Detect VMware vCenter Authentication Bypass via Alternate Path (CVE-2026-123890) in IBM QRadar
Detects activity related to CVE-2026-123890, a critical (CVSS 9.8) authentication bypass in VMware vCenter Server and related Broadcom vSphere products (CWE-288: Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel). According to Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant, the flaw is an unauthenticated Secure Remote Password (SRP-6a) session key disclosure over DCE/RPC, exposed on the vCenter Single Sign-On control interface RPC (TCP port 2012). Successful exploitation discloses the SRP session key without a password and creates an authenticated session as [email protected]. An attacker can then execute arbitrary commands and retrieve files such as the data.mdb database via the Directory Service (vmdird). The vulnerability is on the CISA KEV list and was exploited in the wild in early September 2026 by the suspected China-linked Armory Castle group (formerly UNC5221) using a utility named BONESAW. This detection surfaces anomalous unauthenticated access to privileged vCenter endpoints (/sdk, /ui, /rest, SSO token issuance), suspicious session or token creation without a preceding successful credential event, and post-exploitation administrative actions.
Based on Google Threat Intelligence, Armory Castle Exploits vSphere
MITRE ATT&CK
QRadar Detection Query
-- df00tech DF00-dc13f89b52 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-123890 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
SELECT sourceip, destinationip, "URL", "HTTPMethod", "HTTPResponseCode", "Username", COUNT(*) AS cnt
FROM events
WHERE LOGSOURCETYPENAME(devicetype) IN ('Apache HTTP Server', 'Microsoft IIS', 'VMware vCenter')
AND ("URL" ILIKE '%/sts/STSService%' OR "URL" ILIKE '%/websso/SAML2%' OR "URL" ILIKE '%/rest/vcenter%' OR "URL" ILIKE '%/sdk%' OR "URL" ILIKE '%/invsvc%')
AND "HTTPResponseCode" IN ('200', '201', '302')
AND ("Username" IS NULL OR "Username" = '-' OR "Username" = 'anonymous')
GROUP BY sourceip, destinationip
HAVING cnt >= 3
LAST 1 HOURS Aggregates unauthenticated successful requests to privileged vCenter endpoints per source IP as a possible indicator of exploitation.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Authorized vulnerability scans against vCenter
- Internal monitoring probes with no associated user
- Reverse proxies that omit authenticated username normalization
Other platforms for CVE-2026-123890
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 Anonymous request to vCenter STS/SSO endpoint
Expected signal: websso/STS access log and reverse-proxy log entry showing a POST to /sts/STSService with no authenticated username.
- Test 2 Unauthenticated vCenter REST API enumeration
Expected signal: Multiple GET requests to /rest/vcenter/* without an auth token recorded in envoy/reverse-proxy logs.
- Test 3 Simulated alternate-channel bypass with mutating request
Expected signal: Sequential anonymous SSO GET followed by a POST to /rest/vcenter from the same host within the correlation window.
References (6)
- https://support.broadcom.com/web/ecx/support-content-notification/-/external/content/SecurityAdvisories/0/39495
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-123890
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/armory-castle-exploits-vsphere?e=48754805
- https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-123890
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/china-linked-hackers-exploit-critical.html
Response Playbook
Triage
- Confirm the destination host is an affected vCenter/vSphere version per vulnMetadata (vCenter < 9.0.2.0200, < 9.1.1.0200, or 7.0/8.0/5.x lines) by checking the appliance build via /var/log/vmware/vpxd or the vCenter management UI.
- Validate that the flagged requests to /sts/STSService, /websso/SAML2, /rest/vcenter or /sdk were genuinely unauthenticated by inspecting the SSO (websso) and vpxd logs for a corresponding successful credential/token event; absence of a prior auth event is suspicious.
- Geolocate and reputation-check the source IP; cross-reference against the Armory Castle / vSphere-exploitation indicators published by Google Threat Intelligence and recent KEV reporting.
- Determine whether any SSO token or session was issued to the anonymous caller and what principal/role it mapped to.
Containment
- Isolate the affected vCenter from untrusted networks (restrict management ports to jump hosts) and, if active exploitation is confirmed, take the appliance offline for forensics.
- Apply the Broadcom fixed build (9.0.2.0200 / 9.1.1.0200 / 5.2.5 or later per your line); rotate the vCenter SSO signing certificate and all solution-user and administrator credentials.
- Invalidate all active vCenter sessions and SAML tokens, and force re-authentication for all SSO principals.
Evidence Collection
- Collect vCenter logs: /var/log/vmware/vpxd/vpxd.log, /var/log/vmware/sso/ (websso/STS), /var/log/vmware/vsphere-ui/, and the reverse-proxy/envoy access logs covering the exploitation window.
- Snapshot the vCenter appliance disk and memory before remediation to preserve attacker artifacts (web shells, added SSO users, scheduled tasks).
- Export the full request/response sequence for the flagged source IP and any ESXi hosts or VMs subsequently touched.
Escalation Criteria
- !Escalate to incident response and executive stakeholders if an SSO token or administrative session was successfully issued to an unauthenticated caller.
- !Escalate if post-exploitation activity is observed: new vCenter/SSO admin accounts, VM cloning/export, datastore browsing, or guest-operation API abuse against managed ESXi hosts.
- !Escalate per BOD 26-04 timelines given the KEV status and in-the-wild exploitation.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
vpxd.log and websso/STS SSO logs showing token issuance without preceding authentication - >
New or modified SSO solution-user or administrator accounts in vmdir - >
Reverse-proxy/envoy access logs with anonymous POSTs to /sdk or /rest/vcenter - >
Unexpected scheduled tasks, cron entries, or web shells on the vCenter appliance
Tuning Guidance
Baseline legitimate anonymous traffic to vCenter (load-balancer health checks, monitoring, authorized scanners) and allowlist those source IPs. Scope the queries to known vCenter FQDNs/IPs to cut noise, and verify how your reverse proxy/SSO populates the username field; some deployments drop the authenticated user from access logs, which can cause both false positives and false negatives. Raise the request-count threshold in environments with heavy automation. Note that the underlying exploit works over DCE/RPC on the vCenter SSO control interface (TCP 2012), so HTTP-based detections are supplementary; monitor and restrict access to port 2012 as well.
Hunting Queries
Hunt for unauthenticated successful access to privileged vCenter endpoints across the environment to find additional affected appliances or source IPs.
// df00tech DF00-dc13f89b52 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-123890 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csUriStem has_any ("/sts/STSService","/websso/SAML2","/rest/vcenter","/sdk") | where scStatus in (200,201,302) | where isempty(csUsername) or csUsername == "-" | summarize count() by cIP, csUriStem, bin(TimeGenerated,1h) | order by count_ desc ``` df00tech DF00-dc13f89b52 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-123890 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=vmware (sourcetype="vmware:vcenter:websso" OR sourcetype=iis) (uri_path="*/sts/STSService*" OR uri_path="*/rest/vcenter*" OR uri_path="*/sdk*") status IN (200,201,302) (user="-" OR user="anonymous" OR NOT user=*) | stats count by src_ip, uri_path | sort - count Atomic Red Team Tests
Simulate an unauthenticated request to the vCenter Secure Token Service endpoint to validate detection of alternate-channel access attempts.
Command
curl -sk -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -X POST https://VCENTER_FQDN/sts/STSService/vsphere.local -H 'Content-Type: application/soap+xml' --data '<soap:Envelope/>' Cleanup
echo 'No cleanup required, read-only probe' Expected Telemetry
websso/STS access log and reverse-proxy log entry showing a POST to /sts/STSService with no authenticated username.
Expected Detection
KQL/SPL rules flag the anonymous POST to the privileged SSO endpoint from the test source IP.
Issue anonymous requests to the vCenter REST API to emulate post-bypass enumeration.
Command
for p in /rest/vcenter/vm /rest/vcenter/host /rest/vcenter/datastore; do curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "$p %{http_code}\n" https://VCENTER_FQDN$p; done Cleanup
echo 'No cleanup required, read-only GET requests' Expected Telemetry
Multiple GET requests to /rest/vcenter/* without an auth token recorded in envoy/reverse-proxy logs.
Expected Detection
Detection aggregates >=3 anonymous privileged endpoint requests from one source and alerts.
Chain an anonymous successful SSO request with a privileged POST to emulate the exploit sequence used in EQL correlation.
Command
powershell -c "$ProgressPreference='SilentlyContinue'; try { Invoke-WebRequest -SkipCertificateCheck -Uri 'https://VCENTER_FQDN/websso/SAML2/SSO' -UseBasicParsing | Out-Null } catch {}; try { Invoke-WebRequest -SkipCertificateCheck -Method POST -Uri 'https://VCENTER_FQDN/rest/vcenter/vm' -Body '{}' -ContentType 'application/json' -UseBasicParsing | Out-Null } catch {}" Cleanup
echo 'No cleanup required, lab probe only' Expected Telemetry
Sequential anonymous SSO GET followed by a POST to /rest/vcenter from the same host within the correlation window.
Expected Detection
Elastic EQL sequence rule correlates the unauthenticated SSO success with the subsequent privileged POST.