var/lib/incus/storage-pools/default && sudo /tmp/incusd 0 & sudo bash -c 'echo poc > /var/lib/incus/storage-pools/default/../../../../tmp/incus_dotdot_poc'

Cleanup

bash
sudo rm -f /tmp/incus_dotdot_poc /tmp/incusd

Expected Telemetry

File write resolving through '..' sequences originating near an incusd-named process.

Expected Detection

Detection should flag the traversal ('..') path component in the write.

Test 3 Detect vulnerable Incus version present
linux

Checks the installed Incus version to confirm exposure to CVE-2026-130780 (affects versions before 7.6.0).

Command

bash
incus version 2>/dev/null || dpkg -s incus 2>/dev/null | grep -i version || rpm -q incus

Cleanup

bash
true

Expected Telemetry

Process execution of incus/dpkg/rpm returning a version string below 7.6.0.

Expected Detection

Vulnerability-exposure logic should mark the host vulnerable when the reported Incus version is < 7.6.0.

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