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CVE-2026-114713

UnrealIRCd Delimiter Neutralization Exploitation (CVE-2026-114713)

Initial Access Lateral Movement Execution Last updated:

Detects exploitation attempts against UnrealIRCd for CVE-2026-114713, an improper neutralization of a delimiter (CWE-140). In affected versions (6.0.0 before 6.2.7.1), the labeled-response module does not escape the IRCv3 label message tag when echoing it into replies. On a network with two or more linked servers, any user can inject server-to-server commands that run with server authority. This detection surfaces anomalous IRC traffic to UnrealIRCd listeners containing embedded control characters or delimiter sequences, process and log anomalies on UnrealIRCd hosts, and unexpected server-link or oper command sequences. CVE-2026-114713 is listed in the CISA KEV catalog, indicating active exploitation.

Vulnerability Intelligence

KEV — Known Exploited

What is CVE-2026-114713 UnrealIRCd Delimiter Neutralization Exploitation (CVE-2026-114713)?

UnrealIRCd Delimiter Neutralization Exploitation (CVE-2026-114713) (CVE-2026-114713) maps to the Initial Access and Lateral Movement and Execution tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.

This page provides production-ready detection logic for UnrealIRCd Delimiter Neutralization Exploitation (CVE-2026-114713), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Network Firewall Logs, IRC Server Logs, IDS/IPS. The queries below are rated high severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Lateral Movement Execution
Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
kusto
// df00tech DF00-390fe2a62e · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-114713 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
let UnrealPorts = dynamic([6667, 6697, 7000, 7029, 6660, 6665, 6666, 6668, 6669]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DeviceVendor in~ ("Palo Alto Networks", "Fortinet", "Zscaler", "Check Point")
| where DestinationPort in (UnrealPorts) or ApplicationProtocol has "irc"
| extend Payload = coalesce(column_ifexists("RequestClientApplication", ""), AdditionalExtensions)
| where Payload matches regex @"(?i)(%0a|%0d|\\r|\\n|\x0a|\x0d)" or Payload has_any ("NICK ", "USER ", "PROTOCTL", "SERVER ", "SVSNICK")
| where Payload matches regex @"(?i)(NICK|USER|JOIN|SERVER|PROTOCTL)[^\r\n]*(\r|\n|%0a|%0d|:[^ ]+ )"
| summarize AttemptCount = count(), SamplePayloads = make_set(Payload, 5) by SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, bin(TimeGenerated, 5m)
| where AttemptCount >= 1
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, AttemptCount, SamplePayloads

Identifies IRC protocol traffic to UnrealIRCd listener ports containing embedded CR/LF or encoded delimiter sequences within IRC commands, indicative of delimiter injection per CVE-2026-114713.

high severity medium confidence

Data Sources

Network Firewall Logs IRC Server Logs IDS/IPS

Required Tables

CommonSecurityLog

False Positives

  • Legitimate IRC clients sending multi-line pastes or long messages that get fragmented across packets.
  • IRC server-to-server linking traffic between trusted hubs that legitimately uses PROTOCTL and SERVER commands.
  • Network security appliances that URL-encode payloads in logs, producing %0a/%0d artifacts unrelated to injection.

Query fingerprint DF00-390fe2a62e · licence

Sigma logsource & community rules

The detection logic for UnrealIRCd Delimiter Neutralization Exploitation (CVE-2026-114713) (CVE-2026-114713) above is provided in a vendor-neutral form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the following logsource:

logsource:
  category: network_connection
  product: windows

Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 CRLF delimiter injection in IRC NICK command

    Expected signal: Network logs show a connection to port 6667 with a payload containing CR/LF-separated NICK/JOIN/USER commands.

  2. Test 2 Delimiter injection via PROTOCTL server-link command

    Expected signal: Firewall/IDS logs record IRC server-link commands with embedded delimiters on the linking port.

  3. Test 3 Encoded delimiter injection over IRC web gateway

    Expected signal: Network telemetry shows an outbound connection to port 6667 carrying encoded %0a/%0d delimiter sequences inside an IRC command.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Identify the targeted UnrealIRCd host and confirm its running version against the fixed release 6.2.7.1; versions 6.0.0 before 6.2.7.1 are in scope.
  2. Extract and decode the flagged IRC payload(s) and determine which delimiter characters (CR, LF, extra colon/space field separators) were injected and into which command (NICK/USER/JOIN/SERVER/PROTOCTL).
  3. Correlate the source IP against threat intel and prior connection history to distinguish a known client/peer from an unfamiliar attacker.
  4. Review UnrealIRCd server logs around the event time for parser errors, unexpected command execution, spoofed nicks/channels, or anomalous oper/server-link activity.

Containment

  1. Block the offending source IP(s) at the network firewall and add a K-line/G-line on the UnrealIRCd server for the attacker mask.
  2. Apply the vendor patch or upgrade UnrealIRCd to 6.2.7.1, or temporarily restrict the listener to trusted networks if patching must be scheduled.
  3. Temporarily disable or firewall off server-to-server linking ports if the injection targets S2S commands until patched.

Evidence Collection

  1. Capture full packet traces (pcap) of the malicious IRC session, preserving raw bytes including the injected delimiters.
  2. Export the UnrealIRCd server logs, ircd.log, and any core dumps or crash artifacts covering the event window.
  3. Record the server configuration, running version/build, and loaded modules for the affected instance.

Escalation Criteria

  • ! Escalate to IR if evidence shows successful command spoofing, oper privilege abuse, rogue server linking, or lateral movement beyond the IRC daemon.
  • ! Escalate if the same injection pattern is observed against multiple UnrealIRCd hosts or from multiple sources, indicating a campaign.
  • ! Escalate immediately if the host shows signs of remote code execution or post-exploitation activity following the delimiter injection.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • > UnrealIRCd ircd.log and server logs containing malformed/injected command lines
  • > pcap of the IRC session showing raw CR/LF-laden payloads
  • > UnrealIRCd process core dumps and memory artifacts if the daemon crashed

Tuning Guidance

Baseline your known IRC clients and trusted server-link peers, then exclude their source IPs to cut false positives from legitimate PROTOCTL/SERVER traffic. Confirm which log sources URL-encode payloads (producing benign %0a/%0d artifacts) and adjust the regex to match raw bytes where possible. Narrow destination ports to those actually configured on your UnrealIRCd instance. Raise the attempt threshold in high-traffic environments to focus on repeated injection attempts.


Hunting Queries

Hunt for recurring IRC command payloads containing embedded newline/delimiter characters directed at UnrealIRCd listeners.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-390fe2a62e · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-114713 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
CommonSecurityLog | where DestinationPort in (6667,6697,7000,7029) | where AdditionalExtensions matches regex @'(?i)(NICK|USER|SERVER|PROTOCTL)[^\r\n]*(%0a|%0d|\r|\n)' | summarize count() by SourceIP, DestinationIP, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-390fe2a62e · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-114713 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=network (dest_port=6667 OR dest_port=6697 OR dest_port=7000) | where match(payload,"(?i)(NICK|USER|SERVER|PROTOCTL)") AND match(payload,"(%0a|%0d|\r|\n)") | stats count by src_ip, dest_ip

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 CRLF delimiter injection in IRC NICK command
linux

Sends a crafted IRC NICK registration containing embedded CRLF to inject a second protocol line against an UnrealIRCd test instance.

Command

bash
printf 'NICK test\r\nJOIN #secret\r\nUSER t t t :t\r\n' | nc -w 3 127.0.0.1 6667

Cleanup

bash
pkill -f 'nc -w 3 127.0.0.1 6667' 2>/dev/null; true

Expected Telemetry

Network logs show a connection to port 6667 with a payload containing CR/LF-separated NICK/JOIN/USER commands.

Expected Detection

The KQL/SPL rules match the embedded CRLF within IRC command payloads and raise an alert.

Test 2 Delimiter injection via PROTOCTL server-link command
linux

Simulates injection of extra field delimiters into a PROTOCTL/SERVER handshake against a lab UnrealIRCd linking port.

Command

bash
printf 'PROTOCTL NOQUIT\r\nSERVER evil.example 1 :spoofed\r\n' | nc -w 3 127.0.0.1 7000

Cleanup

bash
true

Expected Telemetry

Firewall/IDS logs record IRC server-link commands with embedded delimiters on the linking port.

Expected Detection

Detection flags PROTOCTL/SERVER commands containing CR/LF delimiter injection.

Test 3 Encoded delimiter injection over IRC web gateway
windows

Sends URL-encoded CR/LF (%0a/%0d) within an IRC command to simulate injection through a proxy/gateway front-ending UnrealIRCd.

Command

powershell
powershell -Command "$c = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TcpClient('127.0.0.1',6667); $s=$c.GetStream(); $b=[Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetBytes('NICK a%0d%0aJOIN%20%23admin' + [char]13 + [char]10); $s.Write($b,0,$b.Length); Start-Sleep 2; $c.Close()"

Cleanup

powershell
echo done

Expected Telemetry

Network telemetry shows an outbound connection to port 6667 carrying encoded %0a/%0d delimiter sequences inside an IRC command.

Expected Detection

Detection matches the encoded delimiter pattern in the IRC payload and alerts.

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