CVE-2025-13223 Elastic Security · Elastic

Detect Google Chromium V8 Type Confusion Exploitation (CVE-2025-13223) in Elastic Security

Detects exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2025-13223, a type confusion vulnerability (CWE-843) in Google Chromium's V8 JavaScript engine. This KEV-listed vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page. Exploitation typically involves a malicious web page triggering memory corruption through confused object type handling in V8, leading to sandbox escape or remote code execution within the browser process.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Execution Defense Evasion

Elastic Detection Query

Elastic Security (Elastic)
eql
sequence by host.name with maxspan=2m
  [process where event.type == "start"
    and process.name : ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "brave.exe", "chromium.exe")
    and process.parent.name : ("explorer.exe", "svchost.exe", "userinit.exe")]
  [process where event.type == "start"
    and process.parent.name : ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "brave.exe", "chromium.exe")
    and process.name : ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe",
                         "mshta.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "certutil.exe",
                         "bitsadmin.exe", "wmic.exe", "msiexec.exe", "schtasks.exe")]
critical severity medium confidence

EQL sequence query detecting the two-event chain of a Chromium-based browser launching and then spawning a suspicious process, indicative of V8 type confusion exploitation (CVE-2025-13223) leading to sandbox escape within a 2-minute window.

Data Sources

Elastic Endpoint SecurityWinlogbeat with Sysmon

Required Tables

logs-endpoint.events.process-*winlogbeat-*

False Positives & Tuning

  • Legitimate Electron applications embedding Chromium that spawn system utilities during updates or normal operation
  • Browser-based enterprise software portals that use shell integration features on managed endpoints
  • Automated testing pipelines using headless Chrome with intentional process spawning
  • Security tools that hook into browser processes for DLP or content inspection purposes

Other platforms for CVE-2025-13223


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Simulate V8 Sandbox Escape - Chrome Spawning cmd.exe

    Expected signal: Sysmon EventID 1 (ProcessCreate) with ParentImage matching chrome.exe and Image matching cmd.exe; DeviceProcessEvents in MDE showing FileName=cmd.exe with InitiatingProcessFileName=chrome.exe

  2. Test 2Browser Process Network Beacon Simulation Post-Exploitation

    Expected signal: Sysmon EventID 3 (NetworkConnect) with Image=powershell.exe, ParentImage=chrome.exe (or powershell spawned in context of test), DestinationIp=192.0.2.1, DestinationPort=4444; DeviceNetworkEvents with InitiatingProcessFileName=powershell.exe

  3. Test 3Chrome Crash Dump Generation - Exploitation Indicator Simulation

    Expected signal: Sysmon EventID 11 (FileCreate) events for each .dmp file creation in the Crashpad reports directory; DeviceFileEvents with FileName ending in .dmp and FolderPath containing Crashpad

  4. Test 4Linux - Chromium Renderer Child Process Spawn Simulation

    Expected signal: Linux audit log (auditd) or Sysdig/Falco events showing bash or sh spawned with ppid matching chromium-browser process; EDR telemetry (CrowdStrike Falcon for Linux, SentinelOne) recording process lineage

Unlock Pro Content

Get the full detection package for CVE-2025-13223 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.

Response PlaybookInvestigation GuideHunting QueriesAtomic Red Team TestsTuning Guidance

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