Skip to content
CVE-2026-120002

CVE-2026-120002: Incorrect Authorization Privilege Escalation in Microsoft Office SharePoint

Privilege Escalation Initial Access Last updated:

Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2026-120002, an incorrect-authorization flaw (CWE-863) in Microsoft Office SharePoint that allows an authenticated attacker to elevate privileges over the network. Because the root cause is a broken authorization check rather than a memory-safety bug, exploitation manifests as an already-authenticated low-privilege account suddenly performing actions normally reserved for elevated roles: accessing or modifying restricted sites/lists, granting itself permissions, invoking privileged SharePoint web services (e.g. _vti_bin, client.svc, _api/web, _layouts admin pages), or operating with an unexpected effective identity. Detection focuses on anomalous privileged SharePoint IIS/ULS activity from accounts or sessions that should not have it, HTTP 200 responses to privileged endpoints that would ordinarily return 401/403, and audit events showing permission grants or role additions correlated with low-privilege callers. Exploit status at authoring time is theoretical (no public PoC); tune aggressively against legitimate admin activity.

Vulnerability Intelligence

Theoretical

Weakness (CWE)

Timeline

Disclosed
November 10, 2026

CVSS

9.9
Critical (9.0–10)
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

What is CVE-2026-120002 CVE-2026-120002: Incorrect Authorization Privilege Escalation in Microsoft Office SharePoint?

CVE-2026-120002: Incorrect Authorization Privilege Escalation in Microsoft Office SharePoint (CVE-2026-120002) maps to the Privilege Escalation and Initial Access tactics — the adversary is trying to gain higher-level permissions in MITRE ATT&CK.

This page provides production-ready detection logic for CVE-2026-120002: Incorrect Authorization Privilege Escalation in Microsoft Office SharePoint, covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Sentinel, IIS W3C logs, SharePoint ULS. The queries below are rated critical severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Privilege Escalation Initial Access
Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
kusto
// df00tech DF00-654ab134b6 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-120002 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
// Privileged SharePoint endpoint access from non-admin accounts returning success
let privilegedPaths = dynamic(["/_layouts/15/user.aspx", "/_layouts/15/aclinv.aspx", "/_layouts/15/mngsiteadmin.aspx", "/_layouts/15/people.aspx", "/_vti_bin/client.svc", "/_api/web/roleassignments", "/_api/web/siteusers", "/_vti_bin/sites.asmx", "/_vti_bin/usergroup.asmx"]);
W3CIISLog
| where csUriStem has_any (privilegedPaths)
| where scStatus in (200, 201, 204)
| where csMethod in ("POST", "PUT", "MERGE", "GET")
| extend caller = coalesce(csUserName, "anonymous")
| where caller != "anonymous"
| summarize hits = count(), paths = make_set(csUriStem, 20), methods = make_set(csMethod, 10), firstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), lastSeen = max(TimeGenerated) by caller, cIP, sSiteName
| where hits >= 3
| order by hits desc

Flags successful HTTP responses to privileged SharePoint management and web-service endpoints from authenticated non-service accounts, a signature of authorization-bypass abuse.

critical severity medium confidence

Data Sources

Microsoft Sentinel IIS W3C logs SharePoint ULS

Required Tables

W3CIISLog

False Positives

  • Legitimate SharePoint farm or site-collection administrators performing routine permission management.
  • Automation/service accounts (e.g. search crawl, workflow, backup) that legitimately invoke privileged web services.
  • Migration or governance tooling (ShareGate, Metalogix, AvePoint) that enumerates and modifies permissions at scale.

Query fingerprint DF00-654ab134b6 · licence

Sigma logsource & community rules

The detection logic for CVE-2026-120002: Incorrect Authorization Privilege Escalation in Microsoft Office SharePoint (CVE-2026-120002) above is provided in a vendor-neutral form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the following logsource:

logsource:
  product: windows

Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Enumerate SharePoint role assignments via REST as low-privilege user

    Expected signal: IIS log entry for GET /_api/web/roleassignments with the test user and a 200/403 status.

  2. Test 2 Attempt self role assignment via REST MERGE

    Expected signal: IIS POST to addroleassignment and a corresponding SharePoint audit permission-change entry.

  3. Test 3 Access site admin page via legacy SOAP web service

    Expected signal: IIS POST to /_vti_bin/usergroup.asmx from the low-privilege account.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Identify the calling account (cs_username) and confirm its intended SharePoint role; verify whether it should have access to the privileged endpoints it successfully reached.
  2. Correlate the IIS success events with SharePoint ULS and audit logs to confirm whether a permission change, role assignment, or restricted-content access actually occurred versus a benign request.
  3. Check the source IP and user-agent against known admin workstations, automation hosts, and governance tooling to rule out sanctioned activity.
  4. Determine the SharePoint build/patch level of the farm and confirm whether the CVE-2026-120002 security update has been applied.

Containment

  1. Suspend or reduce the implicated account's permissions and revoke any role assignments or group memberships it granted during the suspicious window.
  2. Block the source IP at the WAF/reverse proxy and, if exploitation is confirmed, isolate the affected SharePoint web front-end from untrusted networks.
  3. Apply the Microsoft security update for CVE-2026-120002 to all SharePoint servers and recycle the affected IIS application pools.

Evidence Collection

  1. Preserve IIS W3C logs, SharePoint ULS logs, and the SharePoint audit log for the affected site collections covering the suspicious window.
  2. Export the current permission/role assignments and group memberships for affected sites to capture attacker-induced changes before remediation.
  3. Capture the SharePoint content database transaction context (SPAuditEntry rows) and any newly created/modified documents or list items.

Escalation Criteria

  • ! Escalate to incident response if audit logs confirm a low-privilege account granted itself or others elevated roles (site collection admin, full control).
  • ! Escalate if restricted content was accessed or exfiltrated, or if the activity originates from an external/untrusted IP range.
  • ! Escalate to the SharePoint platform owner if the farm is unpatched and exposed, given the 9.9 CVSS and network-exploitable nature.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • > IIS W3C logs showing 200/201/204 responses to privileged _layouts, _api/web/roleassignments and _vti_bin endpoints from non-admin accounts.
  • > SharePoint ULS log entries and SPAuditEntry rows recording permission grants, role assignments, and restricted-content access.
  • > SharePoint site collection permission snapshots showing unexpected elevated role assignments.

Tuning Guidance

Baseline the set of legitimate SharePoint farm/site-collection administrators, service accounts (search crawl, workflow, backup), and sanctioned governance/migration tooling, then allow-list their account names and source IPs. Raise the hit threshold for high-volume automation and scope detection to internet-facing web front-ends first. Pair IIS-success signals with SharePoint audit-log permission-change events to reduce false positives from benign reads versus actual privilege changes.


Hunting Queries

Enumerate authenticated accounts that successfully reached privileged SharePoint permission-management endpoints, to baseline normal admins and surface anomalous callers.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-654ab134b6 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-120002 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csUriStem has_any ("/_api/web/roleassignments", "/_layouts/15/mngsiteadmin.aspx", "/_vti_bin/usergroup.asmx") | where scStatus in (200,201,204) | summarize by csUserName, cIP, csUriStem, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h) | order by TimeGenerated desc
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-654ab134b6 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-120002 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=iis (cs_uri_stem="*/_api/web/roleassignments*" OR cs_uri_stem="*/_layouts/15/mngsiteadmin.aspx" OR cs_uri_stem="*/_vti_bin/usergroup.asmx") sc_status IN (200,201,204) | stats count values(cs_uri_stem) by cs_username c_ip

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Enumerate SharePoint role assignments via REST as low-privilege user
windows

Simulates an attacker probing the roleassignments endpoint that an authorization bypass would expose.

Command

powershell
$u='http://sharepoint.lab/_api/web/roleassignments'; Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $u -UseDefaultCredentials -Headers @{Accept='application/json;odata=verbose'} -Method GET

Cleanup

powershell
Remove-Variable u -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

Expected Telemetry

IIS log entry for GET /_api/web/roleassignments with the test user and a 200/403 status.

Expected Detection

KQL/SPL IIS queries surface the privileged endpoint access by the authenticated test account.

Test 2 Attempt self role assignment via REST MERGE
windows

Simulates an attacker granting itself an elevated role through the SharePoint REST API.

Command

powershell
$u='http://sharepoint.lab/_api/web/roleassignments/addroleassignment(principalid=11,roledefid=1073741829)'; Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $u -UseDefaultCredentials -Method POST -Headers @{Accept='application/json;odata=verbose'}

Cleanup

powershell
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri 'http://sharepoint.lab/_api/web/roleassignments/removeroleassignment(principalid=11,roledefid=1073741829)' -UseDefaultCredentials -Method POST -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

Expected Telemetry

IIS POST to addroleassignment and a corresponding SharePoint audit permission-change entry.

Expected Detection

IIS success-on-privileged-endpoint detection fires; audit-log correlation confirms a role grant.

Test 3 Access site admin page via legacy SOAP web service
linux

Simulates abuse of the usergroup.asmx SOAP endpoint to manage users/groups.

Command

bash
curl -s -u 'LAB\\lowpriv:Passw0rd!' -H 'SOAPAction: http://schemas.microsoft.com/sharepoint/soap/directory/GetUserCollectionFromSite' -H 'Content-Type: text/xml' -X POST 'http://sharepoint.lab/_vti_bin/usergroup.asmx' --data '<?xml version="1.0"?><soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"><soap:Body><GetUserCollectionFromSite xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/sharepoint/soap/directory/"/></soap:Body></soap:Envelope>'

Cleanup

bash
echo 'no cleanup required (read-only request)'

Expected Telemetry

IIS POST to /_vti_bin/usergroup.asmx from the low-privilege account.

Expected Detection

Privileged SOAP web-service access by a non-admin account is flagged by the IIS detections.

Related Detections

Browse by tactic

Full ATT&CK matrix Search all detections