Detect Google Chromium V8 Type Confusion Exploitation (CVE-2025-13223) in IBM QRadar
Detects exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2025-13223, a type confusion vulnerability (CWE-843) in Google Chromium's V8 JavaScript engine. This KEV-listed vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page. Exploitation typically involves a malicious web page triggering memory corruption through confused object type handling in V8, leading to sandbox escape or remote code execution within the browser process.
MITRE ATT&CK
QRadar Detection Query
SELECT
DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS event_time,
"sourceip",
"username",
"Application" AS parent_process,
QIDNAME(qid) AS event_name,
"Process Name" AS child_process,
"Command" AS command_line,
logsourcename(logsourceid) AS log_source
FROM events
WHERE LOGSOURCETYPENAME(devicetype) IN ('Microsoft Windows Security Event Log', 'Sysmon')
AND (
("Application" ILIKE '%chrome.exe%' OR "Application" ILIKE '%msedge.exe%' OR "Application" ILIKE '%brave.exe%')
AND
("Process Name" ILIKE '%cmd.exe%'
OR "Process Name" ILIKE '%powershell.exe%'
OR "Process Name" ILIKE '%wscript.exe%'
OR "Process Name" ILIKE '%mshta.exe%'
OR "Process Name" ILIKE '%rundll32.exe%'
OR "Process Name" ILIKE '%regsvr32.exe%'
OR "Process Name" ILIKE '%certutil.exe%'
OR "Process Name" ILIKE '%cscript.exe%')
)
AND LOGSOURCENAME(logsourceid) NOT ILIKE '%test%'
AND starttime > NOW() - 24 HOURS
ORDER BY starttime DESC
LIMIT 500QRadar AQL query identifying Chromium-based browser processes spawning suspicious child processes consistent with sandbox escape following CVE-2025-13223 V8 type confusion exploitation.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Electron-based desktop applications that embed Chromium and spawn cmd or PowerShell for legitimate feature operations
- Browser automation jobs in development or QA environments running against this endpoint
- Help desk or remote support tools that integrate with browsers and invoke shell commands
- Enterprise endpoint management agents that spawn processes from browser extension contexts
Other platforms for CVE-2025-13223
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Simulate V8 Sandbox Escape - Chrome Spawning cmd.exe
Expected signal: Sysmon EventID 1 (ProcessCreate) with ParentImage matching chrome.exe and Image matching cmd.exe; DeviceProcessEvents in MDE showing FileName=cmd.exe with InitiatingProcessFileName=chrome.exe
- Test 2Browser Process Network Beacon Simulation Post-Exploitation
Expected signal: Sysmon EventID 3 (NetworkConnect) with Image=powershell.exe, ParentImage=chrome.exe (or powershell spawned in context of test), DestinationIp=192.0.2.1, DestinationPort=4444; DeviceNetworkEvents with InitiatingProcessFileName=powershell.exe
- Test 3Chrome Crash Dump Generation - Exploitation Indicator Simulation
Expected signal: Sysmon EventID 11 (FileCreate) events for each .dmp file creation in the Crashpad reports directory; DeviceFileEvents with FileName ending in .dmp and FolderPath containing Crashpad
- Test 4Linux - Chromium Renderer Child Process Spawn Simulation
Expected signal: Linux audit log (auditd) or Sysdig/Falco events showing bash or sh spawned with ppid matching chromium-browser process; EDR telemetry (CrowdStrike Falcon for Linux, SentinelOne) recording process lineage
Unlock Pro Content
Get the full detection package for CVE-2025-13223 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.