Ivanti Connect Secure Predictable Filename File Upload (CVE-2026-118527)
Detects exploitation attempts against CVE-2026-118527, a CWE-340 (Generation of Predictable Numbers or Identifiers) vulnerability in Ivanti Connect Secure. A remote, authenticated attacker can leverage predictable file naming to upload attacker-controlled files to a known/guessable location on the appliance. This detection focuses on authenticated web requests to Ivanti Connect Secure upload endpoints, writes of files to predictable paths, and subsequent access/retrieval of those uploaded files. Because the predictable-filename weakness requires an authenticated session, detection emphasizes correlating an authenticated user context with file-write and file-access activity to known locations. CVE-2026-118527 is listed in the CISA KEV catalog (disclosed 2026-10-30).
Vulnerability Intelligence
KEV — Known ExploitedAffected Software
- Vendor
- Ivanti
- Product
- Connect Secure
Weakness (CWE)
Timeline
- Disclosed
- October 30, 2026
References & Proof of Concept
- https://hub.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Connect-Secure-CVE-2026-104935?language=en_US
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-118527
CVSS
- Attack Vector
- Network
- Attack Complexity
- Low
- Privileges Required
- Low
- User Interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- Low
- Availability
- None
What is CVE-2026-118527 Ivanti Connect Secure Predictable Filename File Upload (CVE-2026-118527)?
Ivanti Connect Secure Predictable Filename File Upload (CVE-2026-118527) (CVE-2026-118527) maps to the Initial Access tactic — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.
This page provides production-ready detection logic for Ivanti Connect Secure Predictable Filename File Upload (CVE-2026-118527), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Ivanti Connect Secure web/proxy logs, Network IDS/WAF. The queries below are rated high severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Initial Access
// df00tech DF00-64ae7dbc56 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-118527 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
let uploadPaths = dynamic(["/dana/", "/dana-ws/", "/dana-na/", "/dana-cached/", "/api/v1/"]);
let uploadVerbs = dynamic(["POST", "PUT"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DeviceVendor has "Ivanti" or DeviceProduct has "Connect Secure" or DeviceProduct has "Pulse"
| where RequestMethod in (uploadVerbs)
| extend uri = tostring(RequestURL)
| where uri has_any (uploadPaths)
| where uri has_any ("upload", "file", "import", "attachment", "cache")
| extend authUser = coalesce(SourceUserName, DestinationUserName, "")
| where isnotempty(authUser)
| summarize uploadCount = count(), paths = make_set(uri, 20), firstSeen = min(TimeGenerated), lastSeen = max(TimeGenerated) by SourceIP, authUser, DeviceName
| where uploadCount >= 1
| project firstSeen, lastSeen, SourceIP, authUser, DeviceName, uploadCount, paths Flags authenticated POST/PUT requests to Ivanti Connect Secure upload-capable endpoints that may write files to predictable locations, correlated with an authenticated user context.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Legitimate administrators importing configuration bundles or uploading files through the admin UI
- Automated backup or configuration-sync tooling that uploads files to the appliance
- Security scanners or inventory tools authenticating and probing upload endpoints
Query fingerprint DF00-64ae7dbc56 · licence
Sigma logsource & community rules
The detection logic for Ivanti Connect Secure Predictable Filename File Upload (CVE-2026-118527) (CVE-2026-118527) above is provided in a vendor-neutral
form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the
following logsource:
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:
Platform-specific guides for CVE-2026-118527
References (4)
- https://hub.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-Ivanti-Connect-Secure-CVE-2026-104935?language=en_US
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-118527
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 Authenticated upload to predictable Ivanti path (simulated)
Expected signal: Web/proxy log entry showing an authenticated POST to /dana-ws/upload with a predictable filename parameter.
- Test 2 Retrieve file from predictable location (simulated)
Expected signal: Web/proxy log entry showing an authenticated GET to a predictable cached path.
- Test 3 Windows authenticated upload simulation
Expected signal: Web/proxy log entry showing an authenticated POST from the Windows host to the predictable upload endpoint.
Response Playbook
Triage
- Confirm the targeted appliance is Ivanti Connect Secure and determine its current version; versions prior to 25.1.1.3 and 22.8R2.6 are affected by CVE-2026-118527 and require the vendor fix.
- Identify the authenticated user account tied to the upload requests and verify whether that account legitimately performs file uploads/imports; the vulnerability requires an authenticated session, so a compromised or misused account is in scope.
- Review the uploaded file's destination path and filename to assess whether it matches a predictable, attacker-guessable location rather than a normal admin import path.
- Correlate the upload activity with any subsequent GET/retrieval requests to the same predictable path, which would indicate the attacker is accessing their planted file.
Containment
- Apply the Ivanti fixed release (25.1.1.3 / 22.8R2.6 or later) to remediate the predictable-filename weakness.
- Suspend or reset credentials for the authenticated account used in the suspicious uploads and invalidate its active sessions.
- Quarantine or remove any attacker-uploaded files from the identified predictable location and restrict access to upload endpoints pending investigation.
Evidence Collection
- Preserve Ivanti Connect Secure web/access logs showing the POST/PUT upload requests, source IPs, authenticated usernames, and target URIs.
- Collect the uploaded file(s) from the predictable path along with filesystem timestamps for forensic analysis.
- Export appliance authentication logs for the implicated account to establish the full session timeline.
Escalation Criteria
- ! Escalate to incident response if an uploaded file is retrieved/executed or if the planted file is a web-accessible script or configuration artifact.
- ! Escalate if the authenticated account shows signs of compromise (anomalous source geography, impossible travel, or credentials used outside normal hours) or if the appliance remains unpatched while exposed to the internet.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
Ivanti Connect Secure web/access logs (/dana, /dana-ws, /api/v1 request records) - >
Files present in predictable upload directories on the appliance and their creation timestamps - >
Appliance authentication and session logs for the implicated user account
Tuning Guidance
Baseline the set of accounts and source IPs that legitimately perform file imports/uploads on the appliance (admins, backup automation) and exclude them. Narrow the URI patterns to the specific upload endpoints exposed in your deployment, and prioritize alerts where an upload is followed by a retrieval of the same predictable path. If the appliance is already patched to 25.1.1.3 / 22.8R2.6, treat matches as lower urgency unless the account appears compromised.
Hunting Queries
Hunt for authenticated upload requests to Ivanti Connect Secure grouped by user, source, and target path to spot writes to predictable locations.
// df00tech DF00-64ae7dbc56 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-118527 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
CommonSecurityLog | where DeviceProduct has "Connect Secure" | where RequestMethod in ("POST","PUT") | where RequestURL has_any ("upload","import","file") | summarize count() by SourceUserName, SourceIP, RequestURL ``` df00tech DF00-64ae7dbc56 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-118527 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=ivanti sourcetype="ivanti:ics:web" (http_method=POST OR http_method=PUT) (uri_path=*upload* OR uri_path=*import* OR uri_path=*file*) | stats count by user src_ip uri_path Atomic Red Team Tests
Simulates an authenticated POST file upload to a predictable Ivanti Connect Secure-style path against a lab endpoint to validate detection of the upload request.
Command
curl -k -s -b 'DSID=labsession' -X POST -F 'file=@/tmp/argus_test.txt' 'https://ics-lab.example.local/dana-ws/upload?name=predictable_123.txt' -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' Cleanup
rm -f /tmp/argus_test.txt Expected Telemetry
Web/proxy log entry showing an authenticated POST to /dana-ws/upload with a predictable filename parameter.
Expected Detection
The KQL/SPL upload-path rules fire on the authenticated POST to the predictable Ivanti path.
Simulates an attacker retrieving a previously uploaded file from a predictable, guessable path on a lab endpoint.
Command
curl -k -s -b 'DSID=labsession' 'https://ics-lab.example.local/dana-cached/predictable_123.txt' -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' Cleanup
echo 'no local artifacts to clean' Expected Telemetry
Web/proxy log entry showing an authenticated GET to a predictable cached path.
Expected Detection
Hunting queries correlate the upload with a subsequent retrieval of the same predictable path.
Uses PowerShell to simulate an authenticated file upload to a predictable Ivanti-style endpoint from a Windows host in a lab.
Command
powershell -Command "$s=New-Object Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.WebRequestSession; $c=New-Object System.Net.Cookie('DSID','labsession','/','ics-lab.example.local'); $s.Cookies.Add($c); Invoke-WebRequest -SkipCertificateCheck -Uri 'https://ics-lab.example.local/dana-ws/upload?name=predictable_456.txt' -Method POST -WebSession $s -InFile C:\Windows\Temp\argus_test.txt" Cleanup
powershell -Command "Remove-Item C:\Windows\Temp\argus_test.txt -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue" Expected Telemetry
Web/proxy log entry showing an authenticated POST from the Windows host to the predictable upload endpoint.
Expected Detection
The upload-path detection rules fire on the authenticated POST request.
Related Detections
Tactic Hub
Related Techniques
Same Tactic: Initial Access
Browse by tactic
- Reconnaissance TA0043
- Resource Development TA0042
- Initial Access TA0001
- Execution TA0002
- Persistence TA0003
- Privilege Escalation TA0004
- Stealth TA0005
- Defense Impairment TA0112
- Credential Access TA0006
- Discovery TA0007
- Lateral Movement TA0008
- Collection TA0009
- Command and Control TA0011
- Exfiltration TA0010
- Impact TA0040