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CVE-2026-120002 Splunk · SPL

Detect CVE-2026-120002: Incorrect Authorization Privilege Escalation in Microsoft Office SharePoint in Splunk

Detects potential exploitation of CVE-2026-120002, an incorrect-authorization flaw (CWE-863) in Microsoft Office SharePoint that allows an authenticated attacker to elevate privileges over the network. Because the root cause is a broken authorization check rather than a memory-safety bug, exploitation manifests as an already-authenticated low-privilege account suddenly performing actions normally reserved for elevated roles: accessing or modifying restricted sites/lists, granting itself permissions, invoking privileged SharePoint web services (e.g. _vti_bin, client.svc, _api/web, _layouts admin pages), or operating with an unexpected effective identity. Detection focuses on anomalous privileged SharePoint IIS/ULS activity from accounts or sessions that should not have it, HTTP 200 responses to privileged endpoints that would ordinarily return 401/403, and audit events showing permission grants or role additions correlated with low-privilege callers. Exploit status at authoring time is theoretical (no public PoC); tune aggressively against legitimate admin activity.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Privilege Escalation Initial Access

SPL Detection Query

Splunk (SPL)
spl
``` df00tech DF00-654ab134b6 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-120002 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=iis (cs_uri_stem="*/_layouts/15/user.aspx" OR cs_uri_stem="*/_layouts/15/aclinv.aspx" OR cs_uri_stem="*/_layouts/15/mngsiteadmin.aspx" OR cs_uri_stem="*/_api/web/roleassignments*" OR cs_uri_stem="*/_api/web/siteusers*" OR cs_uri_stem="*/_vti_bin/usergroup.asmx" OR cs_uri_stem="*/_vti_bin/client.svc*") sc_status IN (200,201,204) cs_username="*"
| where cs_username!="-"
| stats count AS hits values(cs_uri_stem) AS paths values(cs_method) AS methods min(_time) AS firstSeen max(_time) AS lastSeen by cs_username c_ip s_sitename
| where hits>=3
| sort - hits
critical severity medium confidence

Splunk equivalent: successful accesses to privileged SharePoint endpoints by authenticated users via IIS logs.

Data Sources

SplunkIIS W3C logsSharePoint ULS

Required Sourcetypes

ms:iis:autoiisMSSharePoint:ULS

False Positives & Tuning

  • Legitimate SharePoint administrators managing site/list permissions.
  • Service and automation accounts invoking SOAP/REST web services as designed.
  • Third-party governance/migration tooling performing bulk permission operations.

Other platforms for CVE-2026-120002


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Enumerate SharePoint role assignments via REST as low-privilege user

    Expected signal: IIS log entry for GET /_api/web/roleassignments with the test user and a 200/403 status.

  2. Test 2 Attempt self role assignment via REST MERGE

    Expected signal: IIS POST to addroleassignment and a corresponding SharePoint audit permission-change entry.

  3. Test 3 Access site admin page via legacy SOAP web service

    Expected signal: IIS POST to /_vti_bin/usergroup.asmx from the low-privilege account.

Last updated: Research depth: standard
References (1)

Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Identify the calling account (cs_username) and confirm its intended SharePoint role; verify whether it should have access to the privileged endpoints it successfully reached.
  2. Correlate the IIS success events with SharePoint ULS and audit logs to confirm whether a permission change, role assignment, or restricted-content access actually occurred versus a benign request.
  3. Check the source IP and user-agent against known admin workstations, automation hosts, and governance tooling to rule out sanctioned activity.
  4. Determine the SharePoint build/patch level of the farm and confirm whether the CVE-2026-120002 security update has been applied.

Containment

  1. Suspend or reduce the implicated account's permissions and revoke any role assignments or group memberships it granted during the suspicious window.
  2. Block the source IP at the WAF/reverse proxy and, if exploitation is confirmed, isolate the affected SharePoint web front-end from untrusted networks.
  3. Apply the Microsoft security update for CVE-2026-120002 to all SharePoint servers and recycle the affected IIS application pools.

Evidence Collection

  1. Preserve IIS W3C logs, SharePoint ULS logs, and the SharePoint audit log for the affected site collections covering the suspicious window.
  2. Export the current permission/role assignments and group memberships for affected sites to capture attacker-induced changes before remediation.
  3. Capture the SharePoint content database transaction context (SPAuditEntry rows) and any newly created/modified documents or list items.

Escalation Criteria

  • !Escalate to incident response if audit logs confirm a low-privilege account granted itself or others elevated roles (site collection admin, full control).
  • !Escalate if restricted content was accessed or exfiltrated, or if the activity originates from an external/untrusted IP range.
  • !Escalate to the SharePoint platform owner if the farm is unpatched and exposed, given the 9.9 CVSS and network-exploitable nature.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • >IIS W3C logs showing 200/201/204 responses to privileged _layouts, _api/web/roleassignments and _vti_bin endpoints from non-admin accounts.
  • >SharePoint ULS log entries and SPAuditEntry rows recording permission grants, role assignments, and restricted-content access.
  • >SharePoint site collection permission snapshots showing unexpected elevated role assignments.

Tuning Guidance

Baseline the set of legitimate SharePoint farm/site-collection administrators, service accounts (search crawl, workflow, backup), and sanctioned governance/migration tooling, then allow-list their account names and source IPs. Raise the hit threshold for high-volume automation and scope detection to internet-facing web front-ends first. Pair IIS-success signals with SharePoint audit-log permission-change events to reduce false positives from benign reads versus actual privilege changes.


Hunting Queries

Enumerate authenticated accounts that successfully reached privileged SharePoint permission-management endpoints, to baseline normal admins and surface anomalous callers.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-654ab134b6 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-120002 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csUriStem has_any ("/_api/web/roleassignments", "/_layouts/15/mngsiteadmin.aspx", "/_vti_bin/usergroup.asmx") | where scStatus in (200,201,204) | summarize by csUserName, cIP, csUriStem, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h) | order by TimeGenerated desc
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-654ab134b6 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-120002 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=iis (cs_uri_stem="*/_api/web/roleassignments*" OR cs_uri_stem="*/_layouts/15/mngsiteadmin.aspx" OR cs_uri_stem="*/_vti_bin/usergroup.asmx") sc_status IN (200,201,204) | stats count values(cs_uri_stem) by cs_username c_ip

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Enumerate SharePoint role assignments via REST as low-privilege user
windows

Simulates an attacker probing the roleassignments endpoint that an authorization bypass would expose.

Command

powershell
$u='http://sharepoint.lab/_api/web/roleassignments'; Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $u -UseDefaultCredentials -Headers @{Accept='application/json;odata=verbose'} -Method GET

Cleanup

powershell
Remove-Variable u -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

Expected Telemetry

IIS log entry for GET /_api/web/roleassignments with the test user and a 200/403 status.

Expected Detection

KQL/SPL IIS queries surface the privileged endpoint access by the authenticated test account.

Test 2 Attempt self role assignment via REST MERGE
windows

Simulates an attacker granting itself an elevated role through the SharePoint REST API.

Command

powershell
$u='http://sharepoint.lab/_api/web/roleassignments/addroleassignment(principalid=11,roledefid=1073741829)'; Invoke-WebRequest -Uri $u -UseDefaultCredentials -Method POST -Headers @{Accept='application/json;odata=verbose'}

Cleanup

powershell
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri 'http://sharepoint.lab/_api/web/roleassignments/removeroleassignment(principalid=11,roledefid=1073741829)' -UseDefaultCredentials -Method POST -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

Expected Telemetry

IIS POST to addroleassignment and a corresponding SharePoint audit permission-change entry.

Expected Detection

IIS success-on-privileged-endpoint detection fires; audit-log correlation confirms a role grant.

Test 3 Access site admin page via legacy SOAP web service
linux

Simulates abuse of the usergroup.asmx SOAP endpoint to manage users/groups.

Command

bash
curl -s -u 'LAB\\lowpriv:Passw0rd!' -H 'SOAPAction: http://schemas.microsoft.com/sharepoint/soap/directory/GetUserCollectionFromSite' -H 'Content-Type: text/xml' -X POST 'http://sharepoint.lab/_vti_bin/usergroup.asmx' --data '<?xml version="1.0"?><soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"><soap:Body><GetUserCollectionFromSite xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/sharepoint/soap/directory/"/></soap:Body></soap:Envelope>'

Cleanup

bash
echo 'no cleanup required (read-only request)'

Expected Telemetry

IIS POST to /_vti_bin/usergroup.asmx from the low-privilege account.

Expected Detection

Privileged SOAP web-service access by a non-admin account is flagged by the IIS detections.

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