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Upgrade to ProDetect Langflow Untrusted Code Execution via CVE-2026-0770 (CWE-829) in Google Chronicle
Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-0770, an Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere vulnerability in Langflow that allows unauthenticated or low-privileged actors to trigger execution of code, components, or custom nodes sourced from an untrusted control sphere. This flaw is listed in CISA KEV with a public exploit-db PoC and is actively exploited. Exploitation typically manifests as unexpected outbound connections from the Langflow host to fetch remote component definitions, followed by anomalous child process spawns from the Langflow server process, or webhook/API calls to Langflow's flow-execution and custom component endpoints from untrusted sources.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Initial Access Execution
YARA-L Detection Query
rule cve_2026_0770_langflow_untrusted_exec {
meta:
author = "detection-engineering"
description = "Detects Langflow process spawning shell/interpreter children consistent with CVE-2026-0770 exploitation"
severity = "CRITICAL"
events:
$proc.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
$proc.principal.process.parent_process.file.full_path = /langflow/ nocase
$proc.target.process.file.full_path = /(bash|sh|python|powershell\.exe|cmd\.exe|curl|wget)/ nocase
outcome:
$risk_score = 85
condition:
$proc
}YARA-L rule flagging process-launch events where a Langflow parent process creates a shell, scripting, or downloader child process, aligning with untrusted-code-inclusion exploitation of CVE-2026-0770.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Authorized Langflow custom component installs by platform administrators
- Legitimate automated deployment tooling invoking shell commands under the Langflow service account
- Test/staging environments intentionally exercising component-loading code paths
Other platforms for CVE-2026-0770
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Simulate Langflow custom component remote fetch
Expected signal: Outbound HTTP/S connection from a process associated with the Langflow environment to an external GitHub raw content URL, captured in network/proxy logs.
- Test 2Simulate shell spawn from Langflow parent process
Expected signal: Process creation event showing a bash child process spawned by a python3 process whose lineage/name references 'langflow', captured via Sysmon/EDR process telemetry.
- Test 3Simulate encoded PowerShell execution from Langflow process (Windows)
Expected signal: Process creation event for powershell.exe with -EncodedCommand flag, ideally spawned by or associated with a process/service named 'langflow', captured in Windows Security/Sysmon Event ID 4688/1.
References (5)
- https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/releases/tag/v1.9.0
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0770
- https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/52597
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