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Upgrade to ProDetect Langflow Untrusted Code Execution via CVE-2026-0770 (CWE-829) in CrowdStrike LogScale
Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-0770, an Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere vulnerability in Langflow that allows unauthenticated or low-privileged actors to trigger execution of code, components, or custom nodes sourced from an untrusted control sphere. This flaw is listed in CISA KEV with a public exploit-db PoC and is actively exploited. Exploitation typically manifests as unexpected outbound connections from the Langflow host to fetch remote component definitions, followed by anomalous child process spawns from the Langflow server process, or webhook/API calls to Langflow's flow-execution and custom component endpoints from untrusted sources.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Initial Access Execution
LogScale Detection Query
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| ParentBaseFileName="*langflow*" OR ImageFileName="*langflow*"
| in(field=FileName, values=["bash", "sh", "python", "python3", "powershell.exe", "cmd.exe", "curl", "wget"])
| CommandLine="*custom_component*" OR CommandLine="*exec(*" OR CommandLine="*eval(*" OR true
| table([ComputerName, ParentBaseFileName, FileName, CommandLine, UserName, timestamp])
| sort(timestamp, order=desc)Detects process rollup events showing a Langflow parent process launching shell or scripting interpreters, particularly with command lines referencing custom component loading or exec/eval calls, indicative of CVE-2026-0770 exploitation.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Legitimate developer workflows building or testing custom Langflow components
- Scheduled administrative tasks executed under the Langflow service account
- Security tooling or EDR agents themselves invoking shell utilities near the Langflow process tree
Other platforms for CVE-2026-0770
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Simulate Langflow custom component remote fetch
Expected signal: Outbound HTTP/S connection from a process associated with the Langflow environment to an external GitHub raw content URL, captured in network/proxy logs.
- Test 2Simulate shell spawn from Langflow parent process
Expected signal: Process creation event showing a bash child process spawned by a python3 process whose lineage/name references 'langflow', captured via Sysmon/EDR process telemetry.
- Test 3Simulate encoded PowerShell execution from Langflow process (Windows)
Expected signal: Process creation event for powershell.exe with -EncodedCommand flag, ideally spawned by or associated with a process/service named 'langflow', captured in Windows Security/Sysmon Event ID 4688/1.
References (5)
- https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/releases/tag/v1.9.0
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0770
- https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/52597
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