VMware vCenter Authentication Bypass via Alternate Path (CVE-2026-123890)
Detects activity related to CVE-2026-123890, a critical (CVSS 9.8) authentication bypass in VMware vCenter Server and related Broadcom vSphere products (CWE-288: Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel). According to Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant, the flaw is an unauthenticated Secure Remote Password (SRP-6a) session key disclosure over DCE/RPC, exposed on the vCenter Single Sign-On control interface RPC (TCP port 2012). Successful exploitation discloses the SRP session key without a password and creates an authenticated session as [email protected]. An attacker can then execute arbitrary commands and retrieve files such as the data.mdb database via the Directory Service (vmdird). The vulnerability is on the CISA KEV list and was exploited in the wild in early September 2026 by the suspected China-linked Armory Castle group (formerly UNC5221) using a utility named BONESAW. This detection surfaces anomalous unauthenticated access to privileged vCenter endpoints (/sdk, /ui, /rest, SSO token issuance), suspicious session or token creation without a preceding successful credential event, and post-exploitation administrative actions.
Based on Google Threat Intelligence, Armory Castle Exploits vSphere
Vulnerability Intelligence
KEV — Known ExploitedAffected Software
- Vendor
- Broadcom, vmware
- Product
- VMware vCenter, cloud_foundation, telco_cloud_infrastructure, telco_cloud_platform, vcenter_server
- Versions
- >= 5.0, < 5.2.5, 3.0, >= 3.0, <= 5.2, 7.0, 8.0, >= 9.0, < 9.0.2.0200, >= 9.1, < 9.1.1.0200
Weakness (CWE)
Timeline
- Disclosed
- November 19, 2026
References & Proof of Concept
- PoChttps://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/armory-castle-exploits-vsphere?e=48754805
- https://support.broadcom.com/web/ecx/support-content-notification/-/external/content/SecurityAdvisories/0/39495
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-123890
- https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-123890
- https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/china-linked-hackers-exploit-critical.html
CVSS
- Attack Vector
- Network
- Attack Complexity
- Low
- Privileges Required
- None
- User Interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
What is CVE-2026-123890 VMware vCenter Authentication Bypass via Alternate Path (CVE-2026-123890)?
VMware vCenter Authentication Bypass via Alternate Path (CVE-2026-123890) (CVE-2026-123890) maps to the Initial Access and Privilege Escalation and Stealth tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.
This page provides production-ready detection logic for VMware vCenter Authentication Bypass via Alternate Path (CVE-2026-123890), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: IIS/reverse-proxy logs fronting vCenter, VMware vCenter appliance web logs. The queries below are rated critical severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.
MITRE ATT&CK
// df00tech DF00-dc13f89b52 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-123890 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
let privEndpoints = dynamic(["/sdk", "/ui/", "/rest/vcenter", "/sts/STSService", "/websso/SAML2", "/invsvc", "/vsphere-client"]);
let vcenterHosts = dynamic([]); // optional: scope to known vCenter FQDNs/IPs
W3CIISLog
| where csUriStem has_any (privEndpoints)
| where scStatus in (200, 201, 302)
// alternate-channel bypass: privileged access with no auth header / anonymous principal
| where isempty(csUsername) or csUsername == "-" or csUsername =~ "anonymous"
| extend SuspiciousMethod = csMethod in ("POST", "PUT", "DELETE")
| summarize Requests = count(), Endpoints = make_set(csUriStem, 20), Methods = make_set(csMethod, 10), StatusCodes = make_set(scStatus, 10) by cIP, sSiteName, bin(TimeGenerated, 10m)
| where Requests >= 3
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP = cIP, Site = sSiteName, Requests, Endpoints, Methods, StatusCodes
| order by Requests desc Flags unauthenticated (anonymous / missing user) requests to privileged vCenter SSO and vSphere API endpoints returning success, a possible indicator of exploitation. Tune vcenterHosts and thresholds to your environment.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Internal monitoring or health-check probes hitting vCenter endpoints anonymously
- Load balancer or vulnerability-scanner traffic generating unauthenticated requests
- Legitimate automation using API keys that do not populate the csUsername field
Query fingerprint DF00-dc13f89b52 · licence
Sigma logsource & community rules
The detection logic for VMware vCenter Authentication Bypass via Alternate Path (CVE-2026-123890) (CVE-2026-123890) above is provided in a vendor-neutral
form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the
following logsource:
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:
Platform-specific guides for CVE-2026-123890
References (6)
- https://support.broadcom.com/web/ecx/support-content-notification/-/external/content/SecurityAdvisories/0/39495
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-123890
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/armory-castle-exploits-vsphere?e=48754805
- https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-123890
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/china-linked-hackers-exploit-critical.html
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 Anonymous request to vCenter STS/SSO endpoint
Expected signal: websso/STS access log and reverse-proxy log entry showing a POST to /sts/STSService with no authenticated username.
- Test 2 Unauthenticated vCenter REST API enumeration
Expected signal: Multiple GET requests to /rest/vcenter/* without an auth token recorded in envoy/reverse-proxy logs.
- Test 3 Simulated alternate-channel bypass with mutating request
Expected signal: Sequential anonymous SSO GET followed by a POST to /rest/vcenter from the same host within the correlation window.
Response Playbook
Triage
- Confirm the destination host is an affected vCenter/vSphere version per vulnMetadata (vCenter < 9.0.2.0200, < 9.1.1.0200, or 7.0/8.0/5.x lines) by checking the appliance build via /var/log/vmware/vpxd or the vCenter management UI.
- Validate that the flagged requests to /sts/STSService, /websso/SAML2, /rest/vcenter or /sdk were genuinely unauthenticated by inspecting the SSO (websso) and vpxd logs for a corresponding successful credential/token event; absence of a prior auth event is suspicious.
- Geolocate and reputation-check the source IP; cross-reference against the Armory Castle / vSphere-exploitation indicators published by Google Threat Intelligence and recent KEV reporting.
- Determine whether any SSO token or session was issued to the anonymous caller and what principal/role it mapped to.
Containment
- Isolate the affected vCenter from untrusted networks (restrict management ports to jump hosts) and, if active exploitation is confirmed, take the appliance offline for forensics.
- Apply the Broadcom fixed build (9.0.2.0200 / 9.1.1.0200 / 5.2.5 or later per your line); rotate the vCenter SSO signing certificate and all solution-user and administrator credentials.
- Invalidate all active vCenter sessions and SAML tokens, and force re-authentication for all SSO principals.
Evidence Collection
- Collect vCenter logs: /var/log/vmware/vpxd/vpxd.log, /var/log/vmware/sso/ (websso/STS), /var/log/vmware/vsphere-ui/, and the reverse-proxy/envoy access logs covering the exploitation window.
- Snapshot the vCenter appliance disk and memory before remediation to preserve attacker artifacts (web shells, added SSO users, scheduled tasks).
- Export the full request/response sequence for the flagged source IP and any ESXi hosts or VMs subsequently touched.
Escalation Criteria
- ! Escalate to incident response and executive stakeholders if an SSO token or administrative session was successfully issued to an unauthenticated caller.
- ! Escalate if post-exploitation activity is observed: new vCenter/SSO admin accounts, VM cloning/export, datastore browsing, or guest-operation API abuse against managed ESXi hosts.
- ! Escalate per BOD 26-04 timelines given the KEV status and in-the-wild exploitation.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
vpxd.log and websso/STS SSO logs showing token issuance without preceding authentication - >
New or modified SSO solution-user or administrator accounts in vmdir - >
Reverse-proxy/envoy access logs with anonymous POSTs to /sdk or /rest/vcenter - >
Unexpected scheduled tasks, cron entries, or web shells on the vCenter appliance
Tuning Guidance
Baseline legitimate anonymous traffic to vCenter (load-balancer health checks, monitoring, authorized scanners) and allowlist those source IPs. Scope the queries to known vCenter FQDNs/IPs to cut noise, and verify how your reverse proxy/SSO populates the username field; some deployments drop the authenticated user from access logs, which can cause both false positives and false negatives. Raise the request-count threshold in environments with heavy automation. Note that the underlying exploit works over DCE/RPC on the vCenter SSO control interface (TCP 2012), so HTTP-based detections are supplementary; monitor and restrict access to port 2012 as well.
Hunting Queries
Hunt for unauthenticated successful access to privileged vCenter endpoints across the environment to find additional affected appliances or source IPs.
// df00tech DF00-dc13f89b52 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-123890 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csUriStem has_any ("/sts/STSService","/websso/SAML2","/rest/vcenter","/sdk") | where scStatus in (200,201,302) | where isempty(csUsername) or csUsername == "-" | summarize count() by cIP, csUriStem, bin(TimeGenerated,1h) | order by count_ desc ``` df00tech DF00-dc13f89b52 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-123890 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=vmware (sourcetype="vmware:vcenter:websso" OR sourcetype=iis) (uri_path="*/sts/STSService*" OR uri_path="*/rest/vcenter*" OR uri_path="*/sdk*") status IN (200,201,302) (user="-" OR user="anonymous" OR NOT user=*) | stats count by src_ip, uri_path | sort - count Atomic Red Team Tests
Simulate an unauthenticated request to the vCenter Secure Token Service endpoint to validate detection of alternate-channel access attempts.
Command
curl -sk -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -X POST https://VCENTER_FQDN/sts/STSService/vsphere.local -H 'Content-Type: application/soap+xml' --data '<soap:Envelope/>' Cleanup
echo 'No cleanup required, read-only probe' Expected Telemetry
websso/STS access log and reverse-proxy log entry showing a POST to /sts/STSService with no authenticated username.
Expected Detection
KQL/SPL rules flag the anonymous POST to the privileged SSO endpoint from the test source IP.
Issue anonymous requests to the vCenter REST API to emulate post-bypass enumeration.
Command
for p in /rest/vcenter/vm /rest/vcenter/host /rest/vcenter/datastore; do curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "$p %{http_code}\n" https://VCENTER_FQDN$p; done Cleanup
echo 'No cleanup required, read-only GET requests' Expected Telemetry
Multiple GET requests to /rest/vcenter/* without an auth token recorded in envoy/reverse-proxy logs.
Expected Detection
Detection aggregates >=3 anonymous privileged endpoint requests from one source and alerts.
Chain an anonymous successful SSO request with a privileged POST to emulate the exploit sequence used in EQL correlation.
Command
powershell -c "$ProgressPreference='SilentlyContinue'; try { Invoke-WebRequest -SkipCertificateCheck -Uri 'https://VCENTER_FQDN/websso/SAML2/SSO' -UseBasicParsing | Out-Null } catch {}; try { Invoke-WebRequest -SkipCertificateCheck -Method POST -Uri 'https://VCENTER_FQDN/rest/vcenter/vm' -Body '{}' -ContentType 'application/json' -UseBasicParsing | Out-Null } catch {}" Cleanup
echo 'No cleanup required, lab probe only' Expected Telemetry
Sequential anonymous SSO GET followed by a POST to /rest/vcenter from the same host within the correlation window.
Expected Detection
Elastic EQL sequence rule correlates the unauthenticated SSO success with the subsequent privileged POST.
Related Detections
Related Techniques
Same Tactic: Initial Access
Browse by tactic
- Reconnaissance TA0043
- Resource Development TA0042
- Initial Access TA0001
- Execution TA0002
- Persistence TA0003
- Privilege Escalation TA0004
- Stealth TA0005
- Defense Impairment TA0112
- Credential Access TA0006
- Discovery TA0007
- Lateral Movement TA0008
- Collection TA0009
- Command and Control TA0011
- Exfiltration TA0010
- Impact TA0040