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CVE-2026-116779 Sumo Logic CSE · Sumo

Detect SignalWire FreeSwitch Code Injection (CVE-2026-116779) in Sumo Logic CSE

Detects likely exploitation of CVE-2026-116779, a command/code injection flaw in FreeSWITCH (CWE-77/CWE-78/CWE-749). According to the SignalWire advisory, sofia_presence_handle_sip_i_message() splits the To user of an inbound SIP MESSAGE on a plus sign and treats the left side as a chat protocol selector. Selecting the api chat proto reaches switch_api_execute(), so a peer whose MESSAGE is accepted by a profile can run FreeSWITCH API commands, including operating-system command sinks, with the daemon's privileges. Inbound chat is enabled on the stock internal and external profiles. The flaw is fixed in version 1.11.3. It is listed on the CISA KEV catalog with exploitation observed in the wild. Because the server-side effect is the FreeSWITCH process running API and OS commands, this detection focuses on anomalous child processes spawned by the FreeSWITCH daemon (shells, interpreters, network tools) and on configuration tampering that introduces command-execution applications. This is a vulnerability-exploitation detection, not an IOC match.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Execution Lateral Movement

Sumo Detection Query

Sumo Logic CSE (Sumo)
sql
// df00tech DF00-c3039540d4 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-116779 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
_sourceCategory=*process* OR _sourceCategory=*sysmon*
| lower(parent_process_name) as parent
| lower(process_name) as child
| lower(command_line) as cmd
| where parent matches "*freeswitch*" or parent matches "*fs_cli*"
| where child matches /(sh|bash|dash|zsh|cmd\.exe|powershell|pwsh|python|perl|lua|curl|wget|ncat|nc|socat|base64)$/
| where cmd matches /(-c |system|bgapi|:\/\/|base64|\/dev\/tcp|exec)/
| fields _messagetime, host, user, parent, child, cmd
| sort by _messagetime desc
critical severity medium confidence

Sumo Logic search for FreeSwitch daemon spawning suspicious child processes with injection-indicative command lines.

Data Sources

Host process logsSysmon

Required Tables

process events

False Positives & Tuning

  • Dialplan mod_system integrations
  • Scheduled fs_cli admin actions
  • Local health checks using curl/wget

Other platforms for CVE-2026-116779


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 FreeSwitch mod_system command execution via fs_cli (lab)

    Expected signal: Process creation event with parent=freeswitch and child=sh/id writing to /tmp.

  2. Test 2 ESL-driven system command over event socket (lab)

    Expected signal: ESL session followed by freeswitch spawning a whoami/sh child process.

  3. Test 3 Dialplan injection of mod_system execute application (lab)

    Expected signal: Modification of dialplan XML followed by freeswitch spawning touch via the system application after reloadxml.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm the FreeSwitch version on the host and compare against the SignalWire GHSA-mg63-h38w-8p9p advisory; versions before 1.11.3 are in the vulnerable range.
  2. Inspect the full process tree: identify the child process spawned by freeswitch/fs_cli, its command line, user context, and any further descendants (reverse shells, downloaders).
  3. Review FreeSwitch logs and SIP profile activity around the event to locate the inbound SIP MESSAGE and the requested api command.
  4. Confirm whether SIP profiles accept inbound MESSAGE with chat enabled and whether any directory users lack a password or a1-hash.

Containment

  1. Isolate the affected host or restrict SIP profile exposure to trusted peers immediately.
  2. Set enable-chat=false on profiles that do not need inbound SIP chat, and remove directory users that have no password or a1-hash.
  3. Kill the injected child processes and any spawned persistence, then stop the FreeSwitch service pending the upgrade to 1.11.3 if active exploitation is confirmed.

Evidence Collection

  1. Capture a full process-tree snapshot, the injected command line, and the FreeSwitch daemon PID/working directory before remediation.
  2. Preserve FreeSwitch configuration (SIP profiles, dialplan XML, autoload_configs) and logs, including the inbound MESSAGE records and the api commands run.
  3. Collect host network connection state and any downloaded payloads for malware analysis.

Escalation Criteria

  • !Escalate to incident response if the injected process established outbound C2, downloaded a payload, or achieved privilege escalation beyond the FreeSwitch service account.
  • !Escalate to the CISA-KEV remediation owner / change management if the host is internet-exposed or if FreeSwitch runs as root, given BOD-26-04 remediation timelines.
  • !Escalate if dialplan or autoload_configs were modified to persist command execution, indicating attacker-controlled configuration.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • >FreeSwitch logs showing api/system/bgapi or Lua exec invocations
  • >SIP profile and dialplan XML files modified to include execute/system applications
  • >Inbound SIP MESSAGE records with source IPs and the requested chat proto selector
  • >Process execution records (Sysmon/EDR) with freeswitch as parent

Tuning Guidance

Build an allowlist of legitimate child processes and command lines produced by sanctioned dialplan mod_system integrations and provisioning scripts, then exclude those exact (parent,child,cmd) tuples. If FreeSwitch does not legitimately use mod_system or embedded-language execution in your environment, treat any shell/interpreter child as high-fidelity and lower the trigger threshold. Scope SIP MESSAGE alerts to peers originating outside trusted networks to cut noise.


Hunting Queries

Baseline and surface anomalous child-process activity under the FreeSwitch daemon over time to spot injection bursts.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-c3039540d4 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-116779 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
DeviceProcessEvents | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("freeswitch","freeswitch.exe") | summarize count(), make_set(FileName), make_set(ProcessCommandLine) by DeviceName, bin(Timestamp, 1h) | order by count_ desc
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-c3039540d4 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-116779 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=* sourcetype="linux:process" parent_process_name="freeswitch*" | stats count values(process_name) values(process) by host, date_hour | sort - count

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 FreeSwitch mod_system command execution via fs_cli (lab)
linux

Simulates the command-execution effect by invoking the FreeSwitch system application through fs_cli, causing the daemon to spawn a shell command.

Command

bash
fs_cli -x 'bgapi system id > /tmp/fs_inject_poc.txt'

Cleanup

bash
rm -f /tmp/fs_inject_poc.txt

Expected Telemetry

Process creation event with parent=freeswitch and child=sh/id writing to /tmp.

Expected Detection

KQL/SPL/EQL rules fire on freeswitch spawning a shell with 'system' in the command line.

Test 2 ESL-driven system command over event socket (lab)
linux

Connects to mod_event_socket (ESL, TCP 8021) and issues an api system command to reproduce the OS command-execution effect.

Command

bash
printf 'auth ClueCon\n\napi system whoami > /tmp/fs_esl_poc.txt\n\n' | nc -q2 127.0.0.1 8021

Cleanup

bash
rm -f /tmp/fs_esl_poc.txt

Expected Telemetry

ESL session followed by freeswitch spawning a whoami/sh child process.

Expected Detection

Child-process rules fire on freeswitch spawning a shell with 'system' in the command line.

Test 3 Dialplan injection of mod_system execute application (lab)
linux

Writes a dialplan extension that calls the system application and reloads XML, demonstrating configuration-based command-execution persistence.

Command

bash
cp /usr/local/freeswitch/conf/dialplan/default.xml /tmp/default.bak && sed -i 's#</context>#<extension name="poc_inject"><condition><action application="system" data="touch /tmp/fs_dialplan_poc"/></condition></extension></context>#' /usr/local/freeswitch/conf/dialplan/default.xml && fs_cli -x 'reloadxml'

Cleanup

bash
cp /tmp/default.bak /usr/local/freeswitch/conf/dialplan/default.xml && fs_cli -x 'reloadxml' && rm -f /tmp/fs_dialplan_poc /tmp/default.bak

Expected Telemetry

Modification of dialplan XML followed by freeswitch spawning touch via the system application after reloadxml.

Expected Detection

File-integrity alert on dialplan XML plus child-process rule firing on freeswitch spawning a shell/touch.

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