Response playbooks, investigation guides, and Atomic Red Team tests are Pro-only. Upgrade to unlock the full detection package for THREAT-PasteSite-TextStorageExfil.

Upgrade to Pro
THREAT-PasteSite-TextStorageExfil Sumo Logic CSE · Sumo

Detect Data Exfiltration to Public Paste and Text-Storage Sites in Sumo Logic CSE

Public paste and text-storage sites — Pastebin, Ghostbin, Rentry, Hastebin, dpaste, paste.ee, and similar services — let anyone post arbitrary text via a simple HTTPS POST with no authentication and no account required. Unlike code-repository exfiltration (T1567.001, e.g. GitHub Gist, which requires an account and leaves attributable commit metadata) or cloud-storage exfiltration (T1567.002, e.g. S3/Azure Blob, which requires provisioned storage and credentials), paste sites are frictionless: an adversary drops one HTTP request and the data is live at a public URL within seconds. Web-filtering categorization rarely blocks them (most proxies bucket paste sites under 'technology' or 'reference', not 'file sharing' or 'uploads'), and the destination is TLS-encrypted, so DLP tooling that inspects only unencrypted egress or that keys off file-sharing categories misses it entirely. This makes paste sites a favorite low-effort channel for two distinct actor classes: commodity infostealers (RedLine, Vidar, LummaC2 builders have shipped configurations that POST harvested credential/cookie logs directly to Pastebin's API endpoint) and extortion/data-leak operators (LAPSUS$ and similar groups have posted proof-of-compromise source-code snippets and credential dumps to paste sites as pre-ransom leverage before standing up a dedicated leak site). The detection signal is a non-browser process — a script interpreter, a compiled malware binary, or an automation tool that has no legitimate reason to post to a paste service — issuing an HTTPS connection to a paste-site domain, particularly one immediately following bulk file or credential-store access.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Exfiltration

Sumo Detection Query

Sumo Logic CSE (Sumo)
sql
_sourceCategory=network/proxy
| parse "src_ip=*," as src_ip nodrop
| parse "url=*," as url nodrop
| parse "process_name=*," as process_name nodrop
| where url matches "*pastebin.com*" or url matches "*paste.ee*" or url matches "*ghostbin.com*" or url matches "*rentry.co*" or url matches "*hastebin.com*"
| where !(process_name in ("chrome.exe", "msedge.exe", "firefox.exe", "brave.exe", "opera.exe"))
| count as ConnectionCount, values(url) as Domains by src_ip, process_name
| sort by ConnectionCount desc
high severity medium confidence

Sumo Logic query over proxy logs flagging non-browser processes connecting to known paste-site domains, parsed from the raw proxy log field set.

Data Sources

Web proxy logs with process attributionSumo Logic Cloud SIEM

Required Tables

_sourceCategory=network/proxy

False Positives & Tuning

  • Developers or researchers legitimately sharing code/config snippets via a CLI tool rather than a browser
  • CI/CD pipelines uploading build logs to an approved paste service
  • Leaked-credential monitoring tools issuing read-only GET requests to paste sites

Other platforms for THREAT-PasteSite-TextStorageExfil


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Simulated Non-Browser POST to a Paste-Site-Style Endpoint

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 3 (Network Connection) / DeviceNetworkEvents: powershell.exe connecting to 127.0.0.1:8443 with a RemoteUrl resembling a paste-API path. If a local test listener is running, its logs will show the POST body containing the synthetic credential payload.

  2. Test 2Repeated Paste-Style Connections from a Temp-Directory Binary

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: update_helper.exe (a copy of powershell.exe) executing from %TEMP%\atomic_paste_test\. Sysmon Event ID 3: three network connection events to the test endpoint spaced ~5 seconds apart, initiated by the temp-directory binary.

  3. Test 3Bulk File Staging Followed by Paste-Style Post

    Expected signal: Process creation for tar and curl; a network connection event (Sysmon-for-Linux Event ID 3 / auditd network record) from curl to the test endpoint within seconds of the archive being written to /tmp.

Unlock playbooks & atomic tests with Pro

Get the full detection package for THREAT-PasteSite-TextStorageExfil — response playbook and atomic red team tests, plus investigation guidance and hunting queries.

df00tech Pro — £29/user/month

Response PlaybookInvestigation GuideHunting QueriesAtomic Red Team TestsTuning Guidance

Related Detections

Detection Variants (1)

Different telemetry and tradecraft for the same technique — pick the one that matches the data you collect.