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CVE-2026-104099

Fabio Access-Control Bypass via Unnormalized Request Paths (CVE-2026-104099)

Initial Access Stealth Last updated:

Detects attempts to exploit CVE-2026-104099, an access-control bypass in Fabio (github.com/fabiolb/fabio) versions before 1.7.3. Fabio routes requests to backend services based on path prefixes but failed to normalize request paths before matching ACL/routing rules. An attacker can craft a request path containing dot-segments (../, ./), duplicate slashes (//), encoded separators (%2e, %2f, %2E%2F), trailing dot-segments or mixed-case encodings so that the path Fabio evaluates for access control differs from the path the backend ultimately serves. This lets requests reach protected routes (e.g. /admin, /internal) that a prefix-based ACL was intended to block (CWE-41 path equivalence, CWE-289 authentication bypass by alternate name, CWE-863 incorrect authorization). The detection looks for unnormalized path artifacts in HTTP requests traversing Fabio, especially where the request succeeds (2xx/3xx) against sensitive route prefixes. Upgrade to Fabio 1.7.3 or 1.8.0.

Vulnerability Intelligence

Theoretical

CVSS

9.1
Critical (9.0–10)
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

What is CVE-2026-104099 Fabio Access-Control Bypass via Unnormalized Request Paths (CVE-2026-104099)?

Fabio Access-Control Bypass via Unnormalized Request Paths (CVE-2026-104099) (CVE-2026-104099) maps to the Initial Access and Stealth tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.

This page provides production-ready detection logic for Fabio Access-Control Bypass via Unnormalized Request Paths (CVE-2026-104099), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: IIS/Web proxy access logs, HTTP reverse-proxy logs. The queries below are rated high severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Stealth
Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
kusto
// df00tech DF00-e99bec3351 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-104099 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
let sensitivePrefixes = dynamic(["/admin", "/internal", "/manage", "/actuator", "/metrics", "/private"]);
let pathEquivChars = dynamic(["../", "..%2f", "..%2F", "%2e%2e", "%2E%2E", "%2f", "%2F", "//", "/./", "/.%2f", ";/"]);
W3CIISLog
| where csUriStem has_any (pathEquivChars) or cs_uri_query has_any (pathEquivChars)
| where csUriStem matches regex @"(?i)(\.\.[/\\]|%2e%2e|%2f%2f|//|/\./)"
| where tolower(csUriStem) has_any (sensitivePrefixes) or tolower(cs_uri_query) has_any (sensitivePrefixes)
| extend SuspiciousPath = csUriStem, Method = csMethod, Status = scStatus
| where Status < 400
| project TimeGenerated, cIP, csMethod, SuspiciousPath, cs_uri_query, scStatus, csUserAgent, csHost
| sort by TimeGenerated desc

Flags HTTP requests through Fabio-fronted services where the request path contains dot-segment, duplicate-slash or percent-encoded separator artifacts targeting sensitive route prefixes and returning a non-error status, indicating a possible ACL bypass.

high severity medium confidence

Data Sources

IIS/Web proxy access logs HTTP reverse-proxy logs

Required Tables

W3CIISLog

False Positives

  • Legitimate applications that use relative paths or double slashes in URLs for routing or caching
  • Automated vulnerability scanners and security assessment tools probing path traversal
  • Misconfigured clients or SDKs that emit non-normalized URLs
  • CDN or edge caches that rewrite paths with encoded segments

Query fingerprint DF00-e99bec3351 · licence

Sigma logsource & community rules

The detection logic for Fabio Access-Control Bypass via Unnormalized Request Paths (CVE-2026-104099) (CVE-2026-104099) above is provided in a vendor-neutral form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the following logsource:

logsource:
  category: network_connection
  product: windows

Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Dot-segment path bypass against protected prefix

    Expected signal: Fabio access log entry with raw path /public/../admin/health; backend log showing /admin/health served.

  2. Test 2 Percent-encoded separator bypass

    Expected signal: Access log entry containing %2f%2e%2e%2f against the /internal route; backend serves /internal/config.

  3. Test 3 Duplicate-slash prefix bypass

    Expected signal: Access log with path //actuator/env; backend serves /actuator/env.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm the Fabio version fronting the targeted service; versions < 1.7.3 are vulnerable. Check `fabio -version` or the deployment manifest.
  2. Decode the suspicious request path fully (recursively URL-decode and normalize dot-segments) and compare the ACL-evaluated path vs. the backend-served path to confirm they diverge.
  3. Determine which backend route the request actually reached and whether it is a protected/sensitive endpoint intended to be blocked by Fabio routing ACLs.
  4. Review the HTTP response status and size, a 2xx/3xx against a sensitive prefix indicates the bypass likely succeeded.

Containment

  1. Upgrade Fabio to 1.7.3 or 1.8.0, which normalize request paths before ACL/route matching.
  2. As an interim mitigation, place a path-normalizing WAF or front proxy ahead of Fabio to reject or canonicalize dot-segments, duplicate slashes and encoded separators.
  3. Block the offending source IP(s) at the edge if active exploitation is confirmed.

Evidence Collection

  1. Preserve Fabio access logs and backend application logs correlating the raw request path with the served route.
  2. Capture full request/response pairs (headers, path, query, status, body size) for the flagged events.
  3. Record the running Fabio version, route table (/api/routes) and ACL configuration at time of incident.

Escalation Criteria

  • ! Escalate to incident response if a sensitive/administrative endpoint returned a successful response to an unnormalized path.
  • ! Escalate if evidence shows data exfiltration, configuration change or privileged action performed via a bypassed route.
  • ! Escalate if the same technique is observed across multiple services or from multiple source IPs, indicating coordinated exploitation.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • > Fabio access logs showing raw (unnormalized) request paths
  • > Backend application access logs showing the normalized served path
  • > Fabio route table and ACL configuration (/api/routes, consul tags)

Tuning Guidance

Start by baselining which applications legitimately emit double slashes or relative segments and exclude those paths. Tighten the sensitive-prefix list to the actual protected routes in your Fabio route table. Consider alerting only on successful (status < 400) responses to reduce scanner noise, and raise severity when the served backend route differs from the ACL-evaluated path. Correlate with user-agent to separate known scanners from targeted attempts.


Hunting Queries

Surface all requests containing path-equivalence artifacts to baseline normal vs. suspicious usage before narrowing to sensitive prefixes.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-e99bec3351 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-104099 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csUriStem matches regex @"(?i)(%2e%2e|%2f%2f|\.\./|/\./)" | summarize count() by csUriStem, cIP, scStatus | sort by count_ desc
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-e99bec3351 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-104099 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web (sourcetype="fabio:access" OR sourcetype="access_combined") | regex uri_path="(?i)(%2e%2e|%2f%2f|\.\./|/\./)" | stats count by uri_path, src_ip, status | sort - count

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Dot-segment path bypass against protected prefix
linux

Sends a request with embedded dot-segments so Fabio's ACL evaluates a benign prefix while the backend serves a protected route.

Command

bash
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' 'http://fabio.lab:9999/public/../admin/health'

Cleanup

bash
echo 'no cleanup required (read-only request)'

Expected Telemetry

Fabio access log entry with raw path /public/../admin/health; backend log showing /admin/health served.

Expected Detection

KQL/SPL rule matches on '../' artifact against the /admin sensitive prefix with status < 400.

Test 2 Percent-encoded separator bypass
linux

Uses URL-encoded dot and slash sequences to evade prefix-based ACL matching.

Command

bash
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' 'http://fabio.lab:9999/public%2f%2e%2e%2finternal/config'

Cleanup

bash
echo 'no cleanup required'

Expected Telemetry

Access log entry containing %2f%2e%2e%2f against the /internal route; backend serves /internal/config.

Expected Detection

Detection matches '%2f'/'%2e%2e' encoded artifacts against /internal prefix.

Test 3 Duplicate-slash prefix bypass
linux

Exploits unnormalized duplicate slashes to reach a protected actuator endpoint.

Command

bash
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' 'http://fabio.lab:9999//actuator/env'

Cleanup

bash
echo 'no cleanup required'

Expected Telemetry

Access log with path //actuator/env; backend serves /actuator/env.

Expected Detection

Detection matches '//' artifact against /actuator prefix with successful response.

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