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CVE-2026-104099 Splunk · SPL

Detect Fabio Access-Control Bypass via Unnormalized Request Paths (CVE-2026-104099) in Splunk

Detects attempts to exploit CVE-2026-104099, an access-control bypass in Fabio (github.com/fabiolb/fabio) versions before 1.7.3. Fabio routes requests to backend services based on path prefixes but failed to normalize request paths before matching ACL/routing rules. An attacker can craft a request path containing dot-segments (../, ./), duplicate slashes (//), encoded separators (%2e, %2f, %2E%2F), trailing dot-segments or mixed-case encodings so that the path Fabio evaluates for access control differs from the path the backend ultimately serves. This lets requests reach protected routes (e.g. /admin, /internal) that a prefix-based ACL was intended to block (CWE-41 path equivalence, CWE-289 authentication bypass by alternate name, CWE-863 incorrect authorization). The detection looks for unnormalized path artifacts in HTTP requests traversing Fabio, especially where the request succeeds (2xx/3xx) against sensitive route prefixes. Upgrade to Fabio 1.7.3 or 1.8.0.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Stealth

SPL Detection Query

Splunk (SPL)
spl
``` df00tech DF00-e99bec3351 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-104099 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web (sourcetype="fabio:access" OR sourcetype="haproxy:http" OR sourcetype="access_combined")
| regex uri_path="(?i)(\.\.[\/\\]|%2e%2e|%2f%2f|\/\/|\/\.\/|;\/)"
| eval sensitive=if(match(lower(uri_path), "\/(admin|internal|manage|actuator|metrics|private)"), 1, 0)
| where sensitive=1 AND status<400
| stats count min(_time) as firstSeen max(_time) as lastSeen values(uri_path) as paths values(status) as statuses by src_ip http_method http_host
| convert ctime(firstSeen) ctime(lastSeen)
| sort - count
high severity medium confidence

Identifies requests to Fabio-fronted sensitive route prefixes that carry unnormalized path artifacts and succeed, consistent with CVE-2026-104099 access-control bypass.

Data Sources

Fabio access logsHTTP reverse-proxy logs

Required Sourcetypes

fabio:accesshaproxy:httpaccess_combined

False Positives & Tuning

  • Legitimate relative or double-slash paths produced by frontend frameworks
  • Security scanners exercising traversal payloads
  • Buggy clients emitting non-canonical URLs
  • Edge/CDN path rewriting introducing encoded separators

Other platforms for CVE-2026-104099


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Dot-segment path bypass against protected prefix

    Expected signal: Fabio access log entry with raw path /public/../admin/health; backend log showing /admin/health served.

  2. Test 2 Percent-encoded separator bypass

    Expected signal: Access log entry containing %2f%2e%2e%2f against the /internal route; backend serves /internal/config.

  3. Test 3 Duplicate-slash prefix bypass

    Expected signal: Access log with path //actuator/env; backend serves /actuator/env.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Confirm the Fabio version fronting the targeted service; versions < 1.7.3 are vulnerable. Check `fabio -version` or the deployment manifest.
  2. Decode the suspicious request path fully (recursively URL-decode and normalize dot-segments) and compare the ACL-evaluated path vs. the backend-served path to confirm they diverge.
  3. Determine which backend route the request actually reached and whether it is a protected/sensitive endpoint intended to be blocked by Fabio routing ACLs.
  4. Review the HTTP response status and size, a 2xx/3xx against a sensitive prefix indicates the bypass likely succeeded.

Containment

  1. Upgrade Fabio to 1.7.3 or 1.8.0, which normalize request paths before ACL/route matching.
  2. As an interim mitigation, place a path-normalizing WAF or front proxy ahead of Fabio to reject or canonicalize dot-segments, duplicate slashes and encoded separators.
  3. Block the offending source IP(s) at the edge if active exploitation is confirmed.

Evidence Collection

  1. Preserve Fabio access logs and backend application logs correlating the raw request path with the served route.
  2. Capture full request/response pairs (headers, path, query, status, body size) for the flagged events.
  3. Record the running Fabio version, route table (/api/routes) and ACL configuration at time of incident.

Escalation Criteria

  • !Escalate to incident response if a sensitive/administrative endpoint returned a successful response to an unnormalized path.
  • !Escalate if evidence shows data exfiltration, configuration change or privileged action performed via a bypassed route.
  • !Escalate if the same technique is observed across multiple services or from multiple source IPs, indicating coordinated exploitation.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • >Fabio access logs showing raw (unnormalized) request paths
  • >Backend application access logs showing the normalized served path
  • >Fabio route table and ACL configuration (/api/routes, consul tags)

Tuning Guidance

Start by baselining which applications legitimately emit double slashes or relative segments and exclude those paths. Tighten the sensitive-prefix list to the actual protected routes in your Fabio route table. Consider alerting only on successful (status < 400) responses to reduce scanner noise, and raise severity when the served backend route differs from the ACL-evaluated path. Correlate with user-agent to separate known scanners from targeted attempts.


Hunting Queries

Surface all requests containing path-equivalence artifacts to baseline normal vs. suspicious usage before narrowing to sensitive prefixes.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-e99bec3351 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-104099 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csUriStem matches regex @"(?i)(%2e%2e|%2f%2f|\.\./|/\./)" | summarize count() by csUriStem, cIP, scStatus | sort by count_ desc
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-e99bec3351 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-104099 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web (sourcetype="fabio:access" OR sourcetype="access_combined") | regex uri_path="(?i)(%2e%2e|%2f%2f|\.\./|/\./)" | stats count by uri_path, src_ip, status | sort - count

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Dot-segment path bypass against protected prefix
linux

Sends a request with embedded dot-segments so Fabio's ACL evaluates a benign prefix while the backend serves a protected route.

Command

bash
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' 'http://fabio.lab:9999/public/../admin/health'

Cleanup

bash
echo 'no cleanup required (read-only request)'

Expected Telemetry

Fabio access log entry with raw path /public/../admin/health; backend log showing /admin/health served.

Expected Detection

KQL/SPL rule matches on '../' artifact against the /admin sensitive prefix with status < 400.

Test 2 Percent-encoded separator bypass
linux

Uses URL-encoded dot and slash sequences to evade prefix-based ACL matching.

Command

bash
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' 'http://fabio.lab:9999/public%2f%2e%2e%2finternal/config'

Cleanup

bash
echo 'no cleanup required'

Expected Telemetry

Access log entry containing %2f%2e%2e%2f against the /internal route; backend serves /internal/config.

Expected Detection

Detection matches '%2f'/'%2e%2e' encoded artifacts against /internal prefix.

Test 3 Duplicate-slash prefix bypass
linux

Exploits unnormalized duplicate slashes to reach a protected actuator endpoint.

Command

bash
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' 'http://fabio.lab:9999//actuator/env'

Cleanup

bash
echo 'no cleanup required'

Expected Telemetry

Access log with path //actuator/env; backend serves /actuator/env.

Expected Detection

Detection matches '//' artifact against /actuator prefix with successful response.

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