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CVE-2026-116779

SignalWire FreeSwitch Code Injection (CVE-2026-116779)

Initial Access Execution Lateral Movement Last updated:

Detects likely exploitation of CVE-2026-116779, a command/code injection flaw in FreeSWITCH (CWE-77/CWE-78/CWE-749). According to the SignalWire advisory, sofia_presence_handle_sip_i_message() splits the To user of an inbound SIP MESSAGE on a plus sign and treats the left side as a chat protocol selector. Selecting the api chat proto reaches switch_api_execute(), so a peer whose MESSAGE is accepted by a profile can run FreeSWITCH API commands, including operating-system command sinks, with the daemon's privileges. Inbound chat is enabled on the stock internal and external profiles. The flaw is fixed in version 1.11.3. It is listed on the CISA KEV catalog with exploitation observed in the wild. Because the server-side effect is the FreeSWITCH process running API and OS commands, this detection focuses on anomalous child processes spawned by the FreeSWITCH daemon (shells, interpreters, network tools) and on configuration tampering that introduces command-execution applications. This is a vulnerability-exploitation detection, not an IOC match.

Vulnerability Intelligence

KEV — Known Exploited

CVSS

9.8
Critical (9.0–10)
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

What is CVE-2026-116779 SignalWire FreeSwitch Code Injection (CVE-2026-116779)?

SignalWire FreeSwitch Code Injection (CVE-2026-116779) (CVE-2026-116779) maps to the Initial Access and Execution and Lateral Movement tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.

This page provides production-ready detection logic for SignalWire FreeSwitch Code Injection (CVE-2026-116779), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, Process Creation. The queries below are rated critical severity at high confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Execution Lateral Movement
Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
kusto
// df00tech DF00-c3039540d4 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-116779 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
let fsParents = dynamic(["freeswitch", "freeswitch.exe", "fs_cli", "fs_cli.exe"]);
let suspiciousChildren = dynamic(["sh","bash","dash","zsh","cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh","python","python3","perl","lua","curl","wget","nc","ncat","socat","base64","whoami","id"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (fsParents)
| where FileName in~ (suspiciousChildren)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("-c", "system", "bgapi", "http", "://", "base64", "/dev/tcp", "-e ", "exec")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc

Flags OS shells, interpreters, or network tools spawned as children of the FreeSwitch daemon or fs_cli, the primary signal of command/code injection through the FreeSWITCH api command path.

critical severity high confidence

Data Sources

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Process Creation

Required Tables

DeviceProcessEvents

False Positives

  • Legitimate FreeSwitch dialplan actions that intentionally invoke mod_system for provisioning or IVR integration
  • Administrative maintenance scripts launched from fs_cli during scheduled changes
  • Monitoring agents that curl/wget local FreeSwitch status endpoints as a child of the service account

Query fingerprint DF00-c3039540d4 · licence

Sigma logsource & community rules

The detection logic for SignalWire FreeSwitch Code Injection (CVE-2026-116779) (CVE-2026-116779) above is provided in a vendor-neutral form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the following logsource:

logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows

Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 FreeSwitch mod_system command execution via fs_cli (lab)

    Expected signal: Process creation event with parent=freeswitch and child=sh/id writing to /tmp.

  2. Test 2 ESL-driven system command over event socket (lab)

    Expected signal: ESL session followed by freeswitch spawning a whoami/sh child process.

  3. Test 3 Dialplan injection of mod_system execute application (lab)

    Expected signal: Modification of dialplan XML followed by freeswitch spawning touch via the system application after reloadxml.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm the FreeSwitch version on the host and compare against the SignalWire GHSA-mg63-h38w-8p9p advisory; versions before 1.11.3 are in the vulnerable range.
  2. Inspect the full process tree: identify the child process spawned by freeswitch/fs_cli, its command line, user context, and any further descendants (reverse shells, downloaders).
  3. Review FreeSwitch logs and SIP profile activity around the event to locate the inbound SIP MESSAGE and the requested api command.
  4. Confirm whether SIP profiles accept inbound MESSAGE with chat enabled and whether any directory users lack a password or a1-hash.

Containment

  1. Isolate the affected host or restrict SIP profile exposure to trusted peers immediately.
  2. Set enable-chat=false on profiles that do not need inbound SIP chat, and remove directory users that have no password or a1-hash.
  3. Kill the injected child processes and any spawned persistence, then stop the FreeSwitch service pending the upgrade to 1.11.3 if active exploitation is confirmed.

Evidence Collection

  1. Capture a full process-tree snapshot, the injected command line, and the FreeSwitch daemon PID/working directory before remediation.
  2. Preserve FreeSwitch configuration (SIP profiles, dialplan XML, autoload_configs) and logs, including the inbound MESSAGE records and the api commands run.
  3. Collect host network connection state and any downloaded payloads for malware analysis.

Escalation Criteria

  • ! Escalate to incident response if the injected process established outbound C2, downloaded a payload, or achieved privilege escalation beyond the FreeSwitch service account.
  • ! Escalate to the CISA-KEV remediation owner / change management if the host is internet-exposed or if FreeSwitch runs as root, given BOD-26-04 remediation timelines.
  • ! Escalate if dialplan or autoload_configs were modified to persist command execution, indicating attacker-controlled configuration.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • > FreeSwitch logs showing api/system/bgapi or Lua exec invocations
  • > SIP profile and dialplan XML files modified to include execute/system applications
  • > Inbound SIP MESSAGE records with source IPs and the requested chat proto selector
  • > Process execution records (Sysmon/EDR) with freeswitch as parent

Tuning Guidance

Build an allowlist of legitimate child processes and command lines produced by sanctioned dialplan mod_system integrations and provisioning scripts, then exclude those exact (parent,child,cmd) tuples. If FreeSwitch does not legitimately use mod_system or embedded-language execution in your environment, treat any shell/interpreter child as high-fidelity and lower the trigger threshold. Scope SIP MESSAGE alerts to peers originating outside trusted networks to cut noise.


Hunting Queries

Baseline and surface anomalous child-process activity under the FreeSwitch daemon over time to spot injection bursts.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-c3039540d4 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-116779 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
DeviceProcessEvents | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("freeswitch","freeswitch.exe") | summarize count(), make_set(FileName), make_set(ProcessCommandLine) by DeviceName, bin(Timestamp, 1h) | order by count_ desc
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-c3039540d4 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-116779 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=* sourcetype="linux:process" parent_process_name="freeswitch*" | stats count values(process_name) values(process) by host, date_hour | sort - count

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 FreeSwitch mod_system command execution via fs_cli (lab)
linux

Simulates the command-execution effect by invoking the FreeSwitch system application through fs_cli, causing the daemon to spawn a shell command.

Command

bash
fs_cli -x 'bgapi system id > /tmp/fs_inject_poc.txt'

Cleanup

bash
rm -f /tmp/fs_inject_poc.txt

Expected Telemetry

Process creation event with parent=freeswitch and child=sh/id writing to /tmp.

Expected Detection

KQL/SPL/EQL rules fire on freeswitch spawning a shell with 'system' in the command line.

Test 2 ESL-driven system command over event socket (lab)
linux

Connects to mod_event_socket (ESL, TCP 8021) and issues an api system command to reproduce the OS command-execution effect.

Command

bash
printf 'auth ClueCon\n\napi system whoami > /tmp/fs_esl_poc.txt\n\n' | nc -q2 127.0.0.1 8021

Cleanup

bash
rm -f /tmp/fs_esl_poc.txt

Expected Telemetry

ESL session followed by freeswitch spawning a whoami/sh child process.

Expected Detection

Child-process rules fire on freeswitch spawning a shell with 'system' in the command line.

Test 3 Dialplan injection of mod_system execute application (lab)
linux

Writes a dialplan extension that calls the system application and reloads XML, demonstrating configuration-based command-execution persistence.

Command

bash
cp /usr/local/freeswitch/conf/dialplan/default.xml /tmp/default.bak && sed -i 's#</context>#<extension name="poc_inject"><condition><action application="system" data="touch /tmp/fs_dialplan_poc"/></condition></extension></context>#' /usr/local/freeswitch/conf/dialplan/default.xml && fs_cli -x 'reloadxml'

Cleanup

bash
cp /tmp/default.bak /usr/local/freeswitch/conf/dialplan/default.xml && fs_cli -x 'reloadxml' && rm -f /tmp/fs_dialplan_poc /tmp/default.bak

Expected Telemetry

Modification of dialplan XML followed by freeswitch spawning touch via the system application after reloadxml.

Expected Detection

File-integrity alert on dialplan XML plus child-process rule firing on freeswitch spawning a shell/touch.

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