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CVE-2026-118527 Splunk · SPL

Detect Ivanti Connect Secure Predictable Filename File Upload (CVE-2026-118527) in Splunk

Detects exploitation attempts against CVE-2026-118527, a CWE-340 (Generation of Predictable Numbers or Identifiers) vulnerability in Ivanti Connect Secure. A remote, authenticated attacker can leverage predictable file naming to upload attacker-controlled files to a known/guessable location on the appliance. This detection focuses on authenticated web requests to Ivanti Connect Secure upload endpoints, writes of files to predictable paths, and subsequent access/retrieval of those uploaded files. Because the predictable-filename weakness requires an authenticated session, detection emphasizes correlating an authenticated user context with file-write and file-access activity to known locations. CVE-2026-118527 is listed in the CISA KEV catalog (disclosed 2026-10-30).

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access

SPL Detection Query

Splunk (SPL)
spl
``` df00tech DF00-64ae7dbc56 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-118527 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=ivanti (sourcetype="ivanti:ics:web" OR sourcetype="pulse:secure:access")
| eval method=upper(coalesce(http_method, method))
| search method IN ("POST","PUT")
| eval uri=coalesce(uri_path, url, request)
| where match(uri, "(?i)/dana(-ws|-na|-cached)?/|/api/v1/")
| where match(uri, "(?i)(upload|file|import|attachment|cache)")
| eval auth_user=coalesce(user, username, src_user)
| where isnotnull(auth_user) AND auth_user!=""
| stats count AS upload_count values(uri) AS paths min(_time) AS first_seen max(_time) AS last_seen by src_ip auth_user host
| where upload_count>=1
| convert ctime(first_seen) ctime(last_seen)
high severity medium confidence

Identifies authenticated file-upload requests to predictable Ivanti Connect Secure paths from Splunk-indexed appliance web logs.

Data Sources

Ivanti Connect Secure web/proxy logsNetwork IDS/WAF

Required Sourcetypes

ivanti:ics:webpulse:secure:access

False Positives & Tuning

  • Legitimate administrators importing configuration bundles via the admin UI
  • Backup/config-sync automation uploading files to the appliance
  • Authenticated vulnerability scanners probing upload endpoints

Other platforms for CVE-2026-118527


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Authenticated upload to predictable Ivanti path (simulated)

    Expected signal: Web/proxy log entry showing an authenticated POST to /dana-ws/upload with a predictable filename parameter.

  2. Test 2 Retrieve file from predictable location (simulated)

    Expected signal: Web/proxy log entry showing an authenticated GET to a predictable cached path.

  3. Test 3 Windows authenticated upload simulation

    Expected signal: Web/proxy log entry showing an authenticated POST from the Windows host to the predictable upload endpoint.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm the targeted appliance is Ivanti Connect Secure and determine its current version; versions prior to 25.1.1.3 and 22.8R2.6 are affected by CVE-2026-118527 and require the vendor fix.
  2. Identify the authenticated user account tied to the upload requests and verify whether that account legitimately performs file uploads/imports; the vulnerability requires an authenticated session, so a compromised or misused account is in scope.
  3. Review the uploaded file's destination path and filename to assess whether it matches a predictable, attacker-guessable location rather than a normal admin import path.
  4. Correlate the upload activity with any subsequent GET/retrieval requests to the same predictable path, which would indicate the attacker is accessing their planted file.

Containment

  1. Apply the Ivanti fixed release (25.1.1.3 / 22.8R2.6 or later) to remediate the predictable-filename weakness.
  2. Suspend or reset credentials for the authenticated account used in the suspicious uploads and invalidate its active sessions.
  3. Quarantine or remove any attacker-uploaded files from the identified predictable location and restrict access to upload endpoints pending investigation.

Evidence Collection

  1. Preserve Ivanti Connect Secure web/access logs showing the POST/PUT upload requests, source IPs, authenticated usernames, and target URIs.
  2. Collect the uploaded file(s) from the predictable path along with filesystem timestamps for forensic analysis.
  3. Export appliance authentication logs for the implicated account to establish the full session timeline.

Escalation Criteria

  • !Escalate to incident response if an uploaded file is retrieved/executed or if the planted file is a web-accessible script or configuration artifact.
  • !Escalate if the authenticated account shows signs of compromise (anomalous source geography, impossible travel, or credentials used outside normal hours) or if the appliance remains unpatched while exposed to the internet.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • >Ivanti Connect Secure web/access logs (/dana, /dana-ws, /api/v1 request records)
  • >Files present in predictable upload directories on the appliance and their creation timestamps
  • >Appliance authentication and session logs for the implicated user account

Tuning Guidance

Baseline the set of accounts and source IPs that legitimately perform file imports/uploads on the appliance (admins, backup automation) and exclude them. Narrow the URI patterns to the specific upload endpoints exposed in your deployment, and prioritize alerts where an upload is followed by a retrieval of the same predictable path. If the appliance is already patched to 25.1.1.3 / 22.8R2.6, treat matches as lower urgency unless the account appears compromised.


Hunting Queries

Hunt for authenticated upload requests to Ivanti Connect Secure grouped by user, source, and target path to spot writes to predictable locations.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-64ae7dbc56 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-118527 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
CommonSecurityLog | where DeviceProduct has "Connect Secure" | where RequestMethod in ("POST","PUT") | where RequestURL has_any ("upload","import","file") | summarize count() by SourceUserName, SourceIP, RequestURL
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-64ae7dbc56 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-118527 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=ivanti sourcetype="ivanti:ics:web" (http_method=POST OR http_method=PUT) (uri_path=*upload* OR uri_path=*import* OR uri_path=*file*) | stats count by user src_ip uri_path

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Authenticated upload to predictable Ivanti path (simulated)
linux

Simulates an authenticated POST file upload to a predictable Ivanti Connect Secure-style path against a lab endpoint to validate detection of the upload request.

Command

bash
curl -k -s -b 'DSID=labsession' -X POST -F 'file=@/tmp/argus_test.txt' 'https://ics-lab.example.local/dana-ws/upload?name=predictable_123.txt' -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n'

Cleanup

bash
rm -f /tmp/argus_test.txt

Expected Telemetry

Web/proxy log entry showing an authenticated POST to /dana-ws/upload with a predictable filename parameter.

Expected Detection

The KQL/SPL upload-path rules fire on the authenticated POST to the predictable Ivanti path.

Test 2 Retrieve file from predictable location (simulated)
linux

Simulates an attacker retrieving a previously uploaded file from a predictable, guessable path on a lab endpoint.

Command

bash
curl -k -s -b 'DSID=labsession' 'https://ics-lab.example.local/dana-cached/predictable_123.txt' -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n'

Cleanup

bash
echo 'no local artifacts to clean'

Expected Telemetry

Web/proxy log entry showing an authenticated GET to a predictable cached path.

Expected Detection

Hunting queries correlate the upload with a subsequent retrieval of the same predictable path.

Test 3 Windows authenticated upload simulation
windows

Uses PowerShell to simulate an authenticated file upload to a predictable Ivanti-style endpoint from a Windows host in a lab.

Command

powershell
powershell -Command "$s=New-Object Microsoft.PowerShell.Commands.WebRequestSession; $c=New-Object System.Net.Cookie('DSID','labsession','/','ics-lab.example.local'); $s.Cookies.Add($c); Invoke-WebRequest -SkipCertificateCheck -Uri 'https://ics-lab.example.local/dana-ws/upload?name=predictable_456.txt' -Method POST -WebSession $s -InFile C:\Windows\Temp\argus_test.txt"

Cleanup

powershell
powershell -Command "Remove-Item C:\Windows\Temp\argus_test.txt -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue"

Expected Telemetry

Web/proxy log entry showing an authenticated POST from the Windows host to the predictable upload endpoint.

Expected Detection

The upload-path detection rules fire on the authenticated POST request.

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