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CVE-2026-105016

Microsoft QUIC (MsQuic Schannel) Heap-Based Buffer Overflow Remote Code Execution (CVE-2026-105016)

Initial Access Execution Last updated:

Detects exploitation attempts and vulnerable-version exposure for CVE-2026-105016, a critical (CVSS 9.8) heap-based buffer overflow (CWE-122) in the Microsoft.Native.Quic.MsQuic.Schannel NuGet package (version 2.5.11-ci.156755675). The flaw is reachable over the network. A crafted IPv6 QUIC packet can reach the Microsoft QUIC HTTP/3 path without authentication or user interaction, enabling unauthenticated remote code execution in the context of the .NET process hosting MsQuic. Detection focuses on (1) presence of the vulnerable NuGet package or msquic.dll on hosts, (2) anomalous QUIC traffic and crashes of QUIC-hosting processes, and (3) process and crash telemetry indicative of memory-corruption exploitation of a QUIC listener.

Vulnerability Intelligence

Theoretical

Affected Software

Vendor
nuget
Product
Microsoft.Native.Quic.MsQuic.Schannel
Versions
= 2.5.11-ci.156755675

Weakness (CWE)

Timeline

Disclosed
October 13, 2026

CVSS

9.8
Critical (9.0–10)
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

What is CVE-2026-105016 Microsoft QUIC (MsQuic Schannel) Heap-Based Buffer Overflow Remote Code Execution (CVE-2026-105016)?

Microsoft QUIC (MsQuic Schannel) Heap-Based Buffer Overflow Remote Code Execution (CVE-2026-105016) (CVE-2026-105016) maps to the Initial Access and Execution tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.

This page provides production-ready detection logic for Microsoft QUIC (MsQuic Schannel) Heap-Based Buffer Overflow Remote Code Execution (CVE-2026-105016), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. The queries below are rated critical severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Execution
Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
kusto
// df00tech DF00-7e1b99f9db · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-105016 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
// Vulnerable MsQuic Schannel package / DLL present, plus anomalous crashes of QUIC-hosting processes
let vulnFiles = DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ("msquic.dll", "Microsoft.Native.Quic.MsQuic.Schannel.dll")
   or FolderPath has "Microsoft.Native.Quic.MsQuic.Schannel"
| where FolderPath has_any ("2.5.11-ci.156755675", "2.5.11")
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256;
let quicCrashes = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ("WerFault.exe", "dotnet.exe", "w3wp.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("msquic", "quic", "MsQuic.Schannel")
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName;
vulnFiles
| join kind=leftouter (quicCrashes) on DeviceId
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, CrashProcess=FileName1, CrashCmd=ProcessCommandLine

Surfaces hosts carrying the vulnerable MsQuic Schannel package and correlates them with crash/anomaly telemetry of QUIC-hosting .NET or IIS worker processes, a hallmark of heap-overflow exploitation attempts.

critical severity medium confidence

Data Sources

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint

Required Tables

DeviceFileEvents DeviceProcessEvents

False Positives

  • Legitimate installs of the MsQuic Schannel package on development or build hosts that are not internet-exposed
  • WerFault crashes of QUIC processes caused by unrelated bugs or resource exhaustion
  • Security scanners or SBOM tools enumerating msquic.dll across the fleet

Query fingerprint DF00-7e1b99f9db · licence

Sigma logsource & community rules

The detection logic for Microsoft QUIC (MsQuic Schannel) Heap-Based Buffer Overflow Remote Code Execution (CVE-2026-105016) (CVE-2026-105016) above is provided in a vendor-neutral form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the following logsource:

logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows

Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Enumerate vulnerable MsQuic Schannel package version

    Expected signal: Process launch of powershell.exe/dotnet.exe with command line referencing msquic.schannel; file access events under the .nuget packages path.

  2. Test 2 Locate and hash msquic.dll on disk

    Expected signal: Recursive file enumeration and FILE_OPEN events for msquic.dll; SHA256 computation.

  3. Test 3 Generate benign QUIC traffic to a test listener

    Expected signal: Inbound UDP/443 QUIC flows to the test host recorded by Zeek/Suricata.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm whether the host runs a service that uses MsQuic/HTTP3 (ASP.NET Core Kestrel with HTTP/3, or a custom .NET app linking Microsoft.Native.Quic.MsQuic.Schannel) and whether it is internet-exposed on UDP/443.
  2. Enumerate the installed NuGet package version and the on-disk msquic.dll version; confirm presence of the vulnerable build 2.5.11-ci.156755675.
  3. Review application crash events (WER EventCode 1000/1001) and process restart telemetry for the QUIC-hosting process within the alert window.
  4. Correlate inbound QUIC/UDP source IPs with threat-intel to identify whether traffic originates from untrusted/unexpected networks.

Containment

  1. Block or rate-limit inbound UDP/443 (and any custom QUIC ports) to affected hosts at the edge firewall until patched.
  2. Disable HTTP/3 / QUIC on the affected service (e.g., remove HTTP3 from Kestrel endpoint configuration) so traffic falls back to TCP/TLS.
  3. Isolate any host showing post-crash anomalous child processes or outbound connections pending forensic review.

Evidence Collection

  1. Capture the crash dump(s) produced by WerFault for the QUIC-hosting process and preserve them for memory-corruption analysis.
  2. Export PCAP of the inbound QUIC flows to the affected host around the crash time.
  3. Record the exact NuGet package version, msquic.dll SHA256, and application build from the host.

Escalation Criteria

  • ! Escalate to IR if a QUIC-host process crash is followed by spawning of a command interpreter, LOLBin, or unexpected outbound C2 connection.
  • ! Escalate if the vulnerable package is confirmed on an internet-exposed production host receiving traffic from untrusted sources.
  • ! Escalate if crash dumps or EDR telemetry show evidence of code execution or heap grooming consistent with memory-corruption exploitation.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • > WerFault crash dumps for the QUIC-hosting process (.dmp)
  • > msquic.dll file metadata (version, SHA256, path under the NuGet package folder)
  • > Network flow/PCAP records of inbound UDP/443 QUIC traffic preceding crashes

Tuning Guidance

Baseline which hosts legitimately run HTTP/3 and the expected inbound QUIC volume per host; suppress file-presence alerts on non-exposed build/dev systems while keeping network+crash correlation alerts on internet-facing production listeners. Tighten version matching to the exact vulnerable build (2.5.11-ci.156755675) once your SBOM confirms deployed versions to reduce noise from benign newer/older releases.


Hunting Queries

Finds hosts with the vulnerable MsQuic Schannel build and hosts logging QUIC-process crashes.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-7e1b99f9db · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-105016 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
DeviceFileEvents | where FileName =~ "msquic.dll" or FolderPath has "Microsoft.Native.Quic.MsQuic.Schannel" | where FolderPath has "2.5.11-ci.156755675" | project DeviceName, FolderPath, SHA256, Timestamp
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-7e1b99f9db · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-105016 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=endpoint sourcetype="WinEventLog:Application" (EventCode=1000 OR EventCode=1001) (msquic OR dotnet OR quic) | stats count BY host, Application_Name | sort - count

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Enumerate vulnerable MsQuic Schannel package version
windows

Lists restored NuGet packages to confirm whether the vulnerable Microsoft.Native.Quic.MsQuic.Schannel build is present.

Command

powershell
Get-ChildItem -Path "$env:USERPROFILE\.nuget\packages\microsoft.native.quic.msquic.schannel" -Directory | Select-Object Name; dotnet list package --include-transitive | Select-String "MsQuic.Schannel"

Cleanup

powershell
echo 'No changes made; enumeration only.'

Expected Telemetry

Process launch of powershell.exe/dotnet.exe with command line referencing msquic.schannel; file access events under the .nuget packages path.

Expected Detection

CrowdStrike/Defender file-presence queries flag the vulnerable version folder 2.5.11-ci.156755675.

Test 2 Locate and hash msquic.dll on disk
windows

Finds msquic.dll instances and records their hash/version to identify the vulnerable module.

Command

powershell
Get-ChildItem -Path C:\ -Recurse -Filter msquic.dll -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object { Get-FileHash $_.FullName -Algorithm SHA256 }

Cleanup

powershell
echo 'No changes made; read-only scan.'

Expected Telemetry

Recursive file enumeration and FILE_OPEN events for msquic.dll; SHA256 computation.

Expected Detection

DeviceFileEvents/ModuleLoad hunting queries surface the msquic.dll path and hash.

Test 3 Generate benign QUIC traffic to a test listener
linux

Sends benign HTTP/3 (QUIC) requests to a lab MsQuic/Kestrel listener to exercise network detection logic (no exploit payload).

Command

bash
for i in $(seq 1 200); do curl --http3 -k https://quic-lab.internal:443/ -o /dev/null -s; done

Cleanup

bash
echo 'Transient network traffic only; nothing to clean up.'

Expected Telemetry

Inbound UDP/443 QUIC flows to the test host recorded by Zeek/Suricata.

Expected Detection

Network-volume QUIC queries (SPL/AQL/Sumo/EQL) register elevated inbound QUIC flow counts.

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