CVE-2025-13223 Google Chronicle · YARA-L

Detect Google Chromium V8 Type Confusion Exploitation (CVE-2025-13223) in Google Chronicle

Detects exploitation attempts targeting CVE-2025-13223, a type confusion vulnerability (CWE-843) in Google Chromium's V8 JavaScript engine. This KEV-listed vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page. Exploitation typically involves a malicious web page triggering memory corruption through confused object type handling in V8, leading to sandbox escape or remote code execution within the browser process.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Initial Access Execution Defense Evasion

YARA-L Detection Query

Google Chronicle (YARA-L)
yaral
rule cve_2025_13223_chromium_v8_type_confusion {
  meta:
    author = "df00tech Detection Engineering"
    description = "Detects suspicious child processes spawned by Chromium-based browsers, indicative of CVE-2025-13223 V8 type confusion exploitation and sandbox escape"
    severity = "CRITICAL"
    priority = "HIGH"
    reference = "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13223"
    cve = "CVE-2025-13223"

  events:
    $spawn.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
    $spawn.principal.process.file.full_path = /(?i)(chrome|msedge|brave|chromium)\.exe$/
    $spawn.target.process.file.full_path = /(?i)(cmd|powershell|wscript|cscript|mshta|rundll32|regsvr32|certutil|bitsadmin|wmic|msiexec)\.exe$/

  condition:
    $spawn
}
critical severity medium confidence

Chronicle YARA-L 2.0 rule detecting Chromium-based browser processes spawning command interpreters or living-off-the-land binaries, consistent with sandbox escape exploitation of CVE-2025-13223.

Data Sources

Chronicle UDM Process EventsGoogle Workspace / Endpoint telemetry

Required Tables

UDM Process Events

False Positives & Tuning

  • Electron-based applications bundling Chromium that legitimately spawn shell processes (VS Code, Slack)
  • Headless Chrome automation running on monitored endpoints for scraping or testing
  • Enterprise browser management solutions that spawn helper utilities from Chromium contexts
  • Browser extension management tools that invoke command-line utilities via browser APIs

Other platforms for CVE-2025-13223


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Simulate V8 Sandbox Escape - Chrome Spawning cmd.exe

    Expected signal: Sysmon EventID 1 (ProcessCreate) with ParentImage matching chrome.exe and Image matching cmd.exe; DeviceProcessEvents in MDE showing FileName=cmd.exe with InitiatingProcessFileName=chrome.exe

  2. Test 2Browser Process Network Beacon Simulation Post-Exploitation

    Expected signal: Sysmon EventID 3 (NetworkConnect) with Image=powershell.exe, ParentImage=chrome.exe (or powershell spawned in context of test), DestinationIp=192.0.2.1, DestinationPort=4444; DeviceNetworkEvents with InitiatingProcessFileName=powershell.exe

  3. Test 3Chrome Crash Dump Generation - Exploitation Indicator Simulation

    Expected signal: Sysmon EventID 11 (FileCreate) events for each .dmp file creation in the Crashpad reports directory; DeviceFileEvents with FileName ending in .dmp and FolderPath containing Crashpad

  4. Test 4Linux - Chromium Renderer Child Process Spawn Simulation

    Expected signal: Linux audit log (auditd) or Sysdig/Falco events showing bash or sh spawned with ppid matching chromium-browser process; EDR telemetry (CrowdStrike Falcon for Linux, SentinelOne) recording process lineage

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Get the full detection package for CVE-2025-13223 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.

Response PlaybookInvestigation GuideHunting QueriesAtomic Red Team TestsTuning Guidance

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