Detect CVE-2026-114824: Oracle Platform Security for Java (OPSS) Centralized Thirdparty Jars Critical RCE in Elastic Security
Detects exploitation and post-exploitation activity associated with CVE-2026-114824, a CVSS 10.0 (theoretical, unauthenticated, network-exploitable) vulnerability in the Oracle Platform Security for Java (OPSS) product of Oracle Fusion Middleware, component 'Centralized Thirdparty Jars'. A base score of 10.0 with network attack vector and no privileges required indicates complete compromise of confidentiality, integrity and availability, consistent with remote code execution via a vulnerable third-party library bundled and centrally managed by OPSS (for example a deserialization or expression-injection sink reachable through WebLogic/Fusion Middleware HTTP endpoints). Because no PoC is public yet, this detection focuses on the durable indicators of OPSS/WebLogic RCE: anomalous child-process spawning from the WebLogic/Java server JVM, suspicious inbound requests to Fusion Middleware management and OPSS endpoints, and creation or modification of jars in the centralized thirdparty jar directories. Tune to your Fusion Middleware topology before enabling at high confidence.
MITRE ATT&CK
Elastic Detection Query
// df00tech DF00-d44e4ae8f5 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-114824 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
process where event.type == "start" and
process.parent.name in ("java", "java.exe", "javaw.exe", "beasvc.exe") and
(process.parent.command_line : ("*weblogic*", "*opss*", "*fmwconfig*", "*oracle_common*", "*fusionmiddleware*")) and
process.name in ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","bash","sh","ksh","zsh","wget","curl","certutil.exe","bitsadmin.exe","whoami","whoami.exe","nc","ncat","python","perl") EQL sequence-free rule matching child process starts under a Fusion Middleware JVM.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Domain lifecycle scripts spawning shells
- Deployment automation under the WebLogic account
- Diagnostic tooling spawning helper binaries
Other platforms for CVE-2026-114824
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 WebLogic JVM spawns shell command (simulated RCE)
Expected signal: Process-launch event with a java/weblogic parent context followed by bash + whoami/id execution.
- Test 2 Windows WebLogic JVM spawns PowerShell downloader
Expected signal: PowerShell launch with Invoke-WebRequest and whoami in a WebLogic/OPSS command-line context.
- Test 3 Unexpected jar dropped into OPSS centralized thirdparty jar directory
Expected signal: File-create event for a .jar under an oracle_common/modules path by a non-OPatch process.
Response Playbook
Triage
- Confirm the host runs Oracle Fusion Middleware with OPSS and identify the WebLogic domain, managed server and listen ports involved.
- Inspect the child process command line and parent JVM command line to determine whether the action is attacker-driven RCE or a legitimate domain lifecycle script.
- Correlate the process timestamp with inbound HTTP requests to Fusion Middleware/OPSS endpoints (e.g. /console, /em, /wsm-pm, management servlets) to find the triggering request.
- Review the centralized third-party jar directories (e.g. $DOMAIN_HOME and $ORACLE_HOME/oracle_common/modules) for newly added or modified jars around the event time.
Containment
- Isolate the affected managed server from the network or block inbound access to Fusion Middleware management/OPSS endpoints at the WAF/load balancer.
- Suspend the WebLogic managed server or the OPSS service account and rotate any credentials, keystores or OPSS wallet secrets reachable from the host.
Evidence Collection
- Capture WebLogic access logs, server logs (AdminServer.log, managed server .out/.log) and OPSS diagnostic logs covering the event window.
- Preserve a forensic copy of the centralized third-party jar directories, deployed applications and any dropped files, plus volatile process memory of the JVM if feasible.
Escalation Criteria
- !Escalate to IR immediately if a shell, download utility or recon command is confirmed spawned by the WebLogic/OPSS JVM and tied to an external request.
- !Escalate if newly created jars, web shells under the domain's application directories, or outbound C2 connections from the JVM are identified.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
WebLogic access and server logs (AdminServer.log, <server>.out) - >
Centralized third-party jar directory contents and modification timestamps - >
JVM-spawned child process records in Sysmon/auditd/EDR - >
OPSS wallet/keystore and fmwconfig directory state
Tuning Guidance
Baseline your WebLogic startup, patching (OPatch) and deployment automation so their legitimate shell invocations and jar writes can be allow-listed by account, parent command line and path. Because the CVE has no public PoC yet, keep process-spawn rules at medium confidence and pair them with inbound-request context from the load balancer before auto-escalating. Narrow the jar-write hunt to your actual $ORACLE_HOME/$DOMAIN_HOME paths to cut noise.
Hunting Queries
Hunts for unexpected creation or modification of jars in the OPSS centralized third-party jar and Fusion Middleware domain directories, a likely persistence/payload footprint.
// df00tech DF00-d44e4ae8f5 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-114824 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
DeviceFileEvents | where FolderPath has_any ("oracle_common\\modules","fmwconfig","domains") | where FileName endswith ".jar" and ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified") | where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("opatch.exe","java.exe") or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("download","tmp") | project Timestamp, DeviceName, FolderPath, FileName, InitiatingProcessFileName ``` df00tech DF00-d44e4ae8f5 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-114824 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=sysmon EventCode=11 (TargetFilename=*oracle_common\\modules* OR TargetFilename=*fmwconfig* OR TargetFilename=*domains*) TargetFilename=*.jar | stats count values(Image) by host TargetFilename Atomic Red Team Tests
Simulates OPSS third-party-jar RCE by having a Java process with a WebLogic-style command line spawn a shell that runs a recon command.
Command
java -Dweblogic.Name=test_opss -version 2>/dev/null; bash -c 'echo [atomic] parent=weblogic-jvm; whoami; id > /tmp/opss_rce_atomic.txt' Cleanup
rm -f /tmp/opss_rce_atomic.txt Expected Telemetry
Process-launch event with a java/weblogic parent context followed by bash + whoami/id execution.
Expected Detection
The elastic_eql / chronicle_yaral / spl process-spawn rules flag the shell+recon child.
Simulates post-exploitation download activity from a Fusion Middleware JVM on Windows.
Command
cmd /c "set JAVA_OPTS=-Dweblogic.Name=opss && powershell -NoProfile -Command \"Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://127.0.0.1/opss_atomic -OutFile $env:TEMP\\opss_atomic.txt -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue; whoami\"" Cleanup
del /q %TEMP%\opss_atomic.txt Expected Telemetry
PowerShell launch with Invoke-WebRequest and whoami in a WebLogic/OPSS command-line context.
Expected Detection
kql and crowdstrike_cql rules flag the JVM-context PowerShell downloader.
Simulates an attacker writing a malicious jar into the Fusion Middleware centralized third-party jar path.
Command
mkdir -p /tmp/oracle_common/modules && printf 'PK\003\004atomic-opss-payload' > /tmp/oracle_common/modules/evil_thirdparty.jar Cleanup
rm -rf /tmp/oracle_common Expected Telemetry
File-create event for a .jar under an oracle_common/modules path by a non-OPatch process.
Expected Detection
The jar-write hunting queries flag the unexpected jar creation.