Detect UnrealIRCd Delimiter Neutralization Exploitation (CVE-2026-114713) in Elastic Security
Detects exploitation attempts against UnrealIRCd for CVE-2026-114713, an improper neutralization of a delimiter (CWE-140). In affected versions (6.0.0 before 6.2.7.1), the labeled-response module does not escape the IRCv3 label message tag when echoing it into replies. On a network with two or more linked servers, any user can inject server-to-server commands that run with server authority. This detection surfaces anomalous IRC traffic to UnrealIRCd listeners containing embedded control characters or delimiter sequences, process and log anomalies on UnrealIRCd hosts, and unexpected server-link or oper command sequences. CVE-2026-114713 is listed in the CISA KEV catalog, indicating active exploitation.
MITRE ATT&CK
Elastic Detection Query
// df00tech DF00-390fe2a62e · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-114713 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
sequence by source.ip with maxspan=5m
[network where destination.port in (6667, 6697, 7000, 7029, 6660, 6665, 6666, 6668, 6669) and
(stringContains(network.protocol, "irc") or true) and
(match(message, "(?i)(NICK|USER|JOIN|SERVER|PROTOCTL|SVSNICK)") and
match(message, "(%0a|%0d|\\r|\\n|:[^ ]+ )"))] Detects network events to UnrealIRCd listener ports containing IRC commands with embedded delimiter/control characters characteristic of CVE-2026-114713.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Inter-server IRC federation traffic using PROTOCTL/SERVER legitimately.
- Multi-line client pastes reassembled into one event.
- Protocol decoders emitting escaped control-byte representations.
Other platforms for CVE-2026-114713
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 CRLF delimiter injection in IRC NICK command
Expected signal: Network logs show a connection to port 6667 with a payload containing CR/LF-separated NICK/JOIN/USER commands.
- Test 2 Delimiter injection via PROTOCTL server-link command
Expected signal: Firewall/IDS logs record IRC server-link commands with embedded delimiters on the linking port.
- Test 3 Encoded delimiter injection over IRC web gateway
Expected signal: Network telemetry shows an outbound connection to port 6667 carrying encoded %0a/%0d delimiter sequences inside an IRC command.
References (4)
- https://forums.unrealircd.org/viewtopic.php?t=9487
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-114713
Response Playbook
Triage
- Identify the targeted UnrealIRCd host and confirm its running version against the fixed release 6.2.7.1; versions 6.0.0 before 6.2.7.1 are in scope.
- Extract and decode the flagged IRC payload(s) and determine which delimiter characters (CR, LF, extra colon/space field separators) were injected and into which command (NICK/USER/JOIN/SERVER/PROTOCTL).
- Correlate the source IP against threat intel and prior connection history to distinguish a known client/peer from an unfamiliar attacker.
- Review UnrealIRCd server logs around the event time for parser errors, unexpected command execution, spoofed nicks/channels, or anomalous oper/server-link activity.
Containment
- Block the offending source IP(s) at the network firewall and add a K-line/G-line on the UnrealIRCd server for the attacker mask.
- Apply the vendor patch or upgrade UnrealIRCd to 6.2.7.1, or temporarily restrict the listener to trusted networks if patching must be scheduled.
- Temporarily disable or firewall off server-to-server linking ports if the injection targets S2S commands until patched.
Evidence Collection
- Capture full packet traces (pcap) of the malicious IRC session, preserving raw bytes including the injected delimiters.
- Export the UnrealIRCd server logs, ircd.log, and any core dumps or crash artifacts covering the event window.
- Record the server configuration, running version/build, and loaded modules for the affected instance.
Escalation Criteria
- !Escalate to IR if evidence shows successful command spoofing, oper privilege abuse, rogue server linking, or lateral movement beyond the IRC daemon.
- !Escalate if the same injection pattern is observed against multiple UnrealIRCd hosts or from multiple sources, indicating a campaign.
- !Escalate immediately if the host shows signs of remote code execution or post-exploitation activity following the delimiter injection.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
UnrealIRCd ircd.log and server logs containing malformed/injected command lines - >
pcap of the IRC session showing raw CR/LF-laden payloads - >
UnrealIRCd process core dumps and memory artifacts if the daemon crashed
Tuning Guidance
Baseline your known IRC clients and trusted server-link peers, then exclude their source IPs to cut false positives from legitimate PROTOCTL/SERVER traffic. Confirm which log sources URL-encode payloads (producing benign %0a/%0d artifacts) and adjust the regex to match raw bytes where possible. Narrow destination ports to those actually configured on your UnrealIRCd instance. Raise the attempt threshold in high-traffic environments to focus on repeated injection attempts.
Hunting Queries
Hunt for recurring IRC command payloads containing embedded newline/delimiter characters directed at UnrealIRCd listeners.
// df00tech DF00-390fe2a62e · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-114713 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
CommonSecurityLog | where DestinationPort in (6667,6697,7000,7029) | where AdditionalExtensions matches regex @'(?i)(NICK|USER|SERVER|PROTOCTL)[^\r\n]*(%0a|%0d|\r|\n)' | summarize count() by SourceIP, DestinationIP, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h) ``` df00tech DF00-390fe2a62e · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-114713 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=network (dest_port=6667 OR dest_port=6697 OR dest_port=7000) | where match(payload,"(?i)(NICK|USER|SERVER|PROTOCTL)") AND match(payload,"(%0a|%0d|\r|\n)") | stats count by src_ip, dest_ip Atomic Red Team Tests
Sends a crafted IRC NICK registration containing embedded CRLF to inject a second protocol line against an UnrealIRCd test instance.
Command
printf 'NICK test\r\nJOIN #secret\r\nUSER t t t :t\r\n' | nc -w 3 127.0.0.1 6667 Cleanup
pkill -f 'nc -w 3 127.0.0.1 6667' 2>/dev/null; true Expected Telemetry
Network logs show a connection to port 6667 with a payload containing CR/LF-separated NICK/JOIN/USER commands.
Expected Detection
The KQL/SPL rules match the embedded CRLF within IRC command payloads and raise an alert.
Simulates injection of extra field delimiters into a PROTOCTL/SERVER handshake against a lab UnrealIRCd linking port.
Command
printf 'PROTOCTL NOQUIT\r\nSERVER evil.example 1 :spoofed\r\n' | nc -w 3 127.0.0.1 7000 Cleanup
true Expected Telemetry
Firewall/IDS logs record IRC server-link commands with embedded delimiters on the linking port.
Expected Detection
Detection flags PROTOCTL/SERVER commands containing CR/LF delimiter injection.
Sends URL-encoded CR/LF (%0a/%0d) within an IRC command to simulate injection through a proxy/gateway front-ending UnrealIRCd.
Command
powershell -Command "$c = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TcpClient('127.0.0.1',6667); $s=$c.GetStream(); $b=[Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetBytes('NICK a%0d%0aJOIN%20%23admin' + [char]13 + [char]10); $s.Write($b,0,$b.Length); Start-Sleep 2; $c.Close()" Cleanup
echo done Expected Telemetry
Network telemetry shows an outbound connection to port 6667 carrying encoded %0a/%0d delimiter sequences inside an IRC command.
Expected Detection
Detection matches the encoded delimiter pattern in the IRC payload and alerts.