CVE-2026-114824: Oracle Platform Security for Java (OPSS) Centralized Thirdparty Jars Critical RCE
Detects exploitation and post-exploitation activity associated with CVE-2026-114824, a CVSS 10.0 (theoretical, unauthenticated, network-exploitable) vulnerability in the Oracle Platform Security for Java (OPSS) product of Oracle Fusion Middleware, component 'Centralized Thirdparty Jars'. A base score of 10.0 with network attack vector and no privileges required indicates complete compromise of confidentiality, integrity and availability, consistent with remote code execution via a vulnerable third-party library bundled and centrally managed by OPSS (for example a deserialization or expression-injection sink reachable through WebLogic/Fusion Middleware HTTP endpoints). Because no PoC is public yet, this detection focuses on the durable indicators of OPSS/WebLogic RCE: anomalous child-process spawning from the WebLogic/Java server JVM, suspicious inbound requests to Fusion Middleware management and OPSS endpoints, and creation or modification of jars in the centralized thirdparty jar directories. Tune to your Fusion Middleware topology before enabling at high confidence.
Vulnerability Intelligence
TheoreticalTimeline
- Disclosed
- November 17, 2026
References & Proof of Concept
CVSS
- Attack Vector
- Network
- Attack Complexity
- Low
- Privileges Required
- None
- User Interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
What is CVE-2026-114824 CVE-2026-114824: Oracle Platform Security for Java (OPSS) Centralized Thirdparty Jars Critical RCE?
CVE-2026-114824: Oracle Platform Security for Java (OPSS) Centralized Thirdparty Jars Critical RCE (CVE-2026-114824) maps to the Initial Access and Execution and Lateral Movement tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.
This page provides production-ready detection logic for CVE-2026-114824: Oracle Platform Security for Java (OPSS) Centralized Thirdparty Jars Critical RCE, covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. The queries below are rated critical severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.
MITRE ATT&CK
// df00tech DF00-d44e4ae8f5 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-114824 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
// OPSS/WebLogic JVM spawning suspicious OS commands (RCE post-exploitation)
let shellProcs = dynamic(["cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","bash","sh","ksh","zsh","wget","curl","certutil.exe","bitsadmin.exe","whoami.exe","whoami","nc","ncat","python","perl"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("java.exe","java","javaw.exe","beasvc.exe")
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("weblogic","oracle_common","Dweblogic","opss","fmwconfig","fusionmiddleware")
| where FileName in~ (shellProcs) or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("/bin/sh","cmd /c","-EncodedCommand","Invoke-","base64","IEX")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc Flags OS command interpreters, download utilities or recon binaries spawned by a WebLogic/Fusion Middleware JVM, the primary signal of OPSS third-party-jar RCE.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Legitimate WebLogic domain startup/shutdown scripts that invoke shells (startWebLogic, stopManagedWebLogic)
- Patch or deployment automation running under the Fusion Middleware service account
- In-product diagnostic tooling (WLST, Oracle Enterprise Manager agents) spawning helper processes
Query fingerprint DF00-d44e4ae8f5 · licence
Sigma logsource & community rules
The detection logic for CVE-2026-114824: Oracle Platform Security for Java (OPSS) Centralized Thirdparty Jars Critical RCE (CVE-2026-114824) above is provided in a vendor-neutral
form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the
following logsource:
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:
Platform-specific guides for CVE-2026-114824
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 WebLogic JVM spawns shell command (simulated RCE)
Expected signal: Process-launch event with a java/weblogic parent context followed by bash + whoami/id execution.
- Test 2 Windows WebLogic JVM spawns PowerShell downloader
Expected signal: PowerShell launch with Invoke-WebRequest and whoami in a WebLogic/OPSS command-line context.
- Test 3 Unexpected jar dropped into OPSS centralized thirdparty jar directory
Expected signal: File-create event for a .jar under an oracle_common/modules path by a non-OPatch process.
Response Playbook
Triage
- Confirm the host runs Oracle Fusion Middleware with OPSS and identify the WebLogic domain, managed server and listen ports involved.
- Inspect the child process command line and parent JVM command line to determine whether the action is attacker-driven RCE or a legitimate domain lifecycle script.
- Correlate the process timestamp with inbound HTTP requests to Fusion Middleware/OPSS endpoints (e.g. /console, /em, /wsm-pm, management servlets) to find the triggering request.
- Review the centralized third-party jar directories (e.g. $DOMAIN_HOME and $ORACLE_HOME/oracle_common/modules) for newly added or modified jars around the event time.
Containment
- Isolate the affected managed server from the network or block inbound access to Fusion Middleware management/OPSS endpoints at the WAF/load balancer.
- Suspend the WebLogic managed server or the OPSS service account and rotate any credentials, keystores or OPSS wallet secrets reachable from the host.
Evidence Collection
- Capture WebLogic access logs, server logs (AdminServer.log, managed server .out/.log) and OPSS diagnostic logs covering the event window.
- Preserve a forensic copy of the centralized third-party jar directories, deployed applications and any dropped files, plus volatile process memory of the JVM if feasible.
Escalation Criteria
- ! Escalate to IR immediately if a shell, download utility or recon command is confirmed spawned by the WebLogic/OPSS JVM and tied to an external request.
- ! Escalate if newly created jars, web shells under the domain's application directories, or outbound C2 connections from the JVM are identified.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
WebLogic access and server logs (AdminServer.log, <server>.out) - >
Centralized third-party jar directory contents and modification timestamps - >
JVM-spawned child process records in Sysmon/auditd/EDR - >
OPSS wallet/keystore and fmwconfig directory state
Tuning Guidance
Baseline your WebLogic startup, patching (OPatch) and deployment automation so their legitimate shell invocations and jar writes can be allow-listed by account, parent command line and path. Because the CVE has no public PoC yet, keep process-spawn rules at medium confidence and pair them with inbound-request context from the load balancer before auto-escalating. Narrow the jar-write hunt to your actual $ORACLE_HOME/$DOMAIN_HOME paths to cut noise.
Hunting Queries
Hunts for unexpected creation or modification of jars in the OPSS centralized third-party jar and Fusion Middleware domain directories, a likely persistence/payload footprint.
// df00tech DF00-d44e4ae8f5 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-114824 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
DeviceFileEvents | where FolderPath has_any ("oracle_common\\modules","fmwconfig","domains") | where FileName endswith ".jar" and ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified") | where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("opatch.exe","java.exe") or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("download","tmp") | project Timestamp, DeviceName, FolderPath, FileName, InitiatingProcessFileName ``` df00tech DF00-d44e4ae8f5 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-114824 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=sysmon EventCode=11 (TargetFilename=*oracle_common\\modules* OR TargetFilename=*fmwconfig* OR TargetFilename=*domains*) TargetFilename=*.jar | stats count values(Image) by host TargetFilename Atomic Red Team Tests
Simulates OPSS third-party-jar RCE by having a Java process with a WebLogic-style command line spawn a shell that runs a recon command.
Command
java -Dweblogic.Name=test_opss -version 2>/dev/null; bash -c 'echo [atomic] parent=weblogic-jvm; whoami; id > /tmp/opss_rce_atomic.txt' Cleanup
rm -f /tmp/opss_rce_atomic.txt Expected Telemetry
Process-launch event with a java/weblogic parent context followed by bash + whoami/id execution.
Expected Detection
The elastic_eql / chronicle_yaral / spl process-spawn rules flag the shell+recon child.
Simulates post-exploitation download activity from a Fusion Middleware JVM on Windows.
Command
cmd /c "set JAVA_OPTS=-Dweblogic.Name=opss && powershell -NoProfile -Command \"Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://127.0.0.1/opss_atomic -OutFile $env:TEMP\\opss_atomic.txt -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue; whoami\"" Cleanup
del /q %TEMP%\opss_atomic.txt Expected Telemetry
PowerShell launch with Invoke-WebRequest and whoami in a WebLogic/OPSS command-line context.
Expected Detection
kql and crowdstrike_cql rules flag the JVM-context PowerShell downloader.
Simulates an attacker writing a malicious jar into the Fusion Middleware centralized third-party jar path.
Command
mkdir -p /tmp/oracle_common/modules && printf 'PK\003\004atomic-opss-payload' > /tmp/oracle_common/modules/evil_thirdparty.jar Cleanup
rm -rf /tmp/oracle_common Expected Telemetry
File-create event for a .jar under an oracle_common/modules path by a non-OPatch process.
Expected Detection
The jar-write hunting queries flag the unexpected jar creation.
Related Detections
Related Techniques
Same Tactic: Initial Access
Browse by tactic
- Reconnaissance TA0043
- Resource Development TA0042
- Initial Access TA0001
- Execution TA0002
- Persistence TA0003
- Privilege Escalation TA0004
- Stealth TA0005
- Defense Impairment TA0112
- Credential Access TA0006
- Discovery TA0007
- Lateral Movement TA0008
- Collection TA0009
- Command and Control TA0011
- Exfiltration TA0010
- Impact TA0040