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CVE-2026-0770 Elastic Security · Elastic

Detect Langflow Untrusted Code Execution via CVE-2026-0770 (CWE-829) in Elastic Security

Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-0770, an Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere vulnerability in Langflow that allows unauthenticated or low-privileged actors to trigger execution of code, components, or custom nodes sourced from an untrusted control sphere. This flaw is listed in CISA KEV with a public exploit-db PoC and is actively exploited. Exploitation typically manifests as unexpected outbound connections from the Langflow host to fetch remote component definitions, followed by anomalous child process spawns from the Langflow server process, or webhook/API calls to Langflow's flow-execution and custom component endpoints from untrusted sources.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Execution

Elastic Detection Query

Elastic Security (Elastic)
eql
sequence by host.name with maxspan=5m
  [network where process.executable : "*langflow*" and
    not cidrmatch(destination.ip, "10.0.0.0/8", "172.16.0.0/12", "192.168.0.0/16", "127.0.0.0/8")]
  [process where event.type == "start" and
    process.parent.executable : "*langflow*" and
    process.name : ("bash", "sh", "python*", "powershell.exe", "cmd.exe", "curl", "wget")]
critical severity medium confidence

Sequences an outbound network connection from the Langflow process to an external host followed within 5 minutes by a shell or interpreter process spawned by Langflow, consistent with fetching and executing untrusted component code.

Data Sources

Elastic Endpoint network eventsElastic Endpoint process events

Required Tables

networkprocess

False Positives & Tuning

  • Authorized developers pulling and testing external Langflow flow templates
  • Legitimate outbound calls to package registries during approved dependency updates
  • Automated integration tests exercising Langflow's component-loading API

Other platforms for CVE-2026-0770


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Simulate Langflow custom component remote fetch

    Expected signal: Outbound HTTP/S connection from a process associated with the Langflow environment to an external GitHub raw content URL, captured in network/proxy logs.

  2. Test 2Simulate shell spawn from Langflow parent process

    Expected signal: Process creation event showing a bash child process spawned by a python3 process whose lineage/name references 'langflow', captured via Sysmon/EDR process telemetry.

  3. Test 3Simulate encoded PowerShell execution from Langflow process (Windows)

    Expected signal: Process creation event for powershell.exe with -EncodedCommand flag, ideally spawned by or associated with a process/service named 'langflow', captured in Windows Security/Sysmon Event ID 4688/1.

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