Detect Incus Migration Path Traversal (CVE-2026-130780) in Google Chronicle
Detects exploitation and exposure of CVE-2026-130780, a path traversal vulnerability (CWE-22) in Incus before 7.6.0. During instance/volume migration, a malicious migration peer can supply unvalidated path components in the transferred filesystem stream, causing the receiving Incus daemon to write files outside the intended storage pool or instance directory. Successful exploitation can overwrite arbitrary files as the Incus daemon user (typically root), enabling code execution, privilege escalation or host compromise. This detection surfaces vulnerable Incus versions, suspicious migration activity, and daemon writes to unexpected paths.
MITRE ATT&CK
YARA-L Detection Query
// df00tech DF00-79fce0bdff · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-130780 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
rule incus_migration_path_traversal_cve_2026_130780 {
meta:
author = "Argus Detection Platform"
description = "Incus daemon writes outside storage roots or with traversal during migration (CVE-2026-130780)"
severity = "CRITICAL"
events:
$e.metadata.event_type = "FILE_CREATION" or $e.metadata.event_type = "FILE_MODIFICATION"
$e.principal.process.file.full_path = /incusd/ nocase
$e.target.file.full_path = /(\.\.|\/etc\/|\/root\/|\/usr\/|\/bin\/)/ nocase
not $e.target.file.full_path = /^\/var\/lib\/incus\// nocase
condition:
$e
} Chronicle YARA-L rule for Incus daemon suspicious file writes.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Custom storage pools
- Backup/restore operations
- Incus package upgrades
Other platforms for CVE-2026-130780
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 Simulate Incus daemon write outside storage root
Expected signal: File creation event in /etc/ attributed to a root-run process; auditd openat record for /etc/incus_traversal_poc.txt.
- Test 2 Emulate traversal path write by incusd-named process
Expected signal: File write resolving through '..' sequences originating near an incusd-named process.
- Test 3 Detect vulnerable Incus version present
Expected signal: Process execution of incus/dpkg/rpm returning a version string below 7.6.0.
Response Playbook
Triage
- Confirm the installed Incus version on the alerting host (`incus version` / package manager) and determine whether it is below 7.6.0.
- Review the flagged file path(s) written by incusd, identify whether they contain '..' sequences or fall outside /var/lib/incus, /var/log/incus and /run/incus.
- Correlate the write with recent migration activity: check Incus logs (/var/log/incus/) and `incus operation list` for migration/copy/move operations and their remote peer.
- Determine whether the migration source peer is trusted; an untrusted or attacker-controlled remote is a strong exploitation signal.
Containment
- Pause or block inbound migrations on the affected Incus daemon and revoke trust/certificates for the suspicious remote peer (`incus remote remove`, trust prune).
- Isolate the affected host from migration networks and quarantine any files written outside expected directories before they are executed or loaded.
Evidence Collection
- Preserve /var/log/incus/ logs, auditd records for incusd syscalls, and the Incus operations database for the migration operation.
- Collect and hash the out-of-bounds written file(s) and capture their inode/timestamps for forensic comparison.
Escalation Criteria
- !Escalate to IR if written paths include system-critical locations (/etc, /usr, /root, systemd unit dirs) indicating possible root-level overwrite.
- !Escalate if the migration peer is unauthenticated/untrusted or if subsequent code execution or privilege escalation is observed on the host.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
Incus operation logs in /var/log/incus/ and the operations table in the Incus database - >
Auditd/falco records of incusd openat/rename syscalls to out-of-bounds paths - >
File metadata (timestamps, inode, ownership) of files written outside storage roots
Tuning Guidance
Baseline legitimate non-default storage pool paths and backup/restore target directories for your environment and add them to an allowlist so routine Incus operations do not alert. Focus high-fidelity alerting on writes containing '..' or landing in system directories (/etc, /usr, /root, /bin). Correlate with migration operations from untrusted remotes to reduce noise.
Hunting Queries
Surface all incusd file writes with traversal sequences or outside the storage root for retrospective hunting.
// df00tech DF00-79fce0bdff · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-130780 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
DeviceFileEvents | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "incusd" | where FolderPath has ".." or (not(FolderPath startswith "/var/lib/incus/") and not(FolderPath startswith "/var/log/incus/")) | summarize count() by DeviceName, FolderPath ``` df00tech DF00-79fce0bdff · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-130780 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=linux sourcetype=linux:auditd comm=incusd | eval path=coalesce(name,fd_name) | where like(path,"%..%") OR NOT like(path,"/var/lib/incus/%") | stats count by host, path Atomic Red Team Tests
Emulates the daemon writing a file to an out-of-bounds path to validate file-event detection (lab only; does not exploit the CVE).
Command
sudo install -m 0755 /bin/true /usr/local/bin/incusd-sim 2>/dev/null; sudo /usr/local/bin/incusd-sim; sudo -u root bash -c 'cp /etc/hostname /etc/incus_traversal_poc.txt' Cleanup
sudo rm -f /etc/incus_traversal_poc.txt /usr/local/bin/incusd-sim Expected Telemetry
File creation event in /etc/ attributed to a root-run process; auditd openat record for /etc/incus_traversal_poc.txt.
Expected Detection
Detection should flag a write outside the Incus storage roots into /etc/.
Creates a process named incusd that writes a file via a '..' relative path to trigger traversal-pattern matching.
Command
sudo mkdir -p /var/lib/incus/storage-pools/default; sudo cp /bin/sleep /tmp/incusd; cd /var/lib/incus/storage-pools/default && sudo /tmp/incusd 0 & sudo bash -c 'echo poc > /var/lib/incus/storage-pools/default/../../../../tmp/incus_dotdot_poc' Cleanup
sudo rm -f /tmp/incus_dotdot_poc /tmp/incusd Expected Telemetry
File write resolving through '..' sequences originating near an incusd-named process.
Expected Detection
Detection should flag the traversal ('..') path component in the write.
Checks the installed Incus version to confirm exposure to CVE-2026-130780 (affects versions before 7.6.0).
Command
incus version 2>/dev/null || dpkg -s incus 2>/dev/null | grep -i version || rpm -q incus Cleanup
true Expected Telemetry
Process execution of incus/dpkg/rpm returning a version string below 7.6.0.
Expected Detection
Vulnerability-exposure logic should mark the host vulnerable when the reported Incus version is < 7.6.0.