Detect Microsoft QUIC (MsQuic Schannel) Heap-Based Buffer Overflow Remote Code Execution (CVE-2026-105016) in Elastic Security
Detects exploitation attempts and vulnerable-version exposure for CVE-2026-105016, a critical (CVSS 9.8) heap-based buffer overflow (CWE-122) in the Microsoft.Native.Quic.MsQuic.Schannel NuGet package (version 2.5.11-ci.156755675). The flaw is reachable over the network. A crafted IPv6 QUIC packet can reach the Microsoft QUIC HTTP/3 path without authentication or user interaction, enabling unauthenticated remote code execution in the context of the .NET process hosting MsQuic. Detection focuses on (1) presence of the vulnerable NuGet package or msquic.dll on hosts, (2) anomalous QUIC traffic and crashes of QUIC-hosting processes, and (3) process and crash telemetry indicative of memory-corruption exploitation of a QUIC listener.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Initial Access Execution
Elastic Detection Query
// df00tech DF00-7e1b99f9db · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-105016 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
sequence by host.id with maxspan=10m
[ network where network.transport == "udp" and destination.port == 443 and network.protocol == "quic" ]
[ process where event.type == "start" and process.name in ("WerFault.exe", "dotnet.exe", "w3wp.exe") and process.command_line : ("*msquic*", "*quic*") ] Detects inbound QUIC traffic on UDP/443 immediately followed by a crash-handler or QUIC-host process event on the same host, consistent with a crash triggered by the heap overflow.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Benign QUIC traffic coinciding with unrelated process starts
- Development hosts restarting QUIC services frequently
- Monitoring agents that spawn dotnet processes on a schedule
Other platforms for CVE-2026-105016
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 Enumerate vulnerable MsQuic Schannel package version
Expected signal: Process launch of powershell.exe/dotnet.exe with command line referencing msquic.schannel; file access events under the .nuget packages path.
- Test 2 Locate and hash msquic.dll on disk
Expected signal: Recursive file enumeration and FILE_OPEN events for msquic.dll; SHA256 computation.
- Test 3 Generate benign QUIC traffic to a test listener
Expected signal: Inbound UDP/443 QUIC flows to the test host recorded by Zeek/Suricata.
Response Playbook
Triage
- Confirm whether the host runs a service that uses MsQuic/HTTP3 (ASP.NET Core Kestrel with HTTP/3, or a custom .NET app linking Microsoft.Native.Quic.MsQuic.Schannel) and whether it is internet-exposed on UDP/443.
- Enumerate the installed NuGet package version and the on-disk msquic.dll version; confirm presence of the vulnerable build 2.5.11-ci.156755675.
- Review application crash events (WER EventCode 1000/1001) and process restart telemetry for the QUIC-hosting process within the alert window.
- Correlate inbound QUIC/UDP source IPs with threat-intel to identify whether traffic originates from untrusted/unexpected networks.
Containment
- Block or rate-limit inbound UDP/443 (and any custom QUIC ports) to affected hosts at the edge firewall until patched.
- Disable HTTP/3 / QUIC on the affected service (e.g., remove HTTP3 from Kestrel endpoint configuration) so traffic falls back to TCP/TLS.
- Isolate any host showing post-crash anomalous child processes or outbound connections pending forensic review.
Evidence Collection
- Capture the crash dump(s) produced by WerFault for the QUIC-hosting process and preserve them for memory-corruption analysis.
- Export PCAP of the inbound QUIC flows to the affected host around the crash time.
- Record the exact NuGet package version, msquic.dll SHA256, and application build from the host.
Escalation Criteria
- !Escalate to IR if a QUIC-host process crash is followed by spawning of a command interpreter, LOLBin, or unexpected outbound C2 connection.
- !Escalate if the vulnerable package is confirmed on an internet-exposed production host receiving traffic from untrusted sources.
- !Escalate if crash dumps or EDR telemetry show evidence of code execution or heap grooming consistent with memory-corruption exploitation.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
WerFault crash dumps for the QUIC-hosting process (.dmp) - >
msquic.dll file metadata (version, SHA256, path under the NuGet package folder) - >
Network flow/PCAP records of inbound UDP/443 QUIC traffic preceding crashes
Tuning Guidance
Baseline which hosts legitimately run HTTP/3 and the expected inbound QUIC volume per host; suppress file-presence alerts on non-exposed build/dev systems while keeping network+crash correlation alerts on internet-facing production listeners. Tighten version matching to the exact vulnerable build (2.5.11-ci.156755675) once your SBOM confirms deployed versions to reduce noise from benign newer/older releases.
Hunting Queries
Finds hosts with the vulnerable MsQuic Schannel build and hosts logging QUIC-process crashes.
// df00tech DF00-7e1b99f9db · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-105016 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
DeviceFileEvents | where FileName =~ "msquic.dll" or FolderPath has "Microsoft.Native.Quic.MsQuic.Schannel" | where FolderPath has "2.5.11-ci.156755675" | project DeviceName, FolderPath, SHA256, Timestamp ``` df00tech DF00-7e1b99f9db · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-105016 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=endpoint sourcetype="WinEventLog:Application" (EventCode=1000 OR EventCode=1001) (msquic OR dotnet OR quic) | stats count BY host, Application_Name | sort - count Atomic Red Team Tests
Lists restored NuGet packages to confirm whether the vulnerable Microsoft.Native.Quic.MsQuic.Schannel build is present.
Command
Get-ChildItem -Path "$env:USERPROFILE\.nuget\packages\microsoft.native.quic.msquic.schannel" -Directory | Select-Object Name; dotnet list package --include-transitive | Select-String "MsQuic.Schannel" Cleanup
echo 'No changes made; enumeration only.' Expected Telemetry
Process launch of powershell.exe/dotnet.exe with command line referencing msquic.schannel; file access events under the .nuget packages path.
Expected Detection
CrowdStrike/Defender file-presence queries flag the vulnerable version folder 2.5.11-ci.156755675.
Finds msquic.dll instances and records their hash/version to identify the vulnerable module.
Command
Get-ChildItem -Path C:\ -Recurse -Filter msquic.dll -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | ForEach-Object { Get-FileHash $_.FullName -Algorithm SHA256 } Cleanup
echo 'No changes made; read-only scan.' Expected Telemetry
Recursive file enumeration and FILE_OPEN events for msquic.dll; SHA256 computation.
Expected Detection
DeviceFileEvents/ModuleLoad hunting queries surface the msquic.dll path and hash.
Sends benign HTTP/3 (QUIC) requests to a lab MsQuic/Kestrel listener to exercise network detection logic (no exploit payload).
Command
for i in $(seq 1 200); do curl --http3 -k https://quic-lab.internal:443/ -o /dev/null -s; done Cleanup
echo 'Transient network traffic only; nothing to clean up.' Expected Telemetry
Inbound UDP/443 QUIC flows to the test host recorded by Zeek/Suricata.
Expected Detection
Network-volume QUIC queries (SPL/AQL/Sumo/EQL) register elevated inbound QUIC flow counts.